Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region by Maksut, Kuralay
       
 
Kuralay Maksut 
Tese de doutoramento 
 
 Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic in Central Asian region 
Departamento de Ciencia Política e da Administración 
Facultade de Ciencias Políticas e Sociais 
Santiago de Compostela  
2014 
1 
 
Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region  
at the contemporary stage  
CONTENT 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS      4 
I. Research background and theoretical framework   5-21 
 
II. Institutional analysis: Eurasia -two continents and one region 
A. Institutional changes in Central Asian countries   22-24 
B. “Non Statehood” European Union and International relations  25-31 
C. Similarities, peculiarities, converging issues and diverging policies  32-44 
D. Slovak institutional and political reshapes    45-59 
E. Czech Presidency in EU – Czech Government and Institutional Transition 60-67 
 
III. The foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asia 
A. Implementation foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovakia:  
perception of changes.      68-76   
B. The strategy of the European Union in Central Asia   77-91 
C. The objective conditions and prerequisites for the development of relations of Czech   
 Republic and Slovak Republic with Central Asia countries  92-108 
D. Czech approach      109-111 
E. Slovak approach       112-115 
 
IV. The policy analysis in the region  
A. Influence and conditionality of main actors in the region and beyond 116-233 
B. The development of trade, economic, financial, technology transfer and cultural  
 cooperation among Czech and Slovak Republics and Central Asia counties 234-279 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS      280-288 
VI. APPENDICES  
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
 
2 
 
La política exterior de la República Checa y 
Eslovaquia en la región de Asia Central  
 
 
Resumen  
La región de Asia Central postsoviética (antiguas repúblicas socialistas soviéticas que 
comparten fronteras con Afganistán), en particular, la llamada “Gran Asia Central” o “Eurasia 
Balcánica” tiene importancia geopolítica para los actores globales. La zona ha sido centro del 
pluralismo geopolítico y del multiculturalismo, origen de numerosos problemas étnicos y 
tensiones. 
Muchos expertos coinciden en señalar la importancia geoestratégica de Asia Central. Por esta 
razón, se subrayan dos factores fundamentales: en primer lugar, el descubrimiento de las 
reservas de hidrocarburos y en segundo lugar, su transformación en un importante centro de 
transporte que conecta Europa, China, Rusia, la región del Cáucaso, la región del Trans-
Caspio y el Océano Índico. 
Como he señalado en la tesis, la formación institucional, la transformación para el apoyo de la 
economía y la democracia liberal es una tarea difícil para todos los países de la región. Por lo 
que respecta a la calidad institucional, ninguno de estos países han sido capaces de crear 
instituciones que se encuentren al mismo nivel que las organizaciones de los países altamente 
desarrollados. 
La revisión de la política de la UE en Asia Central y en particular, la dirección regional, es 
importante en términos de la identificación de las características, pues evalúa el 
funcionamiento de la acción exterior del conjunto de la UE. 
Al ser miembros de la Unión Europea, la república Checa y la república Eslovaca están 
promoviendo los intereses e ideas de la Unión Europea. Al mismo tiempo, complementan los 
programas y proyectos en diferentes países mediante la ayuda al desarrollo que la UE 
proporciona. Todo ello contribuye a garantizar la seguridad y la estabilidad a nivel global, así 
como a prevenir conflictos en los ámbitos regional y local, además de reducir la migración no 
deseada, proteger el medio ambiente, promover la democracia, el respeto de los derechos 
humanos y libertades fundamentales y, también fortalecer el estado de derecho.  
En esta tesis se presentan los roles de los actores de la región de Asia central, un análisis 
cuantitativo de los países, así como los datos de nivel de cooperación económica y los 
cambios institucionales en los países de la región.  
Con este trabajo se está tratando de componer una tarea aparentemente imposible: la creación 
de la Gran Asia Central en la región asiática, la UE como laboratorio avanzado del enfoque 
del capital político, económico, institucional, social, ambiental, cultural y humano, puesto que 
es una situación muy especial de unión la no condición de estado porque implica la 
colaboración entre países soberanos, independientes, libres. En este gran marco, las 
Repúblicas Checa y Eslovaca representan muy bien cómo conectar el pasado con el futuro, 
con la reverencia a Asia Central, en países  que han sido desde hace mucho parte del llamado 
bloque de la URSS. 
Nadie podría imaginar que las Repúblicas Checa y Eslovaca serían dos pequeños laboratorios 
del Tratado de Roma de 1957, en el que los seis estados fundadores de la UE firmaron un 
tratado. ¿La UE podría convertirse en un posible ejemplo flexible y moderno para una futura 
agregación regional no solo en Europa y Asia, sino también en África, América latina y Asia 
del Pacífico?  
 
Los países de Asia central se centraron en los intereses de los principales actores mundiales y 
esta región, hasta cierto punto, se puede considerar como la “clave” para el futuro geopolítico 
y para la estabilidad de todo el continente de Euroasia. Esta tesis presenta la visión de la 
situación en Asia central, el análisis de los riesgos y desafíos a los que se enfrentan los países 
de la región, describe las posibles vías de desarrollo de la cooperación entre las República 
Checa y República Eslovaca en el contexto de los problemas internos y las influencias 
externas. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: actores internacionales, la importancia geoestratégica, seguridad 
regional, formación institucional, recursos naturales. 
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Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic in Central Asian region   
 
Summary 
Post-Soviet Central Asian region (former Soviet Socialist Republics, sharing borders with 
Afghanistan) in particular, so called “Great Central Asia” or “Eurasian Balkans” according to a 
superficial  Eurasian continent geopolitical importance to global actors. The region has been 
the center of geopolitical pluralism and multiculturalism, which itself engender the ethnic 
problems and tension.  
Many experts are concordant with idea that geo-strategic clarity of Central Asia today has been 
underscored by two principal factors: first, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, 
it has become a major transportation hub connecting Europe, China, Russia, the Caucasus 
region, the Trans-Caspian region and the Indian Ocean.  
We may see how it is indicated in dissertation that the institutional formation and 
transformation for support of economy and liberal democracy is challenging task for all 
countries of region. As for institutional quality none of these countries were capable of 
building institutions which are at the same level as highly developed countries’ institutions.  
Review of EU policy on a particular Central Asia, the regional direction is important in terms 
of identifying the characteristics and evaluates the functioning of the overall EU's external 
action. Being members of European Union the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are 
promoting the interests and ideas of European Union, as well as complementing programs and 
projects in different countries by providing development assistance, which contributes to 
ensure security and stability at the global level as well as conflict prevention at the regional 
and local levels, reduce unwanted migration, the environment, the promotion of democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and strengthening rule of law
.
. External 
actors began to participate more directly in cooperation and support of regional structures due 
to recognition of their interest in the prospering and stable Central Asia. In this thesis are 
presented the roles of actors in Central Asian region, a quantitative analysis of country – level 
data, the data of economic cooperation, and institutional changes in countries of region. This 
dissertation as is trying to compose an apparently impossibly task: Great Central Asian region 
building up; EU most advanced laboratory of political, economic, institutional, social, 
environmental and cultural and human capital approach because it is very special condition of 
non statehood union, that means partnership between sovereign, independent, free countries;  
in this large frame the case of Czech and Slovak Republics very well interpreter how to 
connect the past to the future with reverence to Central Asia, for countries which has been for 
a long part of past century into so called USSR bloc. 
It is now time in the contemporary history, in international relations theories, in transnational 
and regional cooperation experiences, on the way all over the world to make clear the starting 
point of this dissertation, only EU could become a credible, fusible, flexible example and 
modern for future regional aggregation not only in Europe and Asia but also in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia Pacific quagmire.  
In the last process of EU enlargement still undergoing with the last membership of Croatia and 
ongoing negations with Balkan countries, Central and Eastern Europe had assume a great role 
and in bridging problems and incapability, cultural and ideological barriers historical reason of 
conflicts, ethnical and language tensions, as nobody could have imagine as signing the 
founding the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Czech and Slovak republics in this sense are two small 
laboratories what we have said page after page in this dissertation.  
Central Asian countries focused on the interests of the major global players; region to some 
extent can be considered as the ‘key’ to the geopolitical future and stability of the entire Asian 
continent. This dissertation presents the vision of the situation in Central Asia, the analysis of 
the risks and challenges faced by countries in the region, and described possible ways of 
development of cooperation between Czech and Slovak republics in the context of internal 
problems and external influences. 
 
KEYWORDS: international actors, geopolitical importance, regional security, intuitional 
changes, natural recourses.  
4 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
 
I would like to express my profound appreciation to all, for providing an opportunity to 
accomplish this project. 
I would like to express deep feelings of gratitude to my professor and thesis supervisor 
Anton Trabada Losada for his valuable guidance at different stages of this research 
project. I am also grateful to professor Zhuldyz Tulibaeva and professor Tomohiko 
Uyama, head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA Ján Kubiš, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, Professor Dušan Podhorsky, a leading expert of 
the Agency of the Slovak Foreign Policy Ivo Samson. 
I would like to thank my parents and friends, who helped me a lot in finishing project 
within the limited time.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
Research background and theoretical framework 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold, first is to demonstrate approach of institutional 
aspects in Czech Republic and Slovak Republic before joining EU and contemporary 
reshapes, to provide an analysis of gradual transformations and institutional changes 
which are taking place in Central Asian region after the collapse of Former Soviet 
Union, second - theoretical problem analyzed in this research is policy capacities of 
main actors in region. In particular by Haldén’s theoretical approach of “non-statehood” 
of EU, this thesis will attempt to propose the analysis of conceptual framework of 
different actors’ relations, thus by Losada’s relevance of actors’ role, connected with 
assessment of institutional factors, we can consider Czech and Slovak Republics as 
‘small laboratories’ that have mediation and integration role of differences not only in 
politics and economics for Central Asian regional but also being example for building 
up by adopting of the EU non statehood to this very different part of Eurasia.  
The background of this project has emphasized on the role of institutions. As Losada in 
his La Politica del Mar, has identified, “the importance of institutions for analysis of 
politics and its outcomes of an intentional action developed under external restrictions, 
therefore have a subjective component: are intentioned and depend on the perceptions 
and preferences of affected individuals, who in turn act as a function of their perception 
of reality, the definition of its opinion interests and values and its own regulations 
6 
 
convictions about what is beneficial, good and right and due”, therefore the institutions 
have influence and effect on rule of law, property rights, honest and transparent 
government, freedom of press, open markets.  
The thesis statement is about influence of operative and credible institutions to meet a 
large degree of consent, such innovations and development should necessarily be rooted 
in and grows mainly out of political traditional processes in order to fulfill their tasks at 
national and international levels.  
These expectations are probably more linked to the aspect of concrete programs and 
agreements that would finally give a boost to the industrial development, the economic 
growth and the social market economy advancements, in this case the examples of 
Czech and Slovak Republics for Central Asia are becoming more important.  
Research problem under investigation shows acknowledgment according to Gritcenko 
that complete change of the structure of political institutions is not possible in short 
period of time; especially it concerns the role of institutional factors in transitional 
processes of Central Asia. It is essential for post-socialist countries the further 
successful institutional development, formation of regulations, procedures, and 
institutional changes (Gritcenko, 2005).  
The research and studies of EU policy in Central Asia have a scientific and serious 
practical interest. Central Asian is at the center of the Eurasian continent, with no ocean 
and continuity divide since ever, is unquestionably substantial, economic and optional 
geopolitical crossroads. Its conceptualization has been modified in various ways: in this 
context and frame we could better summarize the region ideal as a “Greater Central 
Asia”, a term that includes the five Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang 
region of China (where Kazakh and Uighur people live in autonomous province quite 
well integrated in Mainland China). 
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Central Asia is a priority for Russian Federation’s foreign policy, security and economy 
due to geographical proximity of the states and closer bilateral and multilateral political, 
military, economic and cultural ties with the countries of the region. Nevertheless, at the 
same time Russia is still ranking very low in economic performances, trade, foreign 
investments inflows and outflows with basic industrial production then a situation non-
sustainable in long run. The development of cooperation after the cold war 
(reunification of Germany) led to intensifying the EU policy and strengthening its 
presence in the region after the terroristic attacks in the United States on September 11, 
2001, which has updated the question of harmonization of interests and goals of the 
Russian Federation with the European Union, growing power worldwide, in Central 
Asia. The region has become one of the top priorities on the agenda at meetings of 
senior officials and management of the different actors, but the real strategic change is 
represented by the EU 28 becoming the first world industrial, economic, technologic 
and welfare country-Union ranking power before US and China.    
In recent decades, the global market of carbons reformatted and changed priorities in 
Central Asia, from “oil and gas” row materials, almost unique asset of balance of 
payment it is become urgent for Russia to trade  and promote investment both national 
interpreters and national investors for production in for the domestic market in this 
moment totally importing all the goods. In other terms this means to follow economic 
policy of import substitution. Along with this increased interest also the significance of 
the region as a whole become more competitive. United States at the beforehand 
opportunity since 2001, hastened to gain a foothold in the region, but in the following 
years the two questionable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have weakened the US options 
and capabilities, also because two wars has been concluded without any political and 
military value added, they sought only to perpetuate and consolidate their positions. 
Second major factor that played great role in the growth of interest in Central Asia has 
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become a global financial crisis, deeply affected US since 2008 and EU since 2010. 
Being two major transatlantic power buyer of great part of the regional energy 
resources in order to ensure its own energy security, they discover themselves fatally 
“dependent” from Central Asia and Middle East. EU countries in recent years 
apparently had become dependent on Russian supplies, with the contradiction of their 
vital interest but in fact developing very quickly important alternative energy already 
known as in the case solar and wind and some other based on hydrogen turbines  mainly 
covered by military and technological, total confidentiality. So we assisting to 
paradoxes: while flooding literature as been engaged in studies on the “dependence” 
both of US and specifically of EU due to binging agreement of Russia and some 
Eurasian countries, the great jump has been done of some EU countries post on nuclear 
hydrogen energies.  In the last ten years enormous quantity of funds as been officially 
under covered devoted to these alternative energies sources where now we assist and 
ready to experimental stratospheric jets and use in car industry for the first in the 
history, of the fuel cell batteries. Both these development represent the next frontier of 
the science vigor technology and energy challenging needs by the mean highly 
developed economies.  All these events will not under mind the present dependency for 
the really reason that the interrelations between producing countries and financial 
markets of buying companies are a kind of twine destiny “sisters”. I mean that these 
great innovation, a real revolution affecting all energy consuming sectors (from 
industrial and electromechanically sectors; aerospace; car and automotive; all ICT 
system development and artificial achievements connected to   super computer; 
transportation and logistics; ‘cold and hot’ agro industrial chain, finally the costly oil 
and gas pipelines, constructing and maintenance quite high costs, all these factors are 
bringing us closer to crucial choices not on the real question when the alternative 
energies will be available, “soft landing” on the proper countries, specifically ones 
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which dependent on oil and gas due to before mentioned dependence of these oil and 
gas supply).  
When we are talking of “soft landing” we are in fact opening a “Pandora box”, as world 
economic and industrial reality is showing the quite astonishing diverging perspectives.  
Why for the EU the coexistence of traditional energy producing supplies - and we talk 
of oil and gas, might cohabitated in the long run, for Asia first of all, also the Americas 
and Africa, the alternative energies we come later and then we will not assist to a 
crushing of the past energy and the rushing introductions of the alternative ones.
1
 The 
main reason is related of costs of new energies and cheap availability of traditional one. 
Could these situations let us sleep calm nights without caring of these main changes of 
industrial and economic organization doing on in the world? No. There are three 
reasons, suggesting the main world power to be foresighted and govern the problem, 
and start dealing with problem since now: 
A. The collapse of price of oil and gas could provoke geopolitical catastrophic 
conflicts;  
B. The impact on the financial system of crushing of the traditional prices of oil 
and gas, could not be absorb provoking a currencies volatility and main stoking 
exchange, erratic trends to the point that we could assists to a systemic, 
dangerous and not governed outcomes.  
C. In the long run, the oil producing countries that today mainly under developed 
or in the declining grow and development performances will be obliged by the 
internal and external factors and pressures to start investment on their domestic 
industrial and trade developments.  Paradoxically we could say that new energy 
                                                             
1 Emerging Strategic Technologies: Geopolitical Implications by N.R.F. Al- Rodhan, St Antony College, 
Oxford University  
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alternatives are more convincing way in almost all traditional producing 
countries also in the militaristic Russia and countries which still not aware of 
time out of the next 20-30 years.  
Now we come back to previous evolution of national and international policies are 
facing a challenges before mentioned, the important part of these programs are related 
to human capital, higher education, sound financial banking systems, environment, agro 
industrial re launching and regional cooperation, not in the form on what we have seen 
failing around the world but following the few successful experiences, the most relevant 
of them, the one of the open “non statehood” European Union2. Are we come after 
specific, political, geopolitical crucial point? 
The adoption by the Heads of States and EU Governments in June 2007 “Strategy, a 
new partnership”, the EC Regional Strategy for Central Asia 2007-2013 and Central 
Asia Indicative Program 2011 – 2013 in relations with the countries of Central Asia, 
marked the transition region into the category of important foreign policy priorities of 
the EU and made even more urgent adjustment of Russian Central Asian policy, taking 
into account the European factor. Analysis of EU regional policy is also important for 
understanding the evolution and foreign policy, the dynamics of interstate relations in 
Central Asia. Review of EU policy on a particular Central Asia, the regional direction is 
important in terms of identifying the characteristics and evaluates the functioning of the 
overall EU's external action.  
The EU developed regional programs in accordance with the priorities of the Strategy: 
Among the programs are the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE)
3
 
which helps to control and realize the potential energy originating from Central Asia’s 
                                                             
2
 Stability without Statehood. Lessons from Europe’s History before the Sovereign State by P.Halden, Uppsala University, 
Sweden. 
3
 The INOGATE Program supports energy policy cooperation between the European Union and the INOGATE Partner Countries. 
http://www.inogate.org/ 
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natural resources. The INOGATE deals with the areas of oil and gas, electricity, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. This particular program provides a number of 
services, including practicability and technical studies, legal and institutional support, 
as well as technical assistance. Also INOGATE is supporting medium-sized 
investments in the interstate infrastructure. 
As the famous “Silk Way” Route went through Central Asia and provided the essential 
development of trade in the whole region, building roads and rail within and between 
the countries become a priority, to assist in this process was formed the Traceca 
(Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia program) which covered several transport 
and trade services and expertise. The projects were aiming to promote the integration 
and trade of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia international transport corridor and determine 
problematic issues in the region’s transport systems. 
In order to improve the regional cooperation to facilitate development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were developed various programs for example the 
Central Asia Invest regional program, to stimulate the development of SMEs by means 
of capacity-building projects, specifically its helps develop local BIOs—Business 
Intermediary Organizations to support SMEs. BIOs are organized groups of commerce, 
trade, professional and industrial associations, bodies of regulation and agencies 
supporting investment, trade and commercial activities also sector-based agencies. 
There are programs initiated by the EU promoting regional stability, helping prevent 
criminal activities of drug production, trade and trafficking. To promote the anti-drug 
activities and improve border management currently are working two programs: 1) 
BOMCA - The Border Management in Central Asia program which helps to increase 
security in the Central Asian region, also assisting towards the contribution of 
legitimate trade and transit, and minimize any kind of the illicit trafficking; 2) CADAP 
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– The Central Asia Drug Action Program focus on identifying actions to address 
particular problems associated with illicit drug issues. In the field of disaster 
preparedness, during several years, the European Union is fulfilling a program 
DIPECHO, which covers all five Central Asian countries. The EU institutions provide 
the programs not only in the scope of economic cooperation but also in the educational 
field, one of it is: The Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN) and 
The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for universal primary education is planned 
to be achieved by 2015. In Central Asian, the EU is developing a high-capacity research 
and education network which will provide high-speed internet for universities and 
research centers, also parallel to development of primary education.  
According to the environmental situation in Central Asia, in particular, climate change, 
natural disasters, desertification, and deforestation are a persistent threat. The Central 
Asia Environment program for protection of natural resources and is divided up into 
two important parts. The first part focuses on water resources and run until 2012. The 
second part is under development and run until 2013. All of these initiatives require 
close consultations and exchange between Central Asia and Afghanistan
4
 and software 
interaction. 
Being members of European Union the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are 
promoting the interests and ideas of European Union, as well as complementing 
programs and projects in different countries by providing development assistance, 
which contributes to ensure security and stability at the global level as well as conflict 
prevention at the regional and local levels, reduce unwanted migration, the 
environment, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
                                                             
4
 In mid-October 2013 Czech Republic will withdraw its troops from the province of Logar, after which retain a military presence 
on two military bases - in Kabul and Bagram military base. In 2014, the Special Forces will return from Afghanistan .During ISAF 
special operations in Afghanistan were killed 5 Czech soldiers. 
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freedoms and strengthening rule of law.
5
 The EU policy in Central Asia is also the 
research area of institutes and think tanks in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is the only 
country in Central Asian region, which had upgraded program of cooperation and 
partnership between Kazakhstan and EU, well known as State Program ‘Path to Europe 
– 2009-2011’, Astana 20086. In general, researchers are full of factual information, 
especially regarding the interaction of the EU and Kazakhstan, and contain a detailed 
analysis of the formation of a common legal framework for relations between the EU 
and the countries of Central Asia and the dynamics of bilateral trade and economic ties. 
However, in the EU's external relations are poorly presented the peculiarities of the 
Central Asian countries, the evolution of the structure of interests and objectives of the 
EU in the region. Remains obscure formation of foreign policy strategy of the EU in 
Central Asia, the degree of self-consistency of the regional policy of EU countries and 
their common policy within the EU, the contradictions that arose between the EU 
countries in the elaboration of a joint Central Asian policy, due to the events and 
conflicts in the region and along all are bordering Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the 
Caucasus still burning terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan.  Consideration of the main 
directions of cooperation between the EU and countries of the region sometimes is 
descriptive, in particular, no analysis of the problems that arose during implementation 
of aid programs in the region – the main instrument of EU policy in Central Asia, and 
evaluate their effectiveness.  
 
 
                                                             
5 Zahraniční rozvojová spolupráce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2013. EÚ a rozvojová pomoc, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2013. 
 
6 State Program “Path to Europe” 2009-2011. Государственная программа “Путь в Европу” на 2009-2011. 
http://www.mfa.kz/ru/#!/informatsiya_o_kazahstane/gosudarstvennaya_programma_put_v_evropu_na_2009-2011_godyi/ 
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Scope:  
The issues of Foreign Policy of Slovak Republic and Czech Republic in Central Asia 
take place only in the sphere of diplomatic relations, it should be noted that these parties 
are not well informed about each other. Moreover, in the research literature all aspects 
of the development of relations of these countries are poorly covered. Thus, in this 
thesis are provided analysis with data, indexes, long and short term trends, weighted 
and international accepted criteria measurement social factors and outcomes to show 
the relations between countries.  
The objectives of the thesis are: 1. To focus and to analyze at institutional changes in 
Central Asian region and also to examine the development of relations between Central 
Asian states and Slovakia and Czech Republic through an analysis of policy dialogue 
and its outcome.  
2. To analyze the process of convergence in the EU's foreign and security policy and the 
evolution of geographical priorities, and their total foreign activity in the period after 
the collapse of Soviet Union and find a place in Central Asia in the external interests of 
the EU, in particular in the interests of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic.  
3. To demonstrate the ratio of regional and country aspects of actors’ policies in Central 
Asia 
4. To analyze the relevance of actors and factors that may affect the cooperation 
between EU and Central Asian countries within an appropriate and brand new approach 
to a great regional dimension. 
Interests are central to study of international relations. To understand relations among 
countries we must take into account their interests, just as analysis of foreign policies 
(Frieden, 1999).  
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It was mentioned by Mahoney and Thelen: “Institutional stability is a function not 
simply of positive feedback but of active, ongoing political mobilization, and 
institutions are vulnerable to change not just in moments of crisis but on a more 
ongoing basis. Features of the context and the properties of the institutions themselves 
hold the key to understanding the processes through which such change can be 
accomplished” (Mahoney, Thelen, 2010), the transition of some region can be 
explained by institutional changes as well as connections of these changes to interest of 
actors presented in particular region.  
Institutional analysis has become a central focus in comparative politics. Fueled by a 
wave of institutional change in developing and post communists worlds, scholars from 
diverse research traditions have studied how institutional design, electoral system, and 
other formal institutional arrangements affect political and economic outcomes. (Carey, 
2000, Helmke, Levitsky, 2004)  
A new formats and actors are contributing for global partnerships as a form of 
collaboration and cooperation at different levels for implementation of international 
agreed goals and mechanisms. (UN development agenda, 2013).  
Having in mind all abovementioned references hereby is a model of questions: are 
there presented the relevance of actors in region, the institutional transition of particular 
countries, the interests of countries in region, geopolitical context and its relevance to 
the role of actors, is transitional stage has impact on institutional changes, what are 
major security issues in region, are natural resources becomes the main aspect of 
establishing cooperation.  There were conducted few interviews as a part of field work.  
This model is proposed conceptual framework:  
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FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The theoretical significance of the research lies in the fact that this work has direct 
relevance for the Eastern European study. The practical importance of the work is that 
the results of research may be included in the lectures and seminars on Political 
Sciences, Area Studies and Cultural Studies. 
With regard to the methods used to elaborate this work, thesis compounds theoretical 
and methodological and concrete empirical research used in the work of domestic and 
foreign researcher’s monographic, comparative, typological analysis, different 
procedures of generalization and interpretation of empirical data. While analyzing 
political and socio-economic issues not only structural but also functional features are 
analyzed. The analysis of objective indicators (cooperation level, the various elements 
of institutional structure), is combined with the study of subjective (aspiration, political 
activity, etc.) indicators. The project is based on an analysis of different sources: official 
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documents, which include documents of diplomatic correspondence (notes, 
memoranda, and letters to heads of states) and the leading statesmen on foreign policy 
issues and international relations.  To conduct the study was involved a wide range of 
sources, which are based on: (Founding treaties of the European Communities and the 
European Union, and other basic documents of the EU; - Documentary publication of 
the European Union institutions: the European Council, the European Commission, 
European Parliament; - Documents of the governing bodies of the EU and Central Asia; 
- Official publications, speeches, interviews and statements by officials of EU 
institutions, government bodies of the EU and Central Asia; - Bilateral agreements on 
cooperation between the EU, the EU, on the one hand, and the Central Asian countries - 
the other; - Documents of international organizations: the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
others; - Statistical materials Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) 
and international organizations; - Materials of European, Central Asian and Russian 
press. 
In order to effectively conduct the research investigation both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches have been used, as well as data from Czech statistic offices and 
Slovak agencies due to difficulties of usage of Central Asian countries statistics, some 
of these countries have closed data system according to regimes ruling in these states.   
The statements of thesis: 
As it is indicated in thesis the general situation in Central Asian region might be 
explained by four statements: 
1. The institutional building up in region by adapting models  
2. The rivalry of main actors in Central Asia 
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3. Future importance of a strategic evolution of present and future of energy 
perspective  
4. The relevance of conceptuality  in national politics’ changes necessary for 
development of region 
 
The theoretical framework  
Theoretical foundation for the research  
Institutional and actors analysis have rich and diverse perspectives, the study of 
relationships between countries is particular for each region. Rational choice of 
theoretical approach is begun on analysis of institutions, policies, relations, and 
strategic choices of actors.  
In this thesis to develop a theoretical grounding of this research have been applied the 
key studies, therefore the following subsection brief review of research stream and 
pertinent studies.  
According to Al-Rodhan and Losada’s establishment of institutional framework in 
political traditional processes in Central Asian region have to change with purpose to 
address the current issues but also to be integrated in global political system.  
Professor Losada’s roles of actors explain perfectly the contemporary situation in 
Central Asia. As for relevance of influences of actors in Central Asia this thesis 
attempts to demonstrate the roles of global actors in region. Each actor has its own 
interests and thesis reveals tendency that these interests do not consider the interests of 
Central Asian countries.  
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The model of EU integration as an untraditional theoretical approach of “non-
statehood” by Haldén, emphasizing the positive results widely not forecast by the same 
most outstanding research centers and International Affairs think tank, gives now to the 
EU an extraordinary capability to make work in full efficiency the “laboratory” of wide 
regional cooperation start in 1957.  
Three aspects of such phenomena could be considered as relevant: of course the partial 
transfer of sovereignty to sub-national or-transnational and regional, economic and 
political integration bodies; but more importantly the voluntary retreat of the State from 
the management of the economy and other traditional attributions; finally, the 
effectiveness of its action and powers to cope with the global problems and to solve 
them.  
By Dominese problem of sovereignty erosion thesis analysis reveals that Central Asia 
region has no systematic attempt to modernize its institutions, due to consequences of 
collapse of majority institutions after 1990s. Also that this region is under transition, as 
it is well known that well being of population determined by developed institutions, 
countries' policies and other factors that affect the performance of particular economies. 
From productivity in turn, depends on development of country: the level of income, 
business, budget, return on investment and potential growth. 
 
By Helmke and Levitsky’s post communist Eurasia’s institutions are dealing with 
clientelism, clan-based relations which are coexist with new institutions building up.    
The policy cooperation has a great importance for the countries in order to secure the 
global recovery after crisis and downsize the risks as well as to create new conditions 
for sustainable growth.  (Lipsky, 2011) 
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This thesis draws insights on importance of institutions, relevance of actors and Central 
Asian regional situation, it organized in five chapters, each chapter has various sections. 
The first five sections are devoted to the definition and understanding of institutions in 
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic and in Central Asia. First chapter provides the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Second chapter explores the meaning of “non-
statehood”, similarities, and peculiarities as well as political reshapes, identifies the 
difference between institutions, showing that this region is a special case. The third 
discusses issues concerning foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, 
how the EU strategy was formed and contemporary situation. Forth chapter provides 
policy analysis in region, examines differences, influences of actors and their relevance, 
the instruments applied for reaching their goals in region. Finally the fifth concludes the 
thesis.  
Three of the five Central Asian countries have significant reserves of energy resources. 
Kazakhstan has most large oil resources among the top ten countries in the world, and 
the largest gas reserves - among the top fifteen. Turkmenistan has large untapped gas 
reserves; Uzbekistan is also a major gas producer. Russia is highly dependent on gas 
supplies from Central Asia. (Satbayev, 2014) 
 
The increasing importance of actors in the global economy is evident, and when the 
new actors have influence in development collaboration programs, this context present 
challenges and opportunities for EU. (Grimm, 2009) 
The international cooperation is different by nature if its context. Research of 
development cooperation is a challenging task, the development problematic do not 
explain dynamics of development cooperation. In the Annual Report 2012 the IMF has 
clearly stated that the first economic-financial power in the world is the EU, then comes 
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the US, then China and the followers Japan, India, Brazil and all the emerging 
countries. As result of the very focused policies of the EU to be “avant-garde” in the 
age of the migration from the old growth and development theories to landing on the 
new sophisticated  topping innovative and technological stage (Dominese, 2013) 
 
By Satbayev, Krupnov,Kaukenov, Limin in this thesis are presented relations between 
actors in region, the geopolitical approach of China, Russia, USA, and Turkey. And, by 
Evseenko, Panovkin, significance of situation in Afghanistan for its neighbors and other 
countries.  
By concluding theoretical approach of thesis prevails current institutional 
transformation in Central Asian Region, also dynamic changes in institutions in Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic; using comparative case study design, the analysis shows 
the formation of institutions in Central Asia is very distinctive as it took place in Czech 
and Slovak Republics.  But there are similarities in terms of changing process of 
transition of centrally planned socialist economics. The process of economic transition 
of ex-socialist countries as Czech and Slovak Republics towards market economy may 
serve as example of relative success of transformation process.  
In studying of Central Asian region within the context of its geopolitical importance, 
institutional changes, relevance of actors and their interest in natural resources and 
transport capacities of region bring new challenges and scenarios not only in this region 
itself but also restructuring diplomacies, regional and international cooperation building 
up, enhancement of actors’ influences, their relevance in globalization and 
multipolarity.  
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Chapter II 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - EURASIA: TWO CONTINENTS AND ONE REGION  
 
 
Post-Soviet Central Asian region (former Soviet Socialist Republics, sharing borders 
with Afghanistan) in particular, so called the “Eurasian Balkans” according to a 
superficial  Eurasian continent geopolitical importance to global actors. The region has 
been the center of geopolitical pluralism and multiculturalism, which itself engender the 
ethnic problems and tension. According to some experts Uzbekistan was considered 
important country, being least vulnerable to the influence of Russian government, over 
the last decade the resource-rich Kazakhstan has also emerged as one of the leading 
nations among the Central Asian states. Many experts are concordant with idea that 
geo-strategic clarity of Central Asia today has been underscored by two principal 
factors: first, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, it has become a major 
transportation hub connecting Europe, China, Russia, the Caucasus region, the Trans-
Caspian region and the Indian Ocean. 
Tajikistan (having in mind also that second ethnic majority in Afghanistan are Tajik 
people), Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (the forth ethnic majority in Afghanistan are 
Uzbek people) have borders with Afghanistan, with Iran in west and Pakistan to the east 
and south, hence the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan is strategic environment 
in Central Asia. With the control of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes 
between the Indian sub-continent and resource-rich Central Asia, as well as of a 
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potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Therefore, stability in Afghanistan, and 
in neighboring Pakistan, became a geo-strategic imperative. 
Meanwhile, Central Asia has never been a unified region and is undergoing a stormy 
transitional process with a various range of ethnicities and fragmented societies 
throughout the whole area. These ethnic
7
, social divisions and lack of strong political 
constituent bring together the political and economic challenges. One of the challenging 
imbalances existing in Central Asian countries is the Soviet-era unified energy system
8
, 
in the republics and the southern part of Kazakhstan was created a single integrated 
water-energy complex. This imbalance provokes conflict of interests in region because 
Uzbekistan from the beginning strongly against the constructions of the Rogun 
hydropower plant in Tajikistan
9
 and Kambar-Ata-1 HPP in Kyrgyzstan
10
.  
Kyrgyzstan over the past eight years has gone through two revolutions, and some 
analysts have expressed serious doubts about the prospects of its statehood. Just a 
decade and a half ago ended the civil war in Tajikistan, which nearly brought to 
complete collapse of the state; and the situation in the ‘opposition’ regions such as 
Badakhshan
11
, remains turbulent. Both republics are members of the CSTO
12
, but 
                                                             
7
 In the 90's and in 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan took place ethnic conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz people, hundreds of 
people were killed and injured.    
8 Unified Energy System of Central Asia (CA UES) is a unit of power systems, connected by lines 220 and 500 kV, 
running parallel with the UES of Russia through a network of Kazakhstan. The unit includes the southern part of 
Kazakhstan UPS, power system of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Central Asian energy ‘ring’ 
is a system of almost all energy hubs of the former republics of the USSR. It consisted of 83 plants of Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
9 More information is on appendices Table 1  
10
 Uzbekistan regularly closes borders with Tajikistan, limits the supply of gas and electricity. It also adversely affects 
the development of the Central Asian region, both economically and politically, because it remains fragmented, 
politically unstable and poorly predictable as it depends on the will of authoritarian leaders. 
11 Badakhshan – high mountain area in the Pamir (Tajikistan), historically served as a place for different cultures. Since 
the second half of the XIX century, a divided section of the Pamir territory between England and Russia. Geographical 
line of division was chosen the Pyanj River. Territory on the right bank retreated to Afghanistan, which was part of 
within the interests of Britain, and the left bank was given Russian part of the Emirate of Bukhara. In Badakhshan are 
present the separatist tendencies, the local population never called themselves as part of Tajik ethnic group, they are 
against official Dushanbe and President I.Rakhmon, in 2012 between local militia and Tajik military forces a violent 
conflict took place, the number of causalities is unknown. Nowadays part of Badakhsan is in Tajikistan, other part is in 
24 
 
whether it will intervene in another conflict is not clear. During the “second” Kyrgyz 
revolution in 2010, for example, CSTO refused to interfere. 
At once security and economic issues are the two most relevant compounds of the 
Central Asian countries’ engagement with the global actors. For that matter, there are 
elements of both competition and cooperation among the states. Their historical 
legacies, geo-strategic locations, and as well as all their perceived national interests are 
influence the political choices of Central Asian nations. The weaknesses of the new 
independent states in Central Asia pave the way for outside powers to interfere in their 
internal affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Afghanistan. In combat operations in the north-eastern Afghan province of Badakhshan are participating militants from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/64993.html) 
12 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was founded on May, 1992, fundamental objective of the 
Organization – is to continue and strengthen close and comprehensive relations in the foreign policy, military, military-
technical spheres, coordination and joint efforts in combating international terrorism and other security threats.  
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Section A 
Institutional changes in Central Asian countries  
Contemporary processes in the political sphere of Central Asia have actualized the 
approach of institutional aspects of the study of political issues, since at the level of 
political institutions have formed and changed the political norms, values, stereotypes, 
ideas, behavior, changes of which lead to vast consequences. 
The study of political institutions has a paramount place in political theory aspects, as 
well as comparative politics and public policy. 
 “Institutional change will determine how society evolves over time, and thus, is 
a key to understanding the historical change. Institutions are developed formal 
(laws, constitutions) and informal (contracts and voluntary codes of conduct) 
restrictions, as well as factors of coercion, structuring their interaction. Together 
they form the incentive structure of politics, society and economy”. (North, 
1990).  
But also the dangers and risk for humanity coming from the next decade of exponential 
technology and innovative introduction worldwide. 
 We must establish a truly global framework for dealing with these issues now. 
By the time it is politically expedient to address these issues, it will be too late. 
Not acting now is akin to implicit acceptance of the end of the human race as we 
know it.  
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(Al-Rodhan, 2011)  
According to Levi “as formal agreements between groups of people, whose behavior is 
governed by the application of clearly defined rules and decision-making authority and 
supported by a single person or group of persons having formal authority determines 
political institutions” (Levi, 1990) 
In general the experience the transformation of post-socialist countries is interesting and 
instructive, but also in their specific case institution and political leadership failed short 
facing the challenge of their programs. Its comprehensive analysis and general 
conclusions are still ahead. The collapse of the FSU
13
 was widely welcomed by many 
countries as a sign that democracy had achieved a “victory”. In the context of post-
socialist transformation, when radical change of the society foundations takes place, it 
becomes especially important the ratio of institutional sustainability of society, 
institutional, social, economic and financial dynamics.  
“The institutions are important for political analysis and its outcomes of 
an intentional action developed under external restrictions, therefore 
have a subjective component: are intentioned and depend on the 
perceptions and preferences of affected individuals, who in turn act as a 
function of their perception of reality, the definition of its opinion 
interests and values and its own regulations convictions about what is 
beneficial, good and right and due”. (Losada, 2000) 
Historical approach puts institutional stability on the existence of power. Ruling groups 
differ desire to adapt - to meet the political institutions their needs in the first place - the 
need to maintain their power and to strengthen it.  
                                                             
13 Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
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 “Complete change of the structure of political institutions is not possible. 
Especially it concerns the role of institutional factors in transitional processes. If 
we look at the history of the market transforming economies of the former 
Soviet Union countries, we can see that from theoretically point of view at that 
time were not presented institutional approaches at all. Prevailed at the 
beginning of the transformation process, and especially the neo-classical 
monetarist methodology oriented to market self-regulation and market 
mechanisms imposed by the West and the International Monetary Fund, was 
untenable. This methodology is unable to provide theoretical tools for 
understanding what is happening in society and the economy within the 
transformational terms. In our countries, economies are transitional and 
unbalanced”. (Gritcenko, 2005) 
 In order to understand what is happening and to develop a more or less adequate 
analysis, it should be connected the assessment of institutional factors. As many 
researchers note, ability to change under the influence of activities or groups of agents 
have only a few variables characteristics of institutions pertaining to a particular 
historical period. From economic standpoint the political institutions are defined as 
some point of equilibrium in substantial change of which no one is interested because it 
is fraught with firstly by uncertainties over the long term changes, and secondly, by the 
reluctance expend funds already spent on training institutional agents within existing 
institutions. The high costs factor put by supporters of the economic approach to the 
first place for explaining the causes of institutional stability. (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1990)  
 Political institutions play a primary role in society, notably in times of crisis, 
accompanied by military and economic conflicts, increasing violence in society, 
polarization of public opinion, even leads to social cleavages. (Weaver and Stares, 
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2001) Social upheavals forced to rely on help and protection from the state as the most 
important in modern society political institution that has, moreover, legitimate 
monopoly on force and explicit intervention force priority. Because the state is the 
leading political institute of modern society, it is a priority research for representatives 
of institutionalism approach in political science.  
TABLE 1: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA  
Source: UN Data 2012  
 Institutional weakness of the CIS, the lack of capacity and willingness of the leaders of 
the new states to invest significant resources in building integration led to skepticism of 
many experts examining the processes of post-communist transformation. Violation of 
institutional order and the change of the individual subsystems lead to institutional 
failure and institutional system crash. The collapse of the USSR may serve as an 
example of institutional catastrophe and new states formation with a fundamentally 
different social systems, rules and regulations of public life, as well as values and 
priorities. Thus wise, implemented changes have a long-term impact on consequent 
political, economic and social development.  According to UN Development Program 
hereby provided some main indicators of development of society in Central Asia 
 Life 
expectancy 
Human 
development 
Index 
Poverty 
Index % 
GDP per 
capita 
Education 
Index 
Health 
care 
%  from 
GDP 
Average  
wage 
Countries Year 
2011 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2012 
Year  
2011 
Year  
2011 
Year  
2011 
Year  
2011 
Kazakhstan 67.4 0.754/Rank 69 0.002 12 603 
USD 
0.83/Rank 
35 
3.9 630 USD 
Kyrgyzstan  68.0 0.622/Rank 
125 
0.019 2 238 
USD 
0.72/Rank 
77 
6.5 160 USD 
Tajikistan  67.8 0.622/Rank 
125 
0.068 1 935 
USD 
0.70/Rank 
84 
5.8 85 USD 
Turkmenistan 65.2 0.698/Rank 
102 
N/A 6 785 
USD 
0.74/Rank 
67 
2.7 300 USD  
Uzbekistan 68.6 0.654/Rank 
114 
0.008 3 039 
USD 
0.71/Rank 
80 
5.4 240 USD 
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countries. The last two decades of independence these numbers had been changed 
radically.  
 The peculiarity post-Soviet perception of international relations theory is that political 
science should pass deideolization phase. Rejection of Marxist-Leninist paradigm for 
many years monopolized interpretation of the mutual relations between states was not 
coupled with the emergence of a large number of schools and new theoretical concepts.  
 
At the same time, the absence of the Soviet period, alternative concepts in political 
science began to take precedence empirical studies. This circumstance could not affect 
currently expressed in the weak interest of experts in international relations theorizing. 
Post-Soviet region was then a unique region with this matter that there has the highest 
degree of intensity change geospatial alliances and foreign policy goal setting 
reformatting of states. (Shemielov, 2013)  
TABLE 2: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA Source: UN Data 1991 
Essential for the further successful institutional development of post-socialist countries 
which are engaged in market transformation is the introduction in the basic institutions 
of institutional dynamics, i.e. formation of rules, regulations, procedures, institutional 
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Kazakhstan 68.34  
USSR 
0.920 / Rank  26 
Gini 
coefficient – 
40.11 
 
USSR 
3766 
USD 
 
USSR 
0,900/ 
Rank 24 
 
 
USSR 
3.5 
 
350 USD  
(exchang
e rate 
USD to 
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1,784) 
Kyrgyzstan  68.30 
Tajikistan  69.29 
Turkmenistan 66.22 
Uzbekistan 69.17 
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change, and preparedness of subjects. Institutional dynamics should be one of the basic 
components of countries' development strategies. 
 
The main phases of post-communist transformation in these countries proceeded at 
different rates, but they have several features in common and it is determined by the 
desire of the former Soviet elites become a new ruling class of society based on a 
market economy. These elites have experience of the CPSU, with all its disadvantages: 
inability to work with the masses, fear of transparency in decision-making, bureaucracy 
and authoritarianism. As their priorities proclaimed democratic values: the division of 
powers, the equality of all before the law, respect of human rights. However, the 
opacity of government institutions, ineffective political parties that emerged after the 
collapse of the FSU in the post-Soviet space, not allowed bring new ideas and 
approaches to solving arising issues during reforms. In most post-Soviet countries 
underwent privatization of basic production assets, resulting in an influential stratum of 
large owners. Formation of a new social order was accompanied by the appearance of a 
new politics of post-Soviet states problems and controversies which have acquired 
sustainable features and began to exert a moderating impact on future development. 
One of issues was practically everywhere the concentration of power and property in 
the hands of small groups (clans) of national elites. While government and business 
have been tightly bound to each other, and interests of top officials and owners of 
leading companies and enterprises are closely interlaced. (Ryabov, 2005) 
Socio-economic relations and political regimes that were formed in the 90s of the 
twentieth century in most post-Soviet states differed clearly defined by the inequality in 
the distribution of power and property, lack of public control over the activities of the 
authorities. 
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In the first decade of post-communist transformation and the formation of 
regional oligarchic systems made in the context of social passivity of the 
population. After collapse of Soviet Union heads of all the former Soviet 
republics gained power with independence. In fact, the presidency grew out of 
the republican Communist Party structures for which these institutions has 
become an important tool with which it was possible to concentrate power in 
their own hands. Therefore most of the newly formed states’ presidents have 
received tremendous formal and informal power, which was legitimized by 
national elections. Thus originated the phenomenon of forms of power, which 
allows the holder to prevent a collective response by the regime elites and 
thereby effectively manage them. (Hale, 2005) 
The lack of institutional structure and the monopolization of power by restricted circle 
of local elites in most post-Soviet countries have gained the “family” nature, which led 
to a narrowing of its social base. Weak public administrations which are often 
connected with ruling groups, could not establish operating structure of institutes of the 
power. It led to those small and medium-sized enterprises, people engaged in shuttle 
trade business and small country farms appeared in the power of the corrupted and 
exploiter management system. 
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Section B 
 
An “untraditional” theoretic approach to EU as a “Non Statehood Union” 
 
One of the missing point looking at the EU from outside it for sure the lack of 
understanding the really nature of the institutional building and of the governance of the 
great result achieved with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by the founder countries. 
Abandoning the traditional concept of “state sovereignty” and progressively 
transforming the Union into the “de facto” first word power had been a really long 
itinerary, large part of which done in silent and soft  effective policies by the 
Commission, the Member Countries and lately by the European Parliament. The final 
stage had been the Germany reunification and the introduction of the Euro, events that  
pushed the global role, economic and financial power of the European Union to be 
tested successfully in the most dangerous structural crises occurred to the US starting 
the 2007, Europe starting 2010 and now Asia and the emerging countries in different 
ways and contamination. The positive exit from the tunnel, widely not forecast by the 
same most outstanding research centres and International Affairs think tank, gives now 
to the EU an extraordinary capability to make work in full efficiency the “laboratory” of 
wide regional cooperation start in 1957.  
By the way this model of integration has a large  applicability in many other 
areas of the world and could become a guideline for future aggregations and 
unions, where sovereignty, identities, national languages, different speed and 
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flexible integration timing will avoid the growing of a new traditional power but 
of the main power on the example of the Roman Empire, of the West Holy 
Empire, of the first 50 years of the US existence and - if we really force a bit the 
concept of “non statehood” - of the ten centuries of the Republic of Venice great 
power, an example of early stage of representative, free market and 
internationally assertive actor in the modern political institutions history. Since 
the Congress of Vienna in 1814 anything has grown up to a new stage of the 
previous examples of “non statehood” until the EU starting up in 1957. 
 (Haldén, 2011) 
The concept of sovereignty erosion or – sovereignty progressive inefficacy - 
became familiar to the politicians and to the scholars, although, until the 1980s’, 
such concepts were still reflecting theoretical rather than actual approaches. 
With the reunification of the two Germany, European Union start to develop 
even more a concept of “non statehood” governance that achieved an even more 
emphasis during the recent worldwide financial and economic crisis. More 
precisely, the diminution of state sovereignty was such to produce actual and 
alternative concrete solutions for the management of human communities which 
is, of course, the primary state function. (Dominese, 2013)
14
 
It is quite indicative the main scientific analyses of “Stability without Statehood” by 
Peter Haldén,
15
 from the Uppsala University in Sweden, an in depth investigation on the 
need of stronger national players to guarantee development, growth, stability, peace in 
the future global governance.  
                                                             
14 Erosion of sovereignty and “non statehood” in global governance by G. Dominese Chairman TSN Venice-Rome and Faculty at 
UIBE University Beijing, 2013 
 
 
15 Stability without Statehood. Lessons from Europe’s History before the Sovereign State by P.Haldén, Uppsala University, 
Sweden, 2011 
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Those targets cannot be achieved if not reshaping the “national sovereignty” 
giving more and more room to the notion of a “non Statehood” kind of 
institutional building.  (Haldén, 2011) 
Three aspects of such phenomena could be considered as relevant: of course the partial 
transfer of sovereignty to sub-national or-transnational and regional, economic and 
political integration bodies; but more importantly the voluntary retreat of the State from 
the management of the economy and other traditional attributions; finally, the 
effectiveness of its action and powers to cope with the global problems and to solve 
them.  
On these aspects, a reading of wide impact and interrelations is the paper on “Non 
Statehood Europe and Global Governance” by Giorgio Dominese, university professor 
in Rome since last 2013, at present visiting professor at UIBE University in Beijing, 
who published his final researches in this field in the Journal Transition Studies Review 
and in the Journal of Global Policy and Governance, together with other papers 
presented in main international seminars and conferences by the Author. (Dominese, 
2013) This dissertation is quoting the main passages with his permission.  
 “The example of the world financial and economic crisis erupting in 2008 and 
certainly still ongoing, showed to the world Governments that even the largest 
and most powerful countries, like the US, needed the cooperation of the 
International Community to cool down international financial markets and to re-
launch the economy. But EU demonstrated to be capable to exit from the 
financial disaster without abandoning the foundation on the “non statehood”, 
keeping to acceptable level welfare policies, social lower inequalities and great 
push in human capital, new technologies and diffused innovation to lead now all 
the excellence sectors of industrial, aerospace, agro-industrial, trade, alternative 
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energies, environment and effective security. The horrible conflicts of the past 
had left the immunity of Europe from the conflict temptation in resolving 
international crises, if not when affecting vital interest on the human right and 
freedom of citizens just outside the border of the EU, as it had been with the 
Balkan war and the North Africa military interventions, all events followed by 
the enlargement of the European Union or the inclusion of emerging countries 
among the associated members both of the Union and in different forms of the 
Euro” end of quotation.   
Also small Cyprus, that can be considered a micro-parcel in world economy, might 
affect the global economic system. But even there – wrote the Author - the European 
Central Bank had imposed in 2013 the cleaning up of the banking system from money 
laundry, grafting, income from high corruption and international forbidden trafficking  
and smuggling, disregarding the pressures from Russia to save the money deposits and 
money located in Nicosia.  
“The problem of sovereignty erosion thus became an actual challenge for the 
International Community in the globalization era and requires an urgent review 
of the rules and governance traditionally guiding the International Community. 
In the “non statehood” Europe the strategic answer to the emergency of the 
financial crisis, that could have destroyed the Euro and imploded the EU, had 
been to introduce “de facto” a different speeds governance power in the crucial 
decisions by Ecofin in Brussels and ECB in Frankfurt, where euro-scepticists 
have found inspiration to insinuate the growing of a hegemonic Germany, 
France and Netherland playing alone. In fact, the notion on “Union of States” 
and not “State of States”, not a “Federation“ of States but really a 
“commonwealth” of sovereign countries, is a concept not even understood in 
some EU member countries and certainly not abroad, if not among specialists of 
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history, constitutional law, international affairs and politologists”, wrote Giorgio 
Dominese.  
In the Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, by 
Jackson & Sørensen
16, the evolution of the states’ sovereignty and the crucial 
passage of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with the introduction of the 
“commonwealth” of the fragmented European order, after the thirty year war, 
it's well pictured. “Non statehood” was again finding its legitimacy and valuable 
European perspective, finally capable to decide and act as a political, financial, 
economic and geopolitical protagonist with very distinct “non statehood” 
architecture, nearly perfectly suited to the forthcoming global needs in the 30 to 
50 years ahead. (Jackson, Sørensen, 2012) 
“Banking defaults, subprime collapse in US, Eurozone risking to blow up due to 
the unsustainable burden of public debts of many Member countries, mainly 
determined by modest leaderships, wide ranging corruption and unacceptable 
costs of the political systems in several countries, together with the stratospheric 
costs of the controversial wars in Iraq and  Afghanistan, have given the courage 
to tell at many levels, also officially, some revealing confidential details and 
very crucial genetic political and structural distinctions that characterize Europe 
of the current 28 member states and the nearby countries aspiring to become 
members. The title sounds clear: the European Union is proud not to be 
“statehood” and to represent the most efficient and politically advanced 
laboratory of global governance. In the Annual Report 2012 the IMF has clearly 
stated that the first economic-financial power in the world is the EU, then comes 
the US, then China and the followers Japan, India, Brazil and all the emerging 
countries.  This is the result of the very focused policies of the EU to be “avant-
                                                             
16 Jackson RH, Sørensen G. Introduction to International Relations. Theories and Approaches. Oxford University Press, 2012 
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garde” in the age of the migration from the old growth and development theories 
to landing on the new sophisticated  topping innovative and technological 
stage”, continues the Author.   
The result had been to offer the European economies and societies all the best options 
allowing the optimal strategies and investments for global competitiveness as well as 
for welfare, social achievements and environmental standards but also in security, in the 
capability to transform the great advancement into applied and still in progress 
technologies related to the future deterrence and reliable defense system, where Europe 
and USA could compete in a fair way to the common strategies in the NATO 
transatlantic alliance but also to the specificities and alternative options in the European 
regional and global strategic scenarios.   
There are four very interesting text books by Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan
17
, Scholar 
at the St. Antony’s College Oxford University, published in the last two years by 
Palgrave Macmillan:  The Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies; The 
Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies: Implications for Geopolitics, 
Human Enhancement and Human Destiny; Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: 
An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance. Being the Author 
mainly a philosopher, neuroscientist and well appreciated geo-strategic he was 
very effective to representing, in an evolutionary approach, the growth and 
development, the technological and innovation changes, the institutional, 
strategic and political implications of the world 2030-2050. (Al-Rodhan, 2011) 
In fact – observed Giorgio Dominese -, leaving the master books by Jean 
Bodin
18
 “On Sovereignty” and by Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan” with their own 
                                                             
17 Al-Rodhan NRF The Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies. Implications for Geopolitics, Human Enhancement and 
Human Destiny. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 
 
18 Bodin J, On Sovereignty, (1992), Cambridge University Press,  UK 
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sharp, and quite frankly, obsolete an even dark doctrine of the state, without 
entering into the theoretical debate over sovereignty and the constitutional frame 
of the expression of a nation-state, the European Union starts to appreciate its 
“status” of real “non statehood”, of commonwealth of sovereign states deciding 
a devolution of the governance on main issues to a “Union” quite technocratic 
but capable to give life to a new architecture of the transnational relations and 
entities leading the world affairs. (Bodin, 1992) 
 Today is the appropriate moment to quote some of the most important books on 
these issues, otherwise I would feel a bit exposed to questioning and dogmatic 
wondering on my paper when in fact already these concepts belong to the 
intellectual heritage of our third millennium and not only to my personal 
opinions and preferences. I admit, we are talking of very sensible issues of the 
classic public policy, doctrine of the state, constitutional law and traditional 
democracy. Even so they are already carved in marble and I really doubt they 
could be changed anymore. In his researches and papers, Giorgio Dominese is 
not using diplomatic tuning in giving the names to the main forces that 
attempted to destroy Euro to dismantle European Union. (Dominese, 2013) 
“That’s why European Union did not implode due to the Eurozone crisis; was not torn 
down by the financial and covert political destabilization strategies promoted by main 
speculative groups and so called “strong powers”; did not follow the fatal destiny to 
look for a refuge in a traditional Constitutional Chart; and was not worried by those 
deploring a “lack of democracy”, whenever the debate is open on reforming democracy 
and liberal institutional heritage as well. More than this, we heard the People’s Party 
Congress in Beijing discussing what’s next after the end of socialism and its Chairman 
quoting only one time the word “socialism”, as a “work in progress” to review an 
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obsolete ideological pattern already incapable to reading the contemporary society and 
the global governance conditionality”. A great difference from the tuning in Moscow.   
It will take many decades before reaching stable and shared convergences on the best 
way to govern the world but for sure we will not see the United Nations to interpret the 
fundamental goals and principles for which it had been founded.  G-20 was sounding a 
first signal of the insufficiencies and the lack of the credibility accumulated by the UN. 
Now it must be clear that the world is considering, without any open polemics but 
simply as definitive assumption, as unacceptable the decision making procedures of the 
Security Council and the instrumental use of the veto power by the Jalta conference of 
the five winners powers of a war ended almost seventy years ago. The lessons on the 
mistakes of the past and the consequences worldwide had been learnt but can’t be used 
still as an argument to discriminate the voting system in the Security Council.  
We are getting close to a showdown on this issue and the main European and Asian 
protagonists will be quite firm in pushing for revision and reshaping of the Glass 
Palace, where the lack of effectiveness and transparency appears as the sign of 
obsolescence and fatal destiny. Of course, I believe the mistake to change without 
having an alternative or integrative solution agreed upon, robust and widely accepted, 
will never be made but the front of the countries in favor of a “change and reform” is 
made up of nearly three quarters of the almost 200 member countries of the UN. Russia 
is almost unique case of looking back leadership, where the attempt is to re-establish 
the former Soviet Union better than to become a fast growing economic and political 
system. 
The situation of the border countries are not promising anything good, starting from 
Ukraine and the maneuvers on the way to annex Crimea even with an external 
aggression, on the base of ethnic principles and purely propaganda issues, against all 
the international laws and the signed treaties by Russia itself. When the domestic 
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economic and social situation in Russia is really collapsing, the external enemies are the 
way to hide the total failure of the last ten years of Kremlin policies of growth and 
welfare in the Country. 
“Stability without Statehood” by Peter Haldén, from the Uppsala University in 
Sweden, is disturbing quite a lot the widespread understanding that we need 
stronger national players to guarantee development, growth, stability and peace 
in the future global governance. With an accurate political and philosophical 
examination of the major authors dealing with this subject, the eminent Scholar 
of Uppsala is reviewing the last two thousand years of history and the main 
examples of the “non statehood” great powers - from the Roman Empire to the 
Holy Roman Empire, the first 50 years of the American foundation and finally 
to the European Union -  Haldén doesn’t fear to disturb the sleep of the 
contemporary constitutionalists and main state sovereignty “clerics” and tackle 
the issue directly: given the Fiction of the State as the Good, Natural and the 
Beautiful, we have to consider the revision of a very weak and abused concept 
on which we trusted and fought wars over and the rather modest governance of 
the world for almost 300 years.  
“It is time to propose again something having to do with the too much neglected 
Heritage of Republicanism, evading the spectrum of the “state-system of states” 
and investigating more carefully the Union of States without a “Statehood”, in 
the century dominated by the global governance anxiety and the regional 
approaches need. In fact, this issue cannot find any constructive and viable 
answers if we don’t accept the need to reshape, and in some cases abandon, 
intellectual political theories and praxis tailored for the world of the last several 
centuries but not for sure having the appropriate architecture to host the new 
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incumbent needs of the society, the economy, the citizenship, the welfare, the 
openness and the integration indispensable to govern the “one world”.  
(Haldén, 2011) 
Let’s read the rigorous assumption from which Haldén starts his analysis:  
“I have argued that it is necessary to circumvent the dominant position of the 
state in contemporary political thinking. The precise theoretical problem is the 
idea that the state is the best possible form of political organization and indeed 
the only possible one. A consequence of this mode of thinking, dominant in 
political, legal and historical thinking since the mid- 1700s, is that all entities in 
world politics can be reduced to points along a spectrum ranging from “state” to 
“system of states.” I have not analyzed the European Union (EU) through the 
analytical lens of the state and implicitly or explicitly compared it to ideal-
typical or existing states – a procedure that tends to reproduce the state as a 
normative ideal, propagated since 1576. Instead I have constructed an analytical 
framework based on classical and early modern republican political theory and 
modern systems theory. In this interpretation, republican political theory has two 
aspects, one systems-theoretical which posits a political ontology that transcends 
the distinction between domestic and international, and one normative- political 
which provides a security analysis utterly different from the Hobbesian tradition. 
Both aspects allowed me to create an ideal type of rule, the compound republic. 
Consequently I compared the EU with two other variants of this ideal type, the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (HRE) between 1648 and 1763 and 
the United States of America (USA) between 1776 and 1865”. (Haldén, 2011) 
Without any doubt, much of the architecture of a tangible, operative and credible 
global governance remains to be ‘‘invented’’, and, to be meaningful and meet a 
large degree of consent, such innovations should necessarily be rooted in and 
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grow mainly out of political traditional processes and institutions at national and 
international levels. As we said, it is certainly not the model of the United 
Nations that can show the way out of the night of the years in which we are 
assisting to the failure of the spirit of aims and scope of the global governance 
“ante litteram” announced in the Charter of San Francisco in 1945. Proposing 
the question really never focused, after the second world war, of the reform and 
innovative redefinition of the democracy and the liberal principles on which it is 
based, on the one hand, and of the courageous revision of a great number of the 
crucial pillars of the doctrine and practice of the socialism heritage, on the other, 
we will serve the truth, the credibility and the coherence to the history and the 
humanity”, we can read in.  
The political science, the international affairs, the public policy and the main 
economic-financial strategies of the present and the future decades would 
benefit of our guidelines and safe tracks to move further the global governance 
from theory to practice. As conflicts are part of history and will remain a factor 
of risk and instability in the future, a “non statehood” configuration of the 
alliances and multilateral initiatives seems appropriate. The so called soft power, 
that every time the really need comes is showing to be so mighty and capable to 
enforce peace, had lost the sense of weakness and insufficiency shown in the 
past. In fact Europe and the collective military alliance into NATO - again with 
an approach quite similar to the “non statehood” basic concept of the “union of 
states” rather than the “state of states” or “federation” alliance – have  shown 
already twice in the last 20 years the “dura lex sed lex” in the Balkans and in 
North Africa. And the high tensions in these weeks in the Near East are 
announcing a possible “storm” again, even if everything will be done to avoid it.  
(Haldén, 2011) 
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I understand that expectations are probably more linked to the aspect of concrete 
programs and agreements that would finally give a boost to the industrial development, 
the economic growth and the social market economy advancements in the great Euro-
Asiatic role and potentiality. But we have seen in the last 20 years that the lack of a 
clear political understanding, even if the German reunification had given so many 
reasons and opportunities for change and new course on both sides of the former 
blocks, that the successful “non statehood” in EurAsia and the growing role of main 
global actor of China have propelled the international relations and the global 
governance to a real process of convergence and interrelations.  
“It's not  utopian – going back to Dominese scientific works -to imagine that we 
have to open a special track of negotiations for new adhesions to the European 
Union, even if you are observing how difficult and challenging the enlargement 
to the Eastern and Southeastern countries is, even if this remains a top priority of 
the EU. And now, after Croatia becoming member, also Serbia had started the 
adhesion long run “acquis communautaire”. Even Turkey is proposing a 
deadline not to be overlooked for the membership in the Union by 2023. But in 
the case of Russia, it should be a much bigger effort to be done to assume the 
function of promoter and propeller of a new world order, in which the global 
governance is not any more wild, esoteric and abstract as still it is. Any 
millenarism, heritage, tradition, culture and religious faith could justify the 
failure of Europe and Russia in joining more concretely in this common 
endeavor, where USA, China, Brazil, India, some parts of Africa, Southeast 
Asia, Japan, South East and Central Asia, the same Middle East as the full Euro-
Mediterranean region are investing more and more for the long term, in view of 
the great changes already ongoing and announced almost every day and before 
our eyes. The example of China, jumping after thirty years of deep reforms and 
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still difficult passages, to the top five great powers is in this sense an 
encouraging factor of confidence, credibility and a contemporary successful 
story”.  
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Section C 
 
Similarities, peculiarities, converging issues and diverging policies  
 
During the years of market transformation of the former socialist countries have 
substantially changed its appearance. During this period, are created and started to 
function the formal institutions of a market economy - commercial banks, commodity 
and stock markets, currency exchange, qualitatively new tax arrangements, the rules of 
antitrust regulation, etc. However, costs of market reforms have been significantly 
higher than expected by the initiators. In countries fell sharply average real income of 
the population and at the same time increased the inequality in their distribution. 
Similarities in Central Asia and Central Eastern European experience are seen in 
tendency to manipulate the democratic institutions and procedures in insufficiently 
developed civil society. The result of manipulation is generated outcome, which is 
different than the proclaimed goal, but providing significant dividends to investors – 
manipulators; one example is the Slovak “mečiarism”19, the basis of which is the 
operation of democratic institutions and procedures in the interests of the ruling elite 
                                                             
19 From Slovak Prime Minister who name is Vladimir Mečiar (served three times as Prime Minister from 1990-1991, 1992-1994, 
and 1994-1998). Leader of People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L‘S-HZDS), Mečiar has been criticized for 
autocratic style of administration and manipulation of privatization process in Slovakia. 
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that seeks to establish an authoritarian regime. Elsewhere in the region manipulative 
management model of political process is less developed, it finds expression at the level 
of institutional design - for example, the crisis of a bicameral parliamentary system in 
the Czech Republic in 1992-1996, or the crisis of government in 2009 during the Czech 
presidency of the EU.  
According to Hungarian researcher D. Marcos, “in all post-communist states 
observed deformation ideological issues, and the logic of the left-right spectrum 
is broken. In Eastern Europe during the post-communist period, people vote, in 
fact, for the same party under different signboards.” 
The institutions in Slovakia are not capable to prompt economic development. 
According to analytical research in the sphere of institutions’ quality by UniCredit Bank 
Slovakia in 2012, on the political scene of Slovakia are visible results of corruption 
connected to the politics of ruling elites. Hereby are provided results of research in 
Eastern European countries, which share the same historical background due to their 
socialism heritage, when in these countries had not existed market compatible 
institutions and liberal economy.  
Despite significant differences between countries, in addition to many general features, 
and traced the similarity transformation models that allows evaluating the effects of 
various institutional choices and policy decisions and their impact on the subsequent 
development. 
 If taking in account the data of institutional quality from world-known think-tanks as 
World Economic Forum (WEF), Heritage Foundation and Transparency International 
(TI), it becomes clear that many post-soviet bloc countries share similar indices:  
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TABLE 3: IMPORTANT GLOBAL INDECES IN CENTRAL ASIA  
Countries / 
Data 
Czech 
Republic  
Slovakia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Turkmenistan Uzbekistan  
2011 Diversion of 
public funds  
Rank 
102 
Rank 
113  
Rank 97 Rank 120 Rank 69 N/A N/A 
2013 Judicial  
Independence  
Rank 74/ 
Score 3.7 
Rank 
116/ 
Score 
2.7 
Rank 111/ 
Score 2.7 
Rank 135/ 
Score 1.9 
Rank 72/ 
Score 3.7 
N/A N/A 
2013 Economic 
freedom Index 
Rank 29 Rank 42 Rank 68 Rank 89 Rank 131 Rank 169 Rank 162 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 2013-2014 
Rank 46 Rank 78 Rank 50 Rank 121 N/A N/A N/A 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
2013 (TI) 
Rank 57/ 
Score 48 
Rank 61/ 
Score 47 
Rank 140/ 
Score 26 
Rank 150/ 
Score 24 
Rank 154/ 
Score 22 
Rank 168/ 
Score 17 
Rank 168/ 
Score 17 
Pillars/Institutions 
by WEF 2013 
86 119 55 133 N/A N/A N/A 
2010 KOF Zurich 
Economic 
Globalization 
index 
85.08 
 
83.55 67.65 63.43 N/A N/A N/A 
2010 KOF Zurich 
Political 
Globalization 
index 
86.9 85.44 69.76 65.77 64.11 39.02 43.61 
Source: KOF Index of Globalization 
As it is obvious from these indicators of institutional quality none of these countries 
were capable of building institutions which are at the same level as highly developed 
countries’ institutions. Therefore, we may see that the institutional formation and 
transformation for support of economy and liberal democracy is challenging task.  
In the Central Asia countries ordinary people practically cannot achieve justice if they 
do not have influential patrons or do not resort to corruption. Numerous political, 
institutional and economic negative events, in particular in the economic recession 
which has begun after declaration of independence, substantially explains why regional 
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cooperation of the new states in Central Asia was weak despite numerous assurances of 
the leadership of the countries. National elites and political groups of influence tried to 
protect reducing assets, by limiting the external competition and aspiring to take the 
maximum income in short terms. The leaders who have came to power from the ruling 
elite of the Soviet era, also created, to some extent, political structure in which they and 
their governments kept almost exclusive power over society.  
External partners began to participate more directly in cooperation and support of 
regional structures due to recognition of their interest in the prospering and stable 
Central Asia. 
Growing understanding of common interests in the sphere of safety and SCO role in the 
solution of these questions created base for bigger trust and cooperation in other areas, 
in particular, in the sphere of economic cooperation as the important factor promoting 
effective regional development, safety and stability. Nevertheless, obstacles to further 
economic reforms, regional cooperation and integration continue to exist in the person 
of fully centralized presidential institution, the interests of influential representatives of 
business connected with the government, and also in average and the lowest level of 
public administration and security services. In long-term prospect there is a risk of 
emergence of a vicious circle in which the weak government, limited possibilities of 
institutes and the insufficient accountability of the authorities lead to indignation and 
the performances of the people suppressed by the governments of the countries. The 
similar cycle restrains anything, and plunges the region into political and economic 
chaos, undermines bases of institutes of society, regional cooperation on key economic 
problems.  
Governance problems, especially corruption leads to inability to manage efficiently and 
predictably of all institutions and the economic relations between the countries. 
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It also leads to decrease in resources of the country, falling of volumes of direct 
investments, except for extracting sectors of economy, increase a social inequality, stop 
reforms and lead to growth of discontent of the population. Governmental crisis in 2005 
and 2010 and power crash in Kyrgyzstan and violence in 2005 in Andizhan - 
Uzbekistan
20
, also in 2011 in the western Kazakhstan became a striking example of 
similar consequences
21
. All these events are a warning signal for the Central Asian 
governments. How they interpret them and as will react, will define the future of the 
region and situation in the sphere of human development and safety in the region. Some 
scenarios of succession of events are generally possible. First option heads of the states 
for achievement of short-term stability will limit more and more political and economic 
freedoms that most likely, will lead to high probability long term instability. The second 
scenario is characterized to gradual strengthening of institutes, linearization as well as 
political and economic spheres and it should result political and economic stability. 
Expansion of regional cooperation could strengthen hopes of political success 
considerably. However, such approach demands reforms in institutional spheres, the 
courageous management ready to perform reforms. The neighbor states of Central Asia 
and the international community could support such option of the region development. 
When it comes to the political, economic and institutional realities of Central Asia 
according to many experts, it is possible to expect only limited regional cooperation in 
the short and mid-term. Most likely scenario of cooperation is between Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, regardless of 
internal instability also may choose the preferred path of regional cooperation and 
integration. 
                                                             
20 All official data were closed, but according to local people of Andizhan approximately 2500 people were killed by 
government forces.   
21 The employees’ protests of subsidiaries of the state “KazMunaiGas” Oil and Gas Company (subsidiaries are - 
“Karazhanbasmunay” and “UMG”) in Mangistau region in western Kazakhstan. The most known mass oil strike in 
2011, punctuated in major riots in Zhanaozen on December 16 with 15 dead, dozens injured and arrested.  
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Section D 
Slovak institutional and political reshapes   
 
Nowadays, Slovakia formally involved in developing the EU’s policies and showing a 
general support for intensifying the degree of its integration as well as its further 
enlargement. After withdrawing all obstacles that continue to hold up placing Slovakia 
on an equal ground with other EU member states, it will become truly equable in the 
course of framing the EU policies. Slovakia sustains the EU institutional reforms, and 
has also supported further EU enlargement, particularly to the countries of the Western 
Balkans i.e. Croatia and Serbia.
22
  Prime Minister R.Fico also expressed his support for 
intentions of Turkey to join EU. Besides, Fico also accentuated that Turkey could not 
be ineligible only due to its Islam religion.
23
 
Energy security belongs to notable Slovak policy initiatives inside the EU. 
24
 Czech and 
Slovak Republics are initiated the establishment of the European Nuclear Energy 
Forum. During the 1
st
 forum in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) on November 2007 
participants discussed the prospects for European Union legislative and regulatory 
framework to simplify administration and permits granting for the construction of new 
                                                             
22  Slovakia has not officially recognized the independence of Kosovo.  
23 
 Fico spoke about Turkey’s prospects for EU membership in front of the parliamentary Committee for 
European affairs on December 11, 2006 (Source: CTK, December 11, 2006) 
24  Dzurinda’s coalition government between 2002 and 2006 placed particular policy limits on integration in 
the spheres of direct taxation, social policy and defense. However, such positions were not unique to Slovakia among 
EU member states and they certainly did bring new policy impulse to the intra-EU debate.  
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nuclear energy sources. Fico accentuated Slovakia’s interest by stating that “the 
government is keen to carry on constructing nuclear power plants”.25 
Slovakia is determined to overturn the consequences of its pledge to close down the 
Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant. The Slovak Strategy on energy security
26
  
adopted on September 2007 states that additive to completing two blocks in Mochovce, 
it a intends to build a new nuclear power plant on the area of the Jaslovské Bohunice 
plant due to its closure in 2010 emphasized Slovakia’s importer of electricity position.  
In 2007 Slovakia joined the group of EU member states for involving the nuclear 
energy among the “clean” (free from CO2 emissions) energy sources. Slovakia’s focus 
on nuclear energy issues from the country’s sense of vulnerability as negative 
consequences of the Jaslovské Bohunice plant closure; aside from policy priorities 
holding back from the treaty Slovakia’s policy standpoints have largely been driven by 
fears of the future instead of opportunities brought about by the membership in the EU. 
Such nature of the countries’ priorities in the EU is closely connected to Slovakia’s 
underdeveloped EU policymaking process.  
 
The Slovak government was politically and technically in charge for the adoption of 
policy preferences in the EU. Nevertheless, research and interview with political and 
administrative actors of Slovakia’s EU membership revealed several issues for the 
development of Slovakia’s positions within the EU.27 
Slovakia’s policymaking inside the EU has only little to do with traditional foreign 
policy implicated with the viability of the state. Instead of country’s success in EU is 
linked to the capacity of domestic politics to deploy EU in dissolving domestic 
problems. In Slovak various ministries, though, their use of functioning methods and 
                                                             
25   For more details http: 
//ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/Bratislava_prague/2007_11_26/index_en.htm  
26 The text is available at http://www.economy.gov.sk/index/go.php?id=3167 
27 
 Bilcik V.-Vilagi, A. pp.203-240, Bratislava, 2007 
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coordination of EU affairs vary widely. It is evident that the engagement of domestic 
ministries in EU agenda of foreign affairs, economic and social policy is more 
profound, than in the case of transport policy.  
In Brussels the Slovak Permanent Representation to the EU often plays a significant 
role in working out Slovakia’s position, so far, it cannot replace a domestic ministry by 
reason of it has no efficiency to generate documents of strategic significance.  
Another factor that influences Slovak limited activities in EU is not highly qualified 
human resources. Slovakia’s central administration employs three times less workers in 
EU departments than central administrations of Hungary and Czech Republic. Notably 
more experienced and older members of state administration are less able to argue 
Slovakia’s case in English and French languages during the sections of EU working 
groups. With relatively low salaries in many departments are able to keep their 
employees for a few years when they leave for the well paid positions in private sector. 
The restrained domestic administrative capacity has its external dimension in Brussels. 
The country is using its administrative quotas in the EU only up to about 60-70 percent 
and not in the full range.
28
 Slovakia is not strong at filling mid-management positions in 
European Commission, only Poland and Czech Republic are lagging behind Slovakia. 
Limited number of young people applies for internship in EU institutions; as a result it 
limits the long-term development of high quality human resources.   
Slovak government for years suffered from limited connections between EU political 
community and domestic politics. According to that many representatives were quite 
new to EU institutions; Slovak politicians were a source of more “shame” in Brussels.29  
Also Slovak private sector does not have an adequate institutional basis establish at the 
EU level.  
                                                             
28 
 The Speech of Maros Sefcovic, 2008  
29  Interview with a Slovak diplomat seasoned in EU affairs, Brussels, January 16, 2007. 
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Aside the Government, the Slovak National Council could play significant role in EU 
affaires. In some interview in National Council was mentioned that parliaments’ 
employees concerned on examining the accordance of Slovakia’s EU positions with the 
positions of the other EU member states (Bilcik, 2007).
30
  Since Slovak parliament does 
have a potential legal space for offering to the formulation of the country’s EU policy, it 
lacks the administrative capacity and expertise to control the executive in EU affairs 
regularly or to affect the contents of Slovak positions in EU. The fulfillment of Slovak 
strong parliamentary role in EU policymaking has been limited to intensive exchange of 
information whose flow in one-way: from initiating and deciding government to the 
parliament that acknowledges.  
In recent years Slovakia is running out of its strategic goals vis-á-vis the EU at a time 
when policy preferences determined by the skills and ability of diplomats and state 
administrators rather than upon conceptual analysis.  
Politicians are not interested in the EU beyond the nature of the existing integration or 
the drawing of EU structural funds in Slovakia. The Government Office does not 
represent a leader for the formulation and coordination of Slovak policy strategies in the 
EU. 
Slovakia’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 prepared goals in the country’s 
foreign policy, and it was soon no longer in lacking standing as EU recipient or NATO 
requirements. Membership in these organizations has a potentially important relevance 
for Slovakia’s individual relations with both insiders and outsiders to these 
organizations. Slovakia’s decision to side with the United States during the Iraq war 
was welcomed by some EU member states while the countries opposed to the military 
solution in Iraq saw it as undermining the opportunity of the Union (Valašek).31 
Although Slovakia sided with the U.S. during the war in Iraq, it has, e.g. consistently 
                                                             
30  Bilcik V.-Vilagi, A.  Bratislava, 2007 
31  Valašek, T. p.65, 2004 
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sustained the signing and ratification of the Kyoto protocol. On conflict in Syria and the 
possible consequences of military intervention, Slovak President I. Gašparovič 
expressed support to diplomatic solution, also emphasized the role of the UN as crucial 
in ensuring access of civilians to humanitarian aid, to penalize the perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity and start negotiations on stable post conflict arrangements 
within the Geneva Initiative 2.0.  
There are plenty of opportunities for possible tensions or at times conflicts between 
such a set of external goals on the one hand and institutional constraints posed by EU 
membership on the other hand.  Slovak foreign policy positioned before a double 
challenge: how best to utilize the EU framework for the pursuit of its new goals better.  
The evidence for determining the ability to live up to either challenge for Slovakia’s 
international conduct is few and very recent. However, there are at least some indicators 
of Slovak foreign policy attitudes inside the EU. Slovak diplomacy introduced its own 
strategies in relation to Russia, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and 
North Africa. At the same time one can criticize these documents for vagueness and 
often very general contents without a specific set of Slovak goal, there are also some 
indications of future Slovak foreign policy priorities.  
 
The conclusions demonstrate that Slovakia is still very much in search of its own 
foreign policy goals and instruments even if in the frame of European regulatory 
prescriptions.  Slovakia is also acquiring to play the game of EU politics. Therefore, 
rather than fond of fast integration or re-shaping of the Union, wants to adapt to existing 
structures well. Once the country does internalize the EU modes of policymaking better, 
its current rigid positions on EU security designs and matters may become more 
flexible. Slovakia’s and conversely the EU’s biggest task for a successful formulation 
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and pursuit of foreign policy seems to stem from the complete number of actors, 
interests and variables in Europe’s internal and external agendas.  
Some statements by few Slovak diplomats that “once in the EU we shall not need our 
foreign policy as we shall have EU foreign policy” proved incorrect even before EU 
accession. Slovakia as an EU observer had to take a clear position on the Iraq war since 
the EU remained internally divided. As well as, Slovakia has an opportunity to express 
its stances on the institutional design of EU foreign policy. In brief, the EU is both a 
heterogeneous and an evolving foreign policy player with limited capabilities. 
Moreover, since the latest enlargement the EU has also become a diverse geopolitical 
entity.  
This fact has inferences notable with respect to new eastern neighborhood of the Union 
and plea new opportunities for offering to EU external relations.  
Slovak leading official foreign policy priorities have spotlighted on the countries of the 
Western Balkans and the EU’s eastern neighborhood. Slovak diplomacy has been 
devoted to engage these countries with its own experience in regulating post-communist 
transition and EU and NATO integration. Slovakia introduced its own Official 
Development Assistance Program (Slovak ODA). Yet, foreign policy has remained in 
the shadow of other policy areas.  
Specifically, the foreign diplomacy is distinctly more multi-tasked and disseminate in 
its daily agenda than prior to EU membership. The diplomatic corps resemble more an 
operational service rather than a policymaking body. 
Slovak diplomacy requires reform like other parts of public administration. 
Intellectually, Slovakia is more progressively discovering Ukraine and the Western 
Balkans as significant points of foreign activities.  
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For this reason, the planning and the execution of foreign policy action are in their early 
stages. External policymaking is primarily about events driven reaction rather than 
about agenda setting initiatives. 
Especially, when Slovakia will be Chair of EU Council in the second half of 2016, as 
Presidential State Slovakia will negotiate the new European legislation and top political 
issues. Its main role inside the EU Council will be to seek compromises between 
Member States in European policies. Outwardly, they will represent Slovakia in relation 
to other European institutions like the European Commission or the European 
Parliament.  
 
It will be the first Slovak presidency; preparations began in 2012, and are among the 
priorities of the Government. Launched by Government the resolution No. 392/2012 
established the basic assumptions of the Presidency and current priorities. Since 
approved by a number of other important documents it offers a comprehensive 
overview
32
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
32 http://www.mzv.sk/sk/europske_zalezitosti/predsednictvo_v_rade_eu-slovenske_predsednictvo_v_rade_eu 
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1.1. Evolution of Slovakia relations to the EU membership 
 
The history of relations between Slovak Republic and European Union start after 
signing so-called Association agreements on October 1993, as well as Association 
Agreement Slovak Republic with the EU subsequently ratified by Slovak Parliament in 
the same year. 
Slovak National Council ratified it on December 1993. The Association Agreement 
entered into force on February 1995 after ratification by Parliaments of all member 
countries. 
On June 1995 Enrollment in EU lodged on by Slovakia's former Prime Minister 
Vladimir Mečiar at EU summit in Cannes. Application complemented the 
Memorandum of Government that permitted Slovakia to join in 2000. 
The European Council asked the Commission to make its report on Slovakia's 
application for membership in order to evaluate Slovakia's progress towards meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria. The European Commission had serious reservations against 
Slovakia instability associated with institutions and shortcomings in the functioning of 
democracy. The European Council on the basis of evaluation did not recommended in 
Luxembourg in December 1997 to start accession negotiations with Slovakia. The 
summit on intensive negotiations lead to membership of the Union of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia. Slovakia was dropped from 
the first wave of enlargement. Relations between the EU and the countries remained 
outside the gates of the first round were treated by individual Accession Partnerships. 
They focused specifically on those areas of the Copenhagen criteria, which lagged 
behind the country. 
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In 1998 was held parliamentary elections in Slovakia, which results entail a change in 
style of governance and overall conditions of the political scene in Slovakia. Foreign 
countries highly appreciated the parliamentary elections. The tour of Slovak Prime 
Minister Mikulaš Dzurinda led to the heart of the EU - in Brussels and then to Vienna 
(Austria at that time held the Presidency). A clear priority of the Slovak government 
was integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
 
In 1998, Parliament adopted a resolution on Slovakia's candidacy for EU accession. In 
it, the Parliament recommended a flexible approach to Slovakia and European 
Commission (EC) proposed a new report on Slovakia, as the situation in the country 
after the elections visibly changed. 
Slovakia met the Copenhagen criteria and it was reason for invitation to negotiations on 
accession to the summit in Helsinki 1999, Slovakia along with the other candidate 
countries was open to accession negotiations at the meeting of the Conference on 
Accession at February 2000. Slovakia as a reference date of adoption and 
implementation of the acquis communautaire elected first January 2004, which was 
generally a reference date of entry into the Union.  
At the summit in Nice in December 2000 confirmed the important document for 
enlargement strategy that the European Commission - so-called Road map. Based on its 
schedule of priorities defined at EU discussions of candidate countries during the next 
three presidencies in EU (Sweden, Belgium and Spain) Slovakia, along with other 
candidate countries concluded its accession negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. 
Slovakia fulfilled the prerequisites for admission into the Union on 1 May 2004. The 
European Commission recommended ten accession countries. The European Parliament 
overwhelmingly approved their entry on April 2003. Council of EU Foreign Ministers 
approved the admission of new members on April 2003. Thanks to the Treaty of 
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Accession signed on 16
th
 April 2003 in Athens by President Rudolf Schuster, Prime 
Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan and Chief Negotiator for 
accession to EU Jan Figel. 
In Slovakia was held EU accession referendum. The question that Slovak citizen’s 
answer was: “Do you agree that the Slovak Republic became a member of the European 
Union” Referendums attended a majority of eligible voters where 52.15% participated 
in the referendum and 92.46% of them expressed approval of accession to the EU. 
Slovak Republic in May 2004 along with nine other countries joined the European 
Union. 
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Section E 
Czech Presidency in EU – Czech Government and Institutional Transition 
 
In 2009 Czech Republic’s six months at helm of EU Council was under the three E’s 
priorities – the Economy, Energy and the European Union in the world. As it is known, 
Czech Republic had to face during its presidency the Russian-Ukrainian “gas war”, the 
global economic crisis, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and the resignation of its 
government.  
The Czech Presidency accomplished to attain several positive outcomes in three priority 
areas. Regarding the legislation, due to collaboration with the EU member states and 
institutions, principally with the European Parliament, made certain effective realization 
of dialogue on more than 80 explicit procedures. Along with the other areas took place 
a number of remarkable accomplishments as adoption of conclusions on banking capital 
in order to uphold credit for business and households, rejection of the protectionist 
tendencies, was achieved an Agreement on common concept for dealing with impaired 
means, supplementing the Strategy for supporting the financial sector approved in 
October 2008. Considering investments, adoption of European Economic Recovery 
Plan was a significant issue. The Plan contributes for funding to increase EU’s energy 
security; 3.98 billion EUR out of 5 billion EUR will be invested in energy infrastructure 
(energy interconnectors, gas storages) also offshore wind parks and carbon capture and 
storage. 
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In the age of financial crisis the EU rotating presidency has made one more thing clear 
– the European Union needs an effective structure, greater integration and a higher 
quality overseas mission. Czech government made great efforts to overcome gas crisis, 
but the chances of achieving political success were low because there were strong 
players in the game. Moreover, the Czech term showed that small EU countries are not 
ready for daunting tasks of coordination and leadership that should be solved in a crisis 
of such scale. Due to institutional weakness domestically, the government felt apart 
right in the middle of the term in office of the Council. Presiding country has not taken 
a leadership role in addressing the problem of gas supplies. 
The same applies to its position during the military operations in the Gaza Strip. The 
efforts of the Czech Republic in this direction were so vague that went completely 
unnoticed. However, the influence of Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek 
weakened for a long time from the very beginning he was ineffective at the head of the 
European Union. President Vaclav Klaus has never made a secret of his principal 
dislike of the Maastricht Treaty and to the very idea European integration. Nevertheless 
as an attempt to “save face” on May 6, 2009 Czech Senate approved the Lisbon Treaty 
destroying one of the last barriers to its ratification. In recent years the queries to the 
EU and hence to its chairmanship country have been grown. In addition to constant 
issues on the agenda (energy policy, environmental protection, economic growth, 
modernization of national economies in Europe), which are continuously being 
developed and it is impossible to ignore, every country, occupying the post of chairman, 
takes the lead on a global scale: whether it is a war in Georgia or the financial crisis. 
Sufficient human resources are not less important than the prestige and influence on the 
world stage. Just in this sense, small countries have less to offer. In this matter Czech 
Republic is in similar position as Slovakia with its shortage of highly qualified human 
resources.  
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It would be incorrect to accuse for these problems one only the Czech Republic, which 
is at least trying to create some momentum. The most convincing was the establishment 
of a new “Eastern Partnership” on EU summit in Prague in May, 2009. The EU has 
made new, confident agreements with six countries, each of which is central to the 
stability of Eastern Europe, as well as for fundamental personal interests of the EU in 
terms of energy security. EU Eastern Partnership might produce constructive ideas on 
reforming the geo-strategy especially in regard to the complex relations between Russia 
and the EU. 
Czech Presidency has affected other Eastern European countries. Central and Eastern 
Europe has shown itself unable to advance their interests both within the EU and in its 
relations with Russia. The Czech Republic, like many other new EU members such 
Slovakia and Poland, suffers from the inability to form on its internal political arena 
European policy. Since joining the European Union in 2004, there is still lack of 
policymaking in European political scale. 
 
According to Eurobarometer surveys in the Czech Republic the number of people with 
a pessimistic view of the future more than in other European countries. Only 39% of 
Czechs believe that the worst of the economic crisis is came to end. Recently, in the 
Czech Republic, there have been a number of political scandals, one of them took place 
in June 2013, it was the largest scandal in the last 25 years involving Prime Minister 
Petr Necas. 
 
Well-known Czech political analyst J.Pehe said that Czech President M.Zeman 
is representative of the outgoing post-Communist era. Zeman and Klaus share 
similar political preferences, but there are 2 main differences: first, Zeman is 
more pro-European, he better understands the foreign priorities of country. 
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Second, he has a reputation of the president who is close to common people of 
Czech Republic. 
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1.1.1. Evolution of Czech Republic relations to the EU membership 
In December 1990, Czechoslovakia began talks with the EC concerning the conclusion 
of association agreements.  
Period from 1992 to 1996 
After the breakup of Czechoslovakia EC suspended the ratification process Czech 
diplomats led by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec trying to catch up with delays. In 
1993 both parties signed an “Association between the Czech Republic and the EC and 
Member States” entered into force on 1 February 1995. Until then, relationships were 
under Interim Agreement. 
At Copenhagen meeting in June 1993 the European Council decided that the associated 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the 
European Union. It was also stated that the entry occurs when a country is able to 
accept all responsibilities associated with membership, meet the economic and political 
conditions and sufficient administrative and judicial capacity to take over the acquis. 
At Essen meeting in December 1994 European Council invited the Commission to 
undertake a detailed analysis of the impact of Eastern enlargement and policy of the 
European Union and its development. 
The internal report was submitted to the European Council meeting in Madrid in 
December 1995. The Council asked the Commission as soon as possible after the end of 
IGC had developed opinions on individual applications for membership and began to 
process summary document on the course of expansion. 
In January 1996 the Czech Republic application provided by Czech Prime Minister 
Vaclav Klaus's to join the European Union. 
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1.1.1. Period from 1996 to 2004 
In July 1997 the European Commission published Agenda 2000 material, which 
subscribed to the idea of “bigger and stronger Union”, and published opinions on the 
readiness of all candidate countries. 
The Commission also determined that the Board report regularly on progress made by 
each of the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe amounted to prepare 
for membership. Commission recommended starting membership negotiations with the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
In December 1997 at the Luxembourg summit the European Council instructed the 
Commission processing of regular reports on progress in preparing for membership 
made by the individual applicant countries. 
On the recommendation of the Commission the European Council at its meeting in 
Luxembourg in 1997 of the official invitation of the 11 candidate countries for EU 
accession. The Czech Republic took over the invitation of President Vaclav Havel, 
accompanied by Foreign Minister Jaroslav Sedivy. Luxembourg summit decided that in 
spring 1998 convened bilateral intergovernmental conference, which would open 
accession negotiations with six countries: Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia (the so-called Luxembourg group). March 1998 the process of 
expansion was then launched in Brussels, by Foreign Ministers of EU15 and 11 
candidate countries, including the Czech Republic. 
The legal framework had been formulated in the Accession Partnership. The Czech 
Republic submitted in Brussels 1998 National program preparation for the EU 
membership, which was published successively in 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
In April 1998 began the first part of the Brussels talks on accession to the EU - the so-
called “screening”, e.g. the analytical comparison of the candidate countries legislation 
with European law. After preliminary technical meetings it began in November 1998 
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negotiations on the accession to the EU at the ministerial level. For the purpose of 
screening the acquis was divided according to areas of into 31 chapters before starting 
negotiations on each chapter the EC always proposed a joint negotiating position of the 
Union, approved and presented by the Council Presidency. Opinions on all 31 chapters 
also develop all the candidate states that the negotiations represented the main 
negotiator and his team. 
The process of preparing for membership was continuously monitored by the European 
Commission, which annually since 1998 issued regular progress reports on candidate 
countries prepare for EU membership. The first evaluation report of 1998 the 
Commission was very critical, especially in the areas of state administration and 
judiciary. The government tried to accelerate the process of legislative transposition of 
EU law. Second Commission report 1999 positively identified the adoption of the 
government's economic strategy document joining the European Union, a joint 
evaluation of economic policy priorities, a significant shift in the liberalization of 
capital movements and the adoption of basic rules for the promotion of regional policy. 
Nevertheless, the overall outturn Accession Partnership identified as unsatisfactory, 
including a highly critical assessment of the situation of Roma population. Commission 
Report of 2000 was evaluated much better than the two previous sign, was positively 
evaluated primarily accelerated the adoption of legislation. 
 
From 7 - 11 December 2000, EU summit held in Nice, which dealt with the expansion 
eastwards and the overall reform of the institutions. According to the results had to 
enter into the EU having 11 votes in the Council and 20 members in the EP. Czech 
Republic and Hungary states are approximately the same size as Belgium, Portugal and 
Greece, but they got fewer seats in the EU Council and European Parliament. 
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Report on the 2001 Czech Republic was significantly positively evaluated, especially in 
a functioning market economy. Constant problem was the situation of gypsy population 
and the reform of state administration. In 2002, again was addressed the issue of so-
called Benes Decrees. Based on the analysis, the Commission issued a report that the 
decrees of the acquis in terms pose no obstacle to the accession of the Republic. The 
last evaluation report released in 2003; this report had been called the Comprehensive 
monitoring report on the preparations of the Czech Republic for membership. The 
studies the Commission had proposed to extend the Union by ten countries proposed in 
Laeken. 
 
Pre-accession process with the ten candidate states, including the Czech Republic was 
terminated by the European Council in December 2002 in Copenhagen. Here, the 
finalization of the negotiating chapters, including the transitional period, which 
provided the new member-states a longer period for the successful settlement of all 
obligations arising from EU membership. The European Council decided in accordance 
with the Commission's adoption of 10 new Member States with effect from 2004 
(History of the accession to the EU). 
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Chapter III 
Section A 
The foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovakia: perception of changes  
Foreign policy requires that the particular state has set its interest in the international 
community, formed by the states and other international actors, and this focus taken 
place. States with its foreign policy committed to a certain idea, which the international 
community advocates and receives support for its existence and its operations. The 
conceptual content of foreign policy can be expressed either in concepts or ideas. While 
the concepts are explicitly formulated and defended in the political debate ideas remain 
hidden and may be re-rationalized concepts.  
Czech policy 
The key to the foreign policy of the country's foreign policy interests of its content and 
the way which this interest formulates and advocates. From this perspective, currently 
Czech Foreign Policy distinguish two periods, the first (entry into the EU in 2004), this 
content existed, albeit in incomplete form, the second (after 2004) has disappeared.  
Objective: Return to the West Czech Republic was created in 1993 as a state with clear 
foreign policy interests, which follows the same concern, formulated the Czechoslovak 
federation - it is a return to Europe or return to the West. 
‘Aimlessness in the West’  
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Returning to the West meets the Czech main foreign policy goal that united the greater 
part of the political elite and mobilized society. Since then, the Czech foreign policy 
strays in aimlessness, there are not synthesized various ideas into the political content 
which would have the internal and external support and what could be consistently 
carried out. Public interest in foreign policy, at best scenario, and not only there, is 
replaced by the wider public interest or even completely privatized economic interest 
groups or ideological approach.   Similar process takes place in Slovak foreign policy; 
the ideas of promoting successful foreign policy are not synchronized at the particular 
level.   
This does not mean that the Czech foreign policy completely failed to set targets. For 
example government's concept of Czech foreign policy from 2011 defines the following 
priorities: 
 Strengthen the security of the Czech Republic, analyze threats and to act against 
them; 
 Promote economic and trade interests abroad, including energy security; 
 Strengthen the positive image and perception of the Czech Republic abroad; 
 Develop good relations with neighboring countries and strengthen regional 
cooperation; 
 Support operational and economically and politically strong European Union; 
 Maintain and strengthen the transatlantic link ; 
 Promote respect for human rights and democracy in the world (with resources 
Transformation and development cooperation); 
 Strengthen European integration of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.   
 
In some of these areas may log in Czech as well as some partial successes. However, 
there is lack of specific requirements for these priorities into coherent objectives and 
their subsequent implementation. 
Czech Republic is closely following developments in the CIS countries and within their 
means will endeavor to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the territory 
of some of them. Czech Republic continues the tradition of economic relations with 
each country, but only with Kazakhstan is becomes more realistic the trade relations, 
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rather than with other Central Asian countries due to their closed market and corruption 
issues. 
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2.1. The power and the instruments 
Military and economic resources of the state cannot be expected to have significant 
changes, although budgetary savings may further restrict military sources of power. 
More open is the development of institutional and ideological sources of power. 
Institutional sources will depend on the internal transformation of EU and NATO 
eventually to the establishment of new structures in this area and the ability Czech 
retain and expand existing membership or to join the new initiatives. The approaches, 
which only cling to the already achieved, locks or maintain institutional positions. Even 
the preservation of institutional positions gained entry into the EU requires a proactive 
attitude to European integration, including integration into the euro zone.  
Ideological resources can be strengthened with a new story that Czech society needs for 
inner renewal and which will attract even beyond its borders. Foreign policy requires a 
different mix of instruments. Efforts should concentrate in multilateral action (EU, 
NATO, the UN and other organizations) and supranational (EU), which is not reducing 
the prevailing bilateral instruments. Purely bilateral policy should be limited to 
neighbors and the Visegrad states, because Czech has neither the power nor the 
analytical assumptions for supra-regional or even global impact on the bilateral level. In 
all other cases, the bilateralism serve only as a service objectives multilateral or 
supranational. For example, it makes no sense to attempt their own bilateral policy 
towards global powers (USA, Russia, and China) for the reason that such a policy does 
not match the Czech possibilities. This does not give up any action on these powers.  
On the contrary, the only effective way of action is offered through the Czech and 
supranational multilateral diplomacy within the respective institutions. It should also be 
far more intensive use of indirect instruments of foreign policy operations, primarily 
companies or their organizations and non-governmental organizations. Partnerships 
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with companies and organizations are offered as the main implementation tool of 
economic diplomacy. Space for cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
opens especially in areas of action development, humanitarian and human rights. In all 
these areas, the Czech foreign policy partner has experience with non-governmental 
sector, which can be made and that can be expanded. Deepening concerns (in particular 
human rights) should be part of the new story of Czech foreign operations. A number of 
internal and external reasons, not always suitable Czech state realizes such a policy. 
While the internal reasons for concern unconvincing results of domestic human rights 
policies, external stem from objective necessity of cooperation with countries with 
different ideas about human rights and democratic debate. This does not mean that the 
state should give up this issue. In some cases, however, it could take place, for example, 
through a publicly - supported foundation that would build on its work conceptually 
based on a political task, on the other hand, was independent enough to fairly reflect the 
human rights pro Czech Republic is largely focused on international cooperation. This 
is not only due to the fact that the smaller European nations, but also open economy, a 
high share of exports and services in GDP, and a lack of resources. 
The international environment in which the Czech Republic pursues its foreign policy is 
the result of the interaction of a number of factors - sovereign states, groupings of states 
with different degrees of integration in international organizations , but also non-state 
actors (from NGOs to interest groups , including organized crime groups and terrorist 
organizations) . 
The role, importance and influence of each factor vary, often in a very short period of 
time. After the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the bipolar world and due to 
changes in the security environment, vigorously promoting globalization, liberalization 
of the world economy, the growing interdependence of states and the rapid 
development of science and technology significantly increases the importance of 
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multilateral cooperation within international organizations and integration groupings. In 
the face of new threats posed by certain illegal, especially terrorist organizations, we are 
rapidly growing importance of international mechanisms aimed at countering such 
dangerous phenomena and problems of Czech allies and partners. 
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2.1.1. Slovak diplomacy 
Slovak Foreign Policy of this “generation” should above all be “smart”, it aims to 
increase interoperability with foreign partners, consolidate and deepen position in those 
areas where more than a decade involved - particularly in support of transformation and 
integration processes in neighboring States and EU regions. Complex Foreign Relations 
of 21 century require increased attention on issues of the economy, particularly the 
strengthening of energy and food security, given political, security and economic 
parameters in the interests of Slovakia's support pragmatic and effective European 
cooperation, including the importance of deepening integration and communitarian 
elements within the EU. The test of maturity, professional, organizational and 
diplomatic skills will undoubtedly preparation, and especially successful management 
of EU Presidency issues facing Slovakia in the second half of 2016 Presidency in the 
EU chapter, but not the goal of foreign policy in the next decade. Given that this is a 
cross-sectional, sector project opens the way to improve the implementation of the 
European, but also global policies of sectors level. Competencies of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is indeed responsible for conducting foreign policy, but highlighting a 
comprehensive, cross-sectional characteristics of international relations (economic 
issues, trade, environment, defense and security, finance) and fusion of European and 
national policies is a significant opportunity for profiling the external dimension of the 
work of other central government bodies. It is good that Slovakia is looking well 
beyond the Union and examines the areas in which it can offer the experience, capacity 
or resources. The UN is committed to security sector reform, which is crucial in terms 
of stability and sustainable development in the post-crisis period, supporting 
humanitarian and development activities in East Africa (Kenya, South Sudan). There 
are very successful Slovak diplomats of high rank are working in Afghanistan and 
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Central Asia (Jan Kubis and Miroslav Jenca and others), promoting the international 
cooperation also in preventing diplomacy. 
Slovak diplomacy has seen intense global phenomena. Climate change is happening and 
it is irrelevant to argue about whether this is the result of human activities or natural 
environmental cycle. It is therefore necessary to pay them more attention than before, 
helping to set development goals after 2015 and to define the objectives of sustainable 
development. Already on the ground that one of the priorities of the Slovak Presidency 
of the EU (2016) is the issue of water as a strategic raw material. In these areas, 
Slovakia can find software “Slovak diplomacy 3.0”33 - diplomacy and foreign policy 
of the state that is confident and established in the geopolitical environment. At the 
same time has the human resources that are possibly greater than the financial and 
interest to extend the scope of its activities thanks to the fact that many of the issues it 
does not print the burden of history.  
 
To intensify cooperation with Central Asian countries in the EU will fully exploit the 
potential of partnership agreements and cooperation programs of the European 
Commission and EU Member States, cooperation mechanisms such as the “Baku 
Initiative”34 and political dialogue, using various tools of Common Foreign and security 
policy. It will also expand cooperation with the United Nations, in particular the 
Economic Commission UN, OSCE and the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe, NATO, international financial institutions and other regional organizations and 
forums. EU Special Representative, embassies of EU Member States and European 
Commission delegations should seek to strengthen cooperation with the OSCE. 
                                                             
33
 Establishment of multi-year program of Slovak diplomacy - www.mfa.sk  
34 The “Baku Initiative” was started on the occasion of the Energy Ministerial Conference held in Baku on 13 November 2004 with 
the participation of the European Commission and the Black Sea and the Caspian Littoral States and their neighbors, such as 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran (observer), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation (observer), 
Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
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Furthermore, the EU, together with the countries of Central Asia, should seek new 
forms of cooperation, such as a regular bilateral dialogue on human rights and NGOs. 
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Section B 
The strategy of the European Union in Central Asia 
Evolution of the mechanism of external activities and external relations of the EU  
 
During the postwar Soviet-American confrontation of European integration plans were 
put into practice only in the sphere of economics. The development of a common trade 
policy of the Common Market was originally identified the global nature of the external 
activities of the European Economic Community (EEC). Creating an extensive system 
of assistance to third countries (food, humanitarian, technical, financial, through the 
representation of trade preferences) in the framework of the so-called development 
policy has stimulated the development of relations of the EEC with developing 
countries. Forming in 1970 the mechanism of European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
has contributed to greater coordination of foreign policies of the EEC countries. The 
constant expansion of the EEC intensified its political and economic importance to the 
third countries required registration of new members of the traditional ties with 
individual countries and regions around the world. In existing during the “Cold War” 
system of external relations EEC became the main priorities of West European 
countries, which were not included in the Community, the developed European 
countries and former colonies of the member states (countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean and the countries of the ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific). Mainly 
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from the periphery of interests were removed EEC countries in Latin America and Asia. 
The relations with the socialist bloc were in its early stage. 
The end of the “cold war” led to a drastic change at different levels of world 
political systems and required adaptation to the EEC's new strategic 
environment. Getting rid of the Soviet military threat and, consequently, the 
need for strict adherence to Atlantic solidarity, the appeal of traditional EEC 
partners to expand co-operation opportunities in the “discovered” the socialist 
countries gave rise to the political and academic circles of Western Europe's 
hopes for a speedy transformation of the EEC in the central element of the future 
architecture of “Wider Europe” and the overcoming of its subordinate, 
dependent on the U.S. political status. The then Former European Commission 
President Jacques Delors in his speeches repeatedly called on the European 
political circles to accept the challenge of history and, realizing the “global 
responsibility” of Community, to share the political and military burden of 
keeping the new world order
35
 (J.Delors, 1992). 
It should be noted that the initial formation of a new regional policy has acquired a 
special significance the Soviet factor. The adoption of the 1988 joint declaration of the 
EEC and CMEA paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the Community and the Soviet Union and the signing in December 1989, bilateral trade 
and economic agreements. A constructive policy towards the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the German question, on security issues in Europe and the world had 
turned the Soviet Union in the international political partner of Western European 
states. Instead, the Soviet leadership hoped for a massive economic support ongoing 
domestic reform and development of the format of relations with the EU, such as that 
which was proposed at that time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 
                                                             
35 
 Available on: J.Delors speech at a conference in Luxembourg on May 28, 1990: Delor J. Le Nouveau 
concept européen. Paris, 1992. pp. 233-249 
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December 1990, at a summit in Rome, the EEC approved the allocation of the Soviet 
Union a package of food aid amounting to 750 million ECU, of which 250 million ECU 
at no charge, and to develop a technical assistance program with a budget of 400 to 
1991 mil ECU (after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was called “TASIS” - Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States). In early October 1991 the 
Ministers of Economy and Finance of the European Economic Community agreed to 
grant the Soviet Union ECU 1250 million as a loan to pay for imports of products and 
medications. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union that resulted in a deterioration of political and 
economic situation in the newly independent states, Western European countries were 
clearly aware of the nature and size of the possible threats to the security of the former 
Soviet Union were extremely interested in the establishment and consolidation in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), especially in its European part of Russia, 
headed by the pro-Western democratic regimes, but the stabilization republics of the 
world's business community and were not inclined to use the same tools as in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean. The question of the 
possible accession of CIS countries was not considered. Volumes allocated technical 
and other assistance were significantly lower. Developed the legal framework of 
contractual relations did not contain trade and other preferences. 
Prepared for accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe acted as a filter against 
the destabilizing effects on the European Union from the CIS and at the same time, 
together with the countries of the fourth wave of expansion, taking into account the 
factor of attraction for further promotion of the EU's eastern border. The task of 
ensuring close and stable relations between the neighboring CIS countries and 
candidate countries became an integral part of the strategy of the EU enlargement 
(European Commission, Agenda 2000). Significant for the EU policy began to promote 
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the full participation of Russia and the future border of the CIS countries in the Pan-
European economic and political institutions, support for sub-regional organizations in 
the outlying areas for the EU to the Black, Baltic and Barents seas, cross-border 
cooperation of the EU and candidate countries of the CIS, political, diplomatic 
resolution of support “frozen” conflicts in the Caucasus. In 1999 the European Council 
adopted two strategies that contained a common vision of goals, tools and areas of EU 
cooperation with Russia and Ukraine. 
 
In anticipation of the final entry of the candidate countries the EU had taken steps to 
develop tools of “East” policy. In May 2001, at the EU - Russia in Moscow was 
approved by the idea of creating a common European economic space. In May 2003, 
the parties had agreed to form four integrated space as a “common economic space, 
common space of freedom, security and cooperation in the space of external security 
and space research and education, including cultural aspects” (Diplomatic Herald, p. 
10). In May 2005, in Moscow, had been approved “road map”. 
The overall objective of the new EU initiative was to build relations with 
countries that had “all the advantages offered by the EU, except for the 
integration of our institutions of power” (R.Prodi). 
Thus, in the period since the establishment of the European Communities and their 
subsequent transformation into European Union common foreign activities of EEC / EU 
had undergone a significant evolution. After a long phase of the joint policy primarily 
in the areas of trade and assistance to third countries of central focus in the 1990s - 
early 2000s becomes a strengthening of cooperation among the EU's foreign and 
security policy. Providing expansion of the common interests and activities of foreign 
instruments and political rapprochement of the European Union revealed its limits, thus 
set the overall direction of evolution of a system of external relations. Since the early 
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1990s, the EU took a strategic focus on strengthening its influence in neighboring 
regions and countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the preparation of large-
scale EU enlargement to the east in the strategy of “inner circle” were gradually 
included all the CIS countries, except the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan. The broad, resource-intensive, aimed at long-term agenda of the EU in its 
international environment complicate the identification of common interests and goals 
of the EU Member States in respect of five new independent states, the principles of 
their integration into the EU's external relations. 
 
Optimistic sentiments have strengthened after the signing in November 1990, the so-
called Transatlantic Declaration, which formally means the recognition by the United 
States a united EEC as its global political partner. The desire to control the growing 
economic and political potential of a united Germany and acted as one of the factors 
supporting ideas other Western European countries to strengthen international political 
role of the EEC. 
Efforts had been made to integrate the EEC countries into the areas of foreign and 
security policy: the first step was inclusion in the EEA Regulations for European 
cooperation in foreign policy, mainly codified existing practice of foreign policy 
cooperation among the EU in the EPU. Attempts to significantly deepen the integration 
continued during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1990-1991, initiated by the 
leadership of Germany and France with a view to establishing the EEC political union. 
The discussions revealed significant contradictions on key issues of the future 
mechanism. The compromise was fixed in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered through 
the structure of the three “pillars” were held the dividing line between supranational 
interests of socio-economic and inter – “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and 
“Cooperation in the field of justice and internal affairs” the areas of competence. The 
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agreement widely stated goal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: “the 
protection of common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union”, 
“strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”, “to preserve 
peace and strengthen international security”, “promotion of international Cooperation”, 
“develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” (Single European Act, 163). Separately, noted that the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy “includes issues relating to the security of the 
Union, including the formation of the final light of a common defense policy, which 
could be transformed over time into a common defense”.  In the Maastricht Treaty, a 
wide range of areas, “mutual interest”, was including the “politics of the asylum”, 
“immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries' struggle against 
the “unauthorized migration”, “drug abuse”, “international crime”, “terrorism” (Single 
European Act, 169-170). 
The results of the practical implementation of the mechanism of a common external 
policy, made in the first years after the entry into force in November 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty, were twofold. Might be assessed as positive the apparent trend towards the 
intensification of external political cooperation between EU countries in various organs 
of the Council, the beginning of the use of joint action. Most of the sequence of actions 
the EU was to make the inclusion in the 1994 ENP Secretariat of the General 
Secretariat of the Council. At the same time revealed significant difficulties, questioned 
the “general” nature of the common foreign and security policy. According to 
observers, the main obstacle was the lack of willingness on the part of national 
governments to conduct a coherent common foreign policy within the EU. This was 
manifested in the implementation of unilateral government action without prior 
consultation and coordination of positions in the EU, and in their intransigence on this 
or any other international issue, restraining the production of common EU policy.  
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Along with the consensus method of decision-making in the Council and the lack of a 
mechanism of sanctions against the “offenders” have been identified other weaknesses 
functioning foreign policy. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty did not provide for 
granting the status of the European Union subject of international law, which is 
extremely complicated process of entry into force of EU agreements with third 
countries: if the agreement covered the issues of the second or third “pillars”, required 
the passage of national ratification procedures in all EU countries. Regular rotation of 
the Presidency of the Council of the country has become one of the sources of the 
problem of “institutional memory” - the inconsistency of EU policy in certain areas, 
taking into account different set of priorities for each country. The mechanism of the 
three pillars that united representatives of the three States which were in charge as 
heads of the Council was not sufficient to solve it. 
Separation of a common foreign policy as self-reliance pillar within the 
European Union has led to inter-institutional and contradictions in the EU. 
During the 1990s the issue of distribution of powers between the outer main 
structural units of the European Commission remained valid. In the spring of 
1993 was established the Directorate General for External Political Relations of 
the EU, which together with the general supervision over the implementation of 
a common foreign and security policy, was settled to regulate relations with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, other European countries, Mongolia 
and the former Soviet republics. As a result, responsibility for external relations 
the EU has been distributed among the various General Directorates, the 
competence of which covered only the external aspects of EU activity, which 
could not cause division within the European Commission (Bretherton p.39-40) 
The greatest problems arose between the Council and the European Commission. Much 
of the Board members preferred the Commission to consider more as a technical body 
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that executes decisions of national governments in foreign policy. On the other hand, 
the European Commission, endowed with the exclusive right to propose a socio-
economic sphere, serving as chief negotiator on behalf of the EU at the conclusion of 
agreements, with its wide network of offices in many countries and international 
organizations, sought to increase their influence on EU foreign policy. Involvement of 
the European Commission in an advisory and consultative body to the Council of 
Ministers, Political Committee, working groups of the Council, the Secretariat of the 
Council did not meet the views of the European bureaucrats own role. Tensions 
between the two institutions projected for many areas, up to the weak coordination 
between the embassies of the EU and European Commission Delegations in third 
countries.  
Finally, the lack of common tools in the arsenal of military-political cooperation 
between the European Union narrowed the possibilities. Despite efforts on the 
expansion of Western European countries, increasing its operational capacity, 
agreed cooperation framework of Western European countries and NATO, the 
mechanism of interaction between the EU and Western European countries has 
not been fleshed out, and the EU countries to refrain from prescribed by the 
Maastricht Treaty rights refer to the Western Europeans countries to develop 
and implement the decisions and actions which have defense implications 
(Danilov p.171-173).  
Many of the weaknesses of the common foreign and security policy is visibly 
manifested themselves during the repeated attempts of the EU to resolve the crisis in the 
Balkans, acknowledged as the failure of the largest European political cooperation 
mechanism. 
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Generally, the degree of cooperation of EU countries has increased significantly, 
which allowed the researchers to talk about the current “intensive 
intergovernmental networks” cooperation (Boer den M.Wallence p.503). 
 At the same time because of the significant differences in the structure and traditions of 
the functioning of national judicial systems and security agencies process of 
convergence on many issues delayed. The text of the European Convention on Police 
Office (Europol) mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, along with extra protocol was 
finalized in June 1996. The need for national ratification procedures were further 
delaying the start of full operation of the new agency. 
Revision of the major shortcomings and problems of functioning of the second and 
third “pillars” had become one of the main themes of the next Intergovernmental 
Conference of EU countries that took place in Turin in March 1996 was the Amsterdam 
Treaty, signed at the end of October 2, 1997 upheld the “tricycle” or “three-point” 
structure of the European Union. Changes made to the mechanism of a common foreign 
policy testified about the preservation among national governments cautious approach 
to its development, based on the strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation. The 
post of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was 
established, which is at the same time the Secretary General of the Council, with the 
function of facilitating the preparation, adoption and implementation of the conduct of 
political dialogue with third countries, as well as representational powers. In his work 
he had to rely on a special section of the Policy Planning and Early Warning System, 
established within the General Secretariat of the Council. The contract was secured by 
the Council of the appointment of special representatives of the EU. List of tools added 
to “common strategies” adopted by the European Council framework documents in 
areas where member states have important common interests (Amsterdam Treaty). 
Established principle of qualified majority with the approval of the Council common 
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positions and actions based on common strategies, complemented by a reservation of 
the right member of the Board to require a unanimous decision on important matters of 
national policy (Amsterdam Treaty). More significant was the introduction of the 
position of “constructive abstention”, in which the presences of abstentions among the 
Council members do not interfere with the decision. 
In comparison with the Maastricht Treaty provisions on the common EU defense policy 
as an element of the second “support” were more detailed. There was a clearly defined 
scope of “defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy”:   
“The tasks of humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping issues, as well as the problem of 
striking forces acting to resolve crises and restore peace” (Amsterdam Treaty). The 
contract provides that the definition of principles and guidelines of foreign policy and 
security policy and European Council decisions on joint action by the Board subject to 
the defense. 
Immigration policy and asylum policies fully incorporated into the founding treaties 
Communities, thus becoming the first “pillar” of the EU. 
Changes in the mechanisms of the EU second and third “pillars” have been made after 
the Amsterdam Treaty. Franco-British Declaration, signed at St Male in December 
1998 paved the way for the formation of a new structural element of the common 
foreign and security policy - the European Security and Defense Policy, which meant 
the failure to consider the Western European countries as a military instrument of the 
European Union. Construction of the European Security and Defense Policy in the 
establishment of permanent political and military authorities, as well as plans for the 
accumulation of a large autonomous military and civilian capabilities to the EU in 2003 
and found repercussion in the contract signed by the EU in Nice in February 2001. At 
the special EU summit in Tampere in October 1999, important decisions were taken in 
the field of internal affairs and justice, among whom figured the intention to create a 
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common asylum regime, and joint operational agency to fight organized crime. Under 
the Lisbon Treaty, EU sign a December 13, 2007 assumed the formal elimination of 
“three-point” structure of the EU and the unification of decision-making process. 
However, that did not affect the sphere of common foreign and security policy: the 
provisions of the contract, despite some innovations, retained typical Amsterdam and 
Nice treaties primary progressive course of cooperation. 
Thus, in the framework of EU cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy 
was similar to the principle of enhanced cooperation rather than integration. National 
governments retained a high degree of autonomy in making and implementing 
decisions. Duality of results and the low efficiency of foreign attempts defined the place 
of military integration in the EU's European security architecture. Despite the 
significant increase in its value, a crucial role in ensuring the military security of the 
majority of EU countries continues to NATO, after the “cold war” to initiate the 
expansion of the organization and the range of problems in the area of crisis 
management and peacekeeping outside the territory of its members. Functions were 
expanded of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, transformed in 1995 
into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the cumulative 
impact of the EU countries into NATO and the OSCE has provided great opportunities 
to achieve common interests of the European Union, and coordinate policies in 
international organizations and forums has been spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty as 
one of the areas of common foreign and security policy.  
 
The integration factor severely affected the evolution of the system of 
geographical priorities of the EU. The regional policy crystallized as worsening 
political situation in many countries of your nearest and frustration results of the 
1990-1991 Intergovernmental Conference on political union. Management of 
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the European Commission since the beginning of 1992 speaks of the fallacy of 
spray attention and funds the Community and in the future clearly and 
consistently advocated the adoption of the call, at “the threshold” of the 
organization (Delors, 1992).  
An important step in reaching an agreement has been approved by the European 
Council in Lisbon in June 1992 report of the Foreign Ministers of the EEC areas of 
common foreign and security policy after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: 
among the factors determining the existence of common external interests and the need 
for joint action, had been transferred to the geographical proximity of the region or the 
country
36
. Isolation of the summit in Essen in December 1994 as one of the four priority 
areas for the whole of the EU to ensure peace and stability on the European continent 
and adjacent regions of the evidence conclusively established in the EU consensus
37
. 
 
Self-restraint did not mean self-isolation and did not prevent the activation of policies in 
other areas. This is due to not only the new strategic situation, and Intra-integration 
dynamics, and stable trends in the global economy. Overall, the EU's external activities 
focus on the predominant use of coordination mechanisms, approaches, economic 
resources and political leverage in its immediate international environment. 
Strategy priority to develop relations with its neighbors meant, above all, strengthening 
cooperation with countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Begun in 
June 1990, negotiations on the content, timing mechanisms and creating a unified 
European Economic Area (EEA) concluded with the signing in May of 1992 the first 
version of the agreement. 
                                                             
36  Counseil Européen de Lisbonne (26-27 juin 1992): Conclusions de la Presidence. Available on: 
http://eurparl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon 
37  Counseil Européen d’Essen (9-10 december 1994): Conclusion de la Presidence. Available on: 
http://eurparl.europa.eu/summits/essl_fr 
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Against the backdrop of a clear understanding of goals and means to enhance policy 
toward the countries of the European Free Trade Association within the EEC grew 
discussion about developing a strategy for states lying on the perimeter of the eastern 
and southern borders of the EU. From both sides the EEC was under pressure towards 
the deepening of ties. In the eastern part of the European continent liberated from the 
“iron” Soviet custody in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the “velvet 
revolutions” of 1989-1990 on the path of liberal economic and political reforms whose 
success is inextricably linked with the early “return to Europe” after the entry into the 
European Economic Union. Also, some countries on the southern flank (Morocco and 
Turkey in 1987, Cyprus and Malta in 1990) have applied for membership. By this they 
are also pushing for the last decade, increased economic dependence on the EEC. 
The process of developing an adequate response was complicated by the rapidly 
deteriorating political situation in many states. Internal systemic crisis in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe undermined the fragile political stability. Gloomy 
outlook could become a situation of Yugoslavia, during the “cold war” was part of the 
Mediterranean partners, EEC: a federation is steadily moving to the collapse and civil 
war, increasing tensions in the neighboring states of the EC and Central and Eastern 
Europe. In the Southern Mediterranean countries with the partial liberalization of the 
observed internal destabilization associated with opposition to the secular government 
and Islamic opposition. Multifactor instability in neighboring regions has stimulated 
massive legal and illegal migration and infiltration of criminal and terrorist groups in 
the countries of the European community, has threatened military security of Western 
European countries, the interests of European investors, the reliability of energy 
supplies from North Africa and the USSR, the environmental situation in Europe. 
Comparative analysis of policy in two areas indicates the presence of a hierarchy of 
priorities. Relations with Central and Eastern European countries were normalized in 
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1988-1990 in June 1988 adopted a joint declaration of the EEC and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) of mutual recognition agreements on trade and 
economic cooperation launched a technical assistance program “Phare”. In December 
1991 started the signing of association agreements ("Europe Agreements"), which 
included items such as political dialogue, the introduction of free trade in industrial 
goods, easing restrictions on movement of persons, services and capital. (Commission 
Européenne. P.13-23). Decisive in shaping the "east" policy has been voiced by the EU 
at the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 a proposal for Central and Eastern 
European countries join the EU as soon as they meet the established criteria. According 
to the staff of the Centre of West European Studies, Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, the spread of the integration 
processes in these countries was chosen as “the only effective way to counter 
destabilizing trends in Europe and the strengthening of European security”. An 
additional mechanism was approved by the French initiative is the development and 
signing of the Stability Pact in Europe, designed to ensure the inviolability of borders 
and address the issue of minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Pre-Accession 
Strategy was approved by the European Council in Essen in 1994. In December 1997, 
decided to open formal negotiations with six countries. In October 2002, were identified 
deadlines join the main group of candidate countries in May 2004 completed the 
process of accession of ten countries, including the three Baltic countries. In January 
2007, became full EU members Bulgaria and Romania. Planning the most ambitious in 
the history of European expansion has included the painful process of the 
harmonization of intergovernmental conferences in the future institutional structure and 
financing of the EU. 
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Activation of integration processes within the UES in the second half of the 1980s 
fueled rampant in the member states of mood. Began the integration boom has been the 
most fruitful in the socio-economic sphere. Single European Act in 1986 opened the 
way for the formation of the Common Internal Market. Approved in February 1992 in 
Maastricht “Treaty on European Union” outlined a phased implementation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union member countries. The implementation of the tasks 
contributed to the further convergence of interests of the EU and over supranational 
instruments of domestic and foreign policy. In particular, the overall environmental 
policy of the EU was institutionalized and strengthened, including cooperation with 
third countries and international organizations through the mechanism of trans-
European networks established by the Maastricht Treaty, enhanced external component 
of total activity in the field of transport, energy and telecommunications, providing a 
legal basis for joint policy development (Single European Act). The distance of the 
present Transatlantic relations of that time and nowadays is very well remarked in the 
start up of negotiations of US for TAFTA (A Transatlantic Free Trade Area) and 
including also investments between two sides of ocean. EU has grown up and US 
comparatively had lost some positions.  
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Section C 
The objective conditions and prerequisites for development of relations of Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic with Central Asia countries 
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical approaches for better understanding of history, 
political systems and processes underlying a comparative politics concept. The 
conditions and prerequisites for the development of relations of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia with Central Asia countries have a common ground in the form of shared 
political past of these countries. 
Formation of the geopolitical region of Eastern Europe as a relatively isolated fragment 
on the political map of Europe has been relatively recent and is a logical consequence 
of the restructuring of the post-socialist Eastern part of the European continent. 
Joining a number of Eastern European countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures have 
led Czech Republic and Slovakia being dropped out of the general trends in the 
development of the European system at the beginning, later on took a similar 
transitionary position, as well as the gradual crystallization of the autonomous regional 
dynamics in Central Asia, in its structure and began to be considered by external actors. 
This has contributed to the establishment of separate formats of policies concerning 
these countries, which is not strengthened internal consolidation in this geopolitical 
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space, but gave it some external signs of integrity, or at least common sense of their 
geopolitical situation. 
“The uniqueness of EU’s political system in its diversity; outline between 
Eastern and Western Europe is much more difficult. The EU concept of more 
cultural and historical dimension can have its influence in EU politics. In this 
matter, there is also a presence of ambiguity that characteristic for EU as 
political system which more like a state, and unlike international organization, 
this can bring to a broad range of policy areas, the same ambiguity can be found 
in EU institutional decision-making process. And not every country is reflected 
as source of decision-making agent.  (Lelieveldt, 2011)” 
To clarify these issues, it is necessary to consider the evolution of the geopolitical 
region of Eastern Europe over the past two decades, and its specific results at 
contemporary stage. 
It must be admitted that for a long time in the current upheavals in Eastern Europe were 
not important for European politics. In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, these countries were remained rather reserved and somewhat peripheral field of 
the European Affairs. External impulses of its structuring were minimal and were 
limited mainly to prevent overflow beyond the dominant centrifugal tendencies in it to 
destabilization and fragmentation. Almost constrained, these tendencies in fully proved 
in the 90s, having led not only to increase of turbulence and instability, but also to 
accumulation in it considerable conflict potential. This refers also to Russian – 
Ukrainian gas conflict which affected energy shortage mainly in Slovakia, due to its 
dependence of supplies
38
. As a consequence, none of the conflict lines are has become 
the foundation for building a new system of relationships in Eastern Europe. The 
                                                             
38 Slovakia and Bulgaria depend on gas imports up to 90%.  
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cumulative effect of tension on all existing lines of conflict resulted in the impossibility 
of constructing a system on the basis of cooperative projects. The situation was 
aggravated by the fact that practically none of the major players there did not aim to 
overcome the escalating conflict, seeking rather to use them for more political points 
than neutralize them as a potential threat of safety for all Eastern Europe
39
. The Czech 
Government as EU presiding country in 2009 has not taken a leadership role in 
addressing the problem. It is important to note that the economic interdependence 
inherited from Soviet period is very strong and none of the countries yet overcome it 
completely. The economic interdependence still is provoking the conflict issues in 
Central Asia as well. Also it is possibly to add to it the tactics of use by local elite of the 
conflicts of one level for damping of the conflicts at other levels; it is possible to 
receive rather exact picture of a political landscape of Eastern Europe and deepening its 
political failures. 
In the monograph of Russian specialist S.Zhiznin “Energy Diplomacy”, along with the 
main characteristic of the tendency of European integration in the energy sector, is an 
                                                             
39 In 2012 Putin was solving the problems with Turkish partners. Putin held a ceremony to start the 
construction of the “South Stream”, construction begin in 2014. Italy currently chairing the European Union, 
support the pipeline project “South Stream”, previously, the EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger 
called to suspend construction of the pipeline need to until it will not correspond to the norms the European 
Union. He pointed out that in order to build a pipeline, Russia must recognize the rules of the Third Energy 
Package. According to the document, the owners of pipelines in the EU cannot be gas companies. On the eve 
of Putin's visit to Istanbul in December 2012 observers conclude that Russian-Turkish relations are far from 
ideal. Differences, in particular, were outlined against the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline39, the agreement on 
the construction of which was signed in 2009. Russia believes that the EU's attempts to freeze the 
construction associated with the desire to “punish” Russia for Crimea accession.  
 
South Stream – is a gas pipeline, whose task is to transport gas to bypass Ukraine, with which Russia has 
seriously deteriorated relations. It planned to build a gas pipeline through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Italy. Construction of the “South Stream” launched December 7, 2012 near Anapa. 
Commissioning of the first line is scheduled for the end of 2015. Total capacity of both pipelines will exceed 
60 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Putin solves problems with Turkish partners 12.03.2012 / Sergei 
Kulikov Source - Nezavisimaya Gazeta permanent article address - 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354511040 
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attempt to determine the place of the Caspian region in the external EU energy 
strategy
40
.  
The work of B.Potshveriya (Institute of Oriental Studies) on the establishment of 
relations in Central Asia and Turkey in the first half of the 1990s substantiates 
the thesis of the important role played by EU policy and the leading EU 
countries to strengthen the position of Ankara in the region
41
  
(Potshveriya, 2001). 
While analyzing different points of view of Russian researchers, some of them 
treat certain aspects of the Central Asian policy of the EU as a “forcing away” 
Russia out of the region, a number of experts in the analysis of international 
cooperation in Central Asia are emphasizing based on the thesis that the 
presence of a consolidated policy of the EU countries, as well as their interests 
in terms of economic and political expansion to gain control over energy 
resources of Central Asia
42
 (Belokrinitsky, Sklyarov, 1996).  
Kazakhstan in Central Asia has a role as the largest, relatively self-sufficient state with 
a close relationship with all members of the space and is able to set the vector of the 
political process in its regional environment, although not directly determining it. It is 
well known that in last decade about 30% of oil extracted in Kazakhstan are the share of 
European companies, and more than 43% of the Kazakhstan oil export go to EU 
countries (generally to Italy, the Netherlands and Austria, Slovakia)  (Strokov A., 
Panamonov V.) 
43
. The main items of Czech imports from Kazakhstan in 2011 include 
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 Zhiznin C. Energy Diplomacy, 1999 
41  B. Potshveriya Turkey is between Europe and Asia. Results of Europeanization at the end of the 
twentieth century, 2001 
42 
 Belokrinitsky V. Sklyarov, L., The current situation in Central Asia and Caucasus: A view from Iran, 
1996 
43  Strokov A., Panamonov V., Import of the Kazakhstani hydrocarbons  – The steady basis of cooperation of 
the European Union and Kazakhstan  http://www.easttime.ru/analytics/kazakhstan/import-kazakhstanskikh-
uglevodorodov-ustoichivaya-osnova-sotrudnichestva-evrope 
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crude oil (83%, Kazakhstan is third largest supplier of oil to the Czech Republic after 
Russia and Azerbaijan)
44
. 
This is largely explained by the peculiarities of the situation in the coming years on the 
basic structural level of the European system, which is reduced mainly to the interaction 
of the leading centers of power, and, in the this region directly. But as introduced at the 
beginning of this dissertation “non-statehood” Europe has its peculiarities in the 
capability of flexible governance of different speeds.  
Firstly, the transformation of Eastern Europe into completion ground for power centers 
occurred in the context of conservation and somewhat deepening the geopolitical 
intermediate position in this region. Secondly, competition for influence in this area was 
conducted not directly and openly, but implicitly in mediated forms. Problematic issues 
related to this field have not been the subject of systematic negotiations within the 
current institutional and bilateral interaction formats. Moreover, there was no attempt to 
develop a systematic compromise on these issues. What was happening around Eastern 
Europe in 2005-2008 is rather a chain of mutual asymmetric response of European 
actors to the unilateral actions of each other, generating a kind of “spiral of tension”, 
which, however, could not find an open recognition in political rhetoric of the parties. 
Thirdly, the competition was of uneven and selective. It concerned some of the most 
painful aspects of the situation in Eastern Europe, namely military-political and energy 
sectors. The attention was focused on building a strategic presence in this region, while 
the strengthening of the EU presence did not cause any concerns. However, at this 
particular period in the shadow of the Russian-American confrontation was the 
prerequisites of competition between the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe
45
, which 
                                                             
44  Economic and trade relations of the Czech Republic – Kazakhstan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech 
Republic  
45 
 Russia and the USA declared the beginning of "reset" of the relations in 2009. Then at a meeting in 
Geneva US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov the 
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although is less intensity and resonance, but as it turned out, has a more substantial 
structural importance for the political formation of the region. It must be admitted that 
this competition did not occurred as a result of a deliberate strategy of the parties, but 
rather was a by-product of the implementation of their policies in different directions as 
a lack of coordination between them. 
And fourthly, the competitive policy in regard to Eastern Europe did not affect the 
underlying sources of conflict of the region. It is rather, the controversy at the US-
Russia and some EU-Russia “were imposed” on formed in it at different levels the 
complex of conflicts, but it did not change much, so did not lead to the desired 
stabilization, if not in the former Yugoslavia with the progressive enlargements of EU 
and NATO to the now independent republics. 
46 
However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, due to peripetias of the specified 
period finding a compromise formula of the leading actors’ interaction in Eastern 
Europe became an indispensable condition to the formation of cooperative bases of new 
system of relations on the continent, including the construction of new security 
architecture in Europe. Of course, without overcoming the existing conflict issues in 
this region but developing acceptable modus operandi for all actors in the continental 
system it is not possible. 
Structuring values that acquired EU policy upgrading Eastern Europe over the years 
must be recognized, despite all criticism towards EU policy formats in this region.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
symbolical button which ministers pressed together. It has not passed also several months as a drowning in the 
relations between the countries was braked again. The question of antimissile safety in Europe became a new 
stumbling block.  
 Russia insists on the participation in created by the USA and NATO to EUROABM system, demanding 
guarantees that this system won't be directed against it. The USA refuses to give such guarantees and don't intend to 
connect the ABM system with the country which is not the member of NATO. In 2009 Barack Obama made 
concessions, having agreed to revise plans of placement of interceptor missiles in Poland and radar in the Czech 
Republic.  
 However the new program of creation of the ABM also displeased Moscow. 
46 Case of Crimea can be mentioned.  
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Brussels anyway managed (what Moscow could not) to create the convergent political 
framework uniting all six countries of Eastern Europe, despite separation of their 
purposes and approaches in the relations with EU.  
Summarizing the presented analysis, it should be emphasized that, while remaining the 
most amorphous, least regulated region, Eastern Europe, however, performs a 
constructive function, stimulating the major actors to the search for the optimal options 
and the best interaction principles in this region. The strategic value to the maintenance 
of security and stability in the Europe, widely belonged to the eastern part, is so high 
that it cannot yet be defined as concluded (could be defined as work in progress). 
However, the factors that may produce the further continuation of the current unstable 
issues and might encourage its members to radical changes in the status quo are not 
observed. 
Eastern Europe represents a region with complex multi-level contradictions, which does 
not fit into any externally  suggested - either in the U.S. project of enhancing 
democracy, or more binding EU regulatory convergence, neither in the Russian project 
of post-Soviet reintegration. Finding an acceptable balance in this region requires 
complex interrelated solutions, the implementation of which is necessarily connected 
with the advancement of existing policy approaches, as well as the revision of a number 
of positions as achieved by the major actors, and on the part of the Eastern European 
countries. Based on this, we may say that in the European geopolitical configuration the 
Eastern Europe acts as an intermediate region, which amorphous states creating a field 
of competition for influence and relationships existing configuration, but does not 
determining it. In Eurozone attractive plays in this case a well perceived “second 
adhesion” quite diffused attitude in the countries not yet sitting in the European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt.    
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Complexity and insecurity as well as regional and external rivalry, is taking place in 
Central Asian region. The majority of experts of Central Asian policies in Czech and 
Slovak Republics are unanimously emphasizing the interest of other countries in region.  
In particular, Russia, USA and China are showing more and more interest on the 
potential energy and strategic position of Central Asia. 
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3.1. The criteria of issues of foreign policies of Czech and Slovak Republics: Central Asia 
as a problem or opportunity  
 
 
The following chapter is organized in three sections. The first section is description of 
principal issues of foreign policy of Czech Republic in Central Asian countries. The 
second section will describe the foreign relations policy of Slovak Republic in region; 
the third section will focus on foreign policy line of Central Asian countries, as well as 
the main diverse of the Czech and Slovak Republics foreign policy with the Republic of 
Kazakhstan – as one the most supporters and endeavors to strengthen the development 
of cooperation with the European Union member states – but also with the other 
countries of the region.   
 
With the adoption of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, there was the necessity for the 
better agreed values and interests. The Strategy took into account the specificities of the 
countries in region and developed individual approaches to each of them, without 
leaving aside the regional cooperation.  
Thus Kazakhstan is presented in Central Asia as political, energy and food supplier of 
stability of the entire region. From the perspective of the European Union, on the basis 
of the approved EU document “EU strategic partner - Central Asia” and in particular 
the Republic of Kazakhstan (30. 06. 2008) and response of the Kazakhstan 
governmental by presenting the state program “Path to Europe”, Kazakhstan is the 
largest importer of EU. In 1997 Kazakhstan government adopted a strategy 
“Kazakhstan – 2030” which provided a long-term scheduled, key objectives and 
priorities for the economic development of the country, which was then refined by the 
Strategic Plan in 2010. Comparing economy from 2000 to 2008 (it two years before the 
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strategic signature of the plan) shows that the volume of GDP increased at twice and 
effective social policies has been fulfilled.  
The supplies of Russian and Central Asian gas delivered to Western Europe and 
transiting through Slovakia had been on the basis of long-term contracts, in November 
2008, with validity until 2028 and with a capacity of supplying 6.5 billion cubic meters 
of gas a year. Physical volume deliveries in 2011 reached 5.9 billion m3
47
 (in 2010 to 5 
billion m3), the physical volumes of transit reached 53.78 billion m3 (in 2010 to 43,350 
billion m3). In the first half of 2012 the volume of supply and transit of gas reached 
1.68 respectively 27.97 billion cubic meters
48
.  
The tendency to diverge the natural resources, strengthen industrial engagement, 
leadership, competitive frameworks, innovative technologies launched well known the 
EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program
49
.   
Abovementioned projects such as ICT systems
50
, research and innovation industrial 
capacities and business perspectives (including SMEs), alternative energy opportunities 
are maximizing the impact of the international cooperation actions.  
One of focus areas of innovative technologies in Czech and Slovak Republics are 
research and application of hydrogen technologies and hydrogen fuel cells in the Czech 
Republic there is a project funded by EU Operational Infrastructure Fund
51
 and the state 
                                                             
47  Trade and economic cooperation with the Czech Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Czech Republic  
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/encyklopedie_statu/evropa/rusko/ekonomika/obchodni_a_ekonomicka_spoluprace
_s_cr.html 
48  Trade and Economic Cooperation of the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation; official 
statistics of Embassy of RF in SR. http://rusemb.sk/svk/Rusko-slovenske-vztahy/spravka/ 
49 Horizon 2020 is EU Research and Innovation Program, with €80 billion fund for 2014 to 2020.  
50 Global ICT marketplace was estimated to be worth app. USD 3.7 trillion in 2008, and by 2011 exceeded 
four trillion USD, even in spite of the global economic slowdown. ‘Global ICT Spending Tops $3.5 Trillion’ 
(2008), JCN Newswires, 20 May, ttp://www.japancorp.net/Article.Asp?Art_ID=18281 
51 Among the various EU-funded projects now runs in nine European cities less than thirty experimental 
buses. 
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budget of the Czech Republic, launched in Institute of Chemical Technology in Prague, 
where will be built in Neratovice
52
 hydrogen refueling station. Particularly, in Czech 
project – buses will be powered by an electric motor and power supplying it with 
hydrogen fuel cells. Expected range will be between 400 to 500 kilometers on one fill-
up. Given that it is a bus for urban public transport, it is more than enough. Hydrogen 
source for unique yet classic way bus will be in production from fossil fuels. There are 
some plans to expand the production and implementation in Bratislava (capital of 
Slovakia). Hydrogen is derived from the electrochemical production of sodium 
hydroxide and chlorine. This technology is based on the basis Neratovice called 
mercury, amalgam electrolysis. There is mission platform: Supporting the development 
of hydrogen technologies and introduction of the hydrogen economy in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. The most important business platform:  1) Coordination of activities 
of entities hydrogen economy among themselves and in relation to programs and 
resources both domestic and foreign. 2) Support and promote the common interests of 
its members with the aim of creating an enabling environment for the development of 
the hydrogen economy. 3) Association with the EU Platform, partner of similar 
institutions abroad. 4) Providing expertise in the departments and agencies of state and 
local governments in areas related to the development of the hydrogen industry. The 
European Commission has proposed investment of € 22 billion Innovation Package for 
Medicine, Fuel Cells and Hydrogen, Bio-based Industries, Clear Sky, Electronic 
Components and Systems for European Leadership
53
.  
Generally the rates of Czech and Slovak Republic in KOF Rankings are high, which 
shows the perspectives of future growth of region. Following graphs are representing 
the numbers:  
                                                             
52
 In Neratovice (Central Bohemian Region of Czech Republic) was launched project with hydrogen fuel cells also in Honda car 
model as experimental project. www.ujv.cz  
53 Horizon 2020 – Public-Private Partnership Joint Technology Initiatives 2013, www.ec.europa.eu/programms   
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TABLE 4: POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION  
Sources: KOF Index of Globalization 
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TABLE 5: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION  
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TABEL 7: SOCIAL GLOBALIZATION  
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 Cyprus   
 Austria   
 Netherlands   
 France   
 Czech Republic   
 Slovak Republic   
 Kuwait   
 Greece   
 United Arab Emirates   
 Liechtenstein   
 Italy   
 Malaysia   
 Israel   
 Croatia   
 Puerto Rico   
 Romania   
 Macao, China   
 Turkey   
 Jordan   
 Bahrain   
 Brunei Darussalam   
 Oman   
 Montenegro   
 Antigua and Barbuda   
 Fiji   
 Azerbaijan   
 Barbados   
 St. Kitts and Nevis   
Morocco 
Palau 
Maldives 
Honduras 
Venezuela, RB 
Korea, Rep. 
Guatemala 
Ecuador 
Greenland 
Samoa 
Belize 
Brazil 
Peru 
Tunisia 
Philippines 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Algeria 
Togo 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Vanuatu 
Bhutan 
Mongolia 
Cameroon 
Kiribati 
Zambia 
Solomon Islands 
Yemen, Rep. 
Tajikistan 
Eritrea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Timor-Leste 
Equatorial Guinea 
Madagascar 
Chad 
Angola 
Ethiopia 
Myanmar 
Channel Islands 
Isle of Man 
91,81 90,99 90,79 89,84 89,79 88,81 88,8 88,59 85,82 85,78 85,44 85,19 83,21 82,67 82,23 82,06 81,46 81,4 81,29 81,12 80,6 80,44 80,07 79,82 78,91 77,02 76,56 76,24 76,2 75,69 75,02 74,36 73,31 72,97 72,82 72,6 72,22 70,99 70,82 70,67 69,93 69,84 69,39 69,27 69,03 67,2 67,19 67,01 66 64,88 64,85 64,62 64,22 63,92 63,55 63,39 63,27 62,73 62,47 61,91 61,88 60,6 58,75 58,65 58,56 58,45 58,21 58,07 57,78 57,49 54,29 53,89 53,79 53,72 53,01 52,43 52,1 51,96 51,86 51,7 51,16 51,02 50,99 50,8 50,77 50,6 50,5 49,6 49,42 48,94 48,85 48,79 47,72 47,12 47,02 46,94 46,28 46,26 45,96 45,75 45,28 45,08 44,77 44,73 44,59 44,05 43,32 43,27 42,81 42,47 42,2 41,83 41,48 41,38 41,36 41,31 41 40,89 40,42 40,18 40,09 40,05 39,09 38,52 38,36 37,9 37,79 37,13 36,51 36,44 35,96 35,93 35,28 35,25 35,22 34,91 34,58 34,27 34,19 33,99 33,27 32,81 31,98 31,63 30,59 30,51 29,89 29,74 29,42 29,02 28,88 28,65 28,3 27,94 27,93 27,59 27,52 27,46 26,81 26,61 26,57 26,47 26,26 26,13 26,05 24,39 24,34 24,25 24,19 24,16 23,9 23,24 22,59 22,42 21,72 21,67 21,59 21,43 21,38 21,28 21,02 20,99 20,51 20,08 19,9 19,5 18,97 18,95 16,99 16,56 16,15 15,88 15,19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Social Globalization   
107 
 
 
Considering the ratio of regional and country aspects of EU external policy – innovative 
technologies of EU will substantially impact the growth of Central Asia. Due to the 
region’s undergoing rapid structural transformation, having institutional changes, non-
competitive products or factor markets and the condition of the commodity economy 
nature, which is common for Central Asia. Soviet closed economic complex - was 
simply not adapted to the new conditions. In the course of the market, largely 
spontaneous transformation survived the most liquid sector of exporting raw materials 
and semi-finished products. In fact, all countries have experienced massive 
deindustrialization, loss of quality and simplifying the structure of the total production. 
Nowadays is presented the extremely high dependence on imports of consumer goods, 
technology and sophisticated products. From fluctuations in the prices for major export 
commodities and other factors that governances do not control. Having an economy that 
does guarantee – neither stability nor sovereignty nor decent welfare – is destabilizing 
factor for region.  
In order to overcome the economic and industrial challenges in every country of Central 
Asia have been adopted the development Strategies: Strategy of Industrial and 
Innovation Development of Kazakhstan for 2003-2015, The Welfare Improvement 
Strategy of Uzbekistan for 2013-2015, Sustainable Development Strategy of 
Kyrgyzstan for 2013-2017, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy strategy: following the 
course of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation.  
It remains to determine whether these strategies will gain efficiency and will constitute 
the growth of economies. The scope for improvement and growth do not depend only 
internal forces but significantly on adopting technologies and innovations. In this case 
the Czech and Slovak Republics experiences are very important for Central Asia – due 
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to Czech and Slovak technologies with its implications and applications to frame and 
implement economic policies that can maintain the stability in Central Asia; the only 
issue here are these opportunities will be adequately and comprehensively applied in 
region.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
 
 
Section D 
Czech approach  
 
The majority of experts of Central Asian region in Czech Republic are unanimously 
emphasize the interest of other countries in region; in particular, Russia, USA and 
China showing increasing interest about the potential energy and strategic position of 
Central Asia.  One of the well-known experts Slavomír Horák has large number of 
publications with main topic is the economic opportunities of different actors in region. 
Czech foreign policy in Central Asian region is guided by the interests and values of the 
state according to principles of promoting the Czech Republic as part of the European 
Union; committed to contribute to application and development of the common cultural, 
material and spiritual values as an integral part of the European heritage. Czech foreign 
policy especially in the context of the European integration process is determined to 
firm bilateral relations. It relies on the traditional values of the Czech political thinking, 
which builds on the usefulness of dialogue, integration and the need to understand the 
complexity of the contemporary world.  
Clarifying the relationships existing between Czech Republic and Central Asian 
countries is a necessary to understand the causes, origins, impact on policy-making and 
strategies of policy-makers. The majority of EU decisions are taken within existing EU 
frameworks (Lelieveldt, 2011), nevertheless decision-making in the EU is time to time 
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described as technocratic, as consequences of different approaches often make difficult 
to reach effective decisions. Inefficient and inflexible decision-making is a common 
way to treat policy failures (Scharpf, 1988). The existing barriers do not allow apply the 
potential of each Member State and Union in general. The Czech Republic recognizes 
that the EU is sometimes perceived from the outside as closed Community.  
Therefore, main motto of the Czech Presidency in 2009 had become “Europe 
without barriers”. The Czech Republic external dimension considers pointing 
out the existence of barriers for low level of liberalization of trade with third 
countries, inadequate energy policy of the European Union, the slower pace of 
expansion EU, and the obstacles existing within transatlantic economic 
cooperation. Further progress is in creating a common migration and asylum 
policy following the removal of barriers to mobility between Member States of 
the Union, as well as achieves greater external openness (Czech Committee for 
the EU, 2007).  
The financial crisis provided an enormous stimulus for cooperation with growing-
economic countries. In this case the membership of Kazakhstan in Customs Union 
(with market of population over 167 million people) can be lucrative for decision-
making policies.  
Moreover the economic issues on patent and certificate authorization and requirements 
are unified in the territory of Customs Union. The crisis convinced politicians that 
something needed to be done.  Czech Republic included Kazakhstan in their list of 12 
priority countries for business interaction.   
The Czech Republic began in the region the developing projects in the field of 
migration, development work since 2008, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The projects are funded by the Department for Asylum and Migration Policy 
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of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic from the International Development 
Cooperation. These projects supported migratory capacity to support all three states, as 
well as support for returnee reintegration mechanisms, but also the population at risk of 
migration. Over € 150,000 has been allocated in 2008-2009 to support area countries of 
Central Asia in migration management and support reintegration mechanisms.  
It was planned that in July 2013 MFA of the Czech Republic to continue further to the 
operational strategy mid-term evaluation conducted humanitarian budget utilization and 
global humanitarian needs. According to its results, and depending on the state of 
available funds will be in III - IV quarter supported activities humanitarian funds and 
UN agencies (CERF
54
, OCHA
55
, UNHCR
56
, UNICEF
57
, UNRWA
58
, and WFP
59
). In 
relation to international obligations and current needs will be implemented food aid - 
embassies tentatively indicated the need for food and nutrition assistance in Tajikistan 
and few African countries. The balance of any outstanding humanitarian budget will 
support humanitarian activities. Czech are active in CADAP
60
 is divided into four 
programs DAMOS
61
, MEDISSA
62
, TREAT
63
 and OCAN
64
, DAMOS run by Czech 
representatives. DAMOS program designed to increase national capacity and the 
introduction of international standards in the comprehensive report on the drug situation 
in the country. 
                                                             
54
 CERF – The Central Emergency Response Fund – a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations  
55 OCHA – The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs   
56 UNHCR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
57 UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund 
58 UNRWA – The United Nations Relief and Works Agency  
59
 WFP – United Nations World Food Program  
60 CADAP is project commissioned by the European Commission conducted by a consortium of European countries, coordinated 
by the German company for international assistance (GIZ). CADAP project is part of the Action Plan on Drugs EU - Central Asia, 
signed in 2009 within the framework of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
61 DAMOS – implemented by ResAd, Czech Republic, to help the governments develop a better understanding of the drug 
trafficking, drug use, misuse and abuse, as well as their consequences in Central Asia. 
62 MEDISSA – implemented by the National Bureau for Drug Prevention (KBPN) Poland, to help the governments prevent 
potential new drug users and reduce the number of current drug addicts by better informing the public of drug usage risks. 
63 TREAT – implemented by Zentrum fur interdisziolinare Suchforschiung of Hamburg University (ZIS), Germany, to support the 
introduction of modern drug addiction treatment methods within the public health system and the prison system. 
64 OCAN – implemented by GIZ, Germany, to help to project management issues of all three specific components. 
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Section E 
Slovak approach  
 
In the matter of Slovak foreign policy in Central Asian region the primary 
implementation of interests of the Slovak Republic is the key approach within external 
policy of European Union. In 2014 is 10 years of the accession of Slovak Republic to 
EU. During this period Slovak Government supported the decision-making process 
based on joint action by Member States and European institutions on rules and 
regulations of EU. Special attention paid to the Government of the Slovak Republic and 
the cross-sectional EU multiannual strategic issues which have a direct effect on the 
performance of key roles in the financial, economic, regional and social development, 
security and foreign policy of Slovak Republic; inter alia, for preparing the multiannual 
financial framework for 2014-2020, the implementation of the Europe 2020 objectives, 
to stabilize the financial environment, as well as the field of EU external relations the 
context of foreign policy priorities. 
Economic diplomacy is one of the pillars of Slovak foreign activities. Primary attention 
paid to the promotion of exports and tourism, foreign investments, currency stability, 
equalization of Slovak producers on the EU internal market and enhancing energy 
security. The Government works with relevant organizations, especially with the Slovak 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Government provides comprehensive and 
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effective support to Slovak business entities. The pro-export policy focuses on the 
potential of fast-growing economies in the world and search for new opportunities, to 
which adjusts the priority of development assistance, as well as on the expansion of 
export-oriented capacities of Eximbanka
65
. Representatives of business circles of 
government involved in the foreign policy planning and organization. Through export 
promotion council will ensure greater coherence and synergy of all actors working in 
the field of economic diplomacy and in promoting trade and economic interests abroad. 
Abovementioned issues of foreign policies of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic will 
be achieved through programmatic and institutional strengthening of the EU policy. In 
this matter it becomes actual the relevance of energy resources and security aspects of 
Central Asian region and have been recognized as a cornerstone of implementing the 
EU foreign policy. 
Since the 1st May 2004 the Slovak Republic is a member of the European Union, 
Slovakia follows the EU foreign policy approach. Stability and security are the EU’s 
top priorities in Central Asia and are not just indispensable for peace and prosperity in 
the entire Caspian and Black Sea region, but are also directly linked to Europe’s 
security.  
In the area of security, Europe also promotes cross-border cooperation within Central 
Asia. Closed, and in some cases even mined, borders between Central Asian countries 
continue to claim human lives and hinder the movement of people and goods. At the 
same time, cross-border drug trafficking is increasingly becoming an obstacle to 
modernizing the affected societies. Fair distribution and use of water resources, as well 
as environmental protection issues, constitute major regional challenges.   
                                                             
65 EXIMBANKA was founded in 1997 in Bratislava Slovakia, the bank’s mission is to support the Slovak 
exports through banking and insurance activities. Its mission is to improve the economic exchange between 
the Slovak Republic and foreign countries, also increase the competitiveness of Slovak producers in foreign 
markets. 
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The crisis in Kyrgyzstan showed that lasting stability, peace and prosperity can only 
develop soundly if all the fundamental social forces enjoy fair levels of involvement in 
economic and political development. The EU also supports political development in the 
Central Asian states within a comprehensive, partnership-based approach. Here, it is 
guided by the canon of values embraced by institutions like the United Nations and the 
OSCE.
 
Slovak Republic in Kazakhstan, seen as politically stable partner of EU and 
NATO, also as a country with important diplomatic activities in global and regional 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN in Geneva, UNRCCA
66
 in 
Ashgabat), WTO
67
, OECD
68
, IAEA
69
 and as member country of V–470. Slovakia as an 
independent state for the Kazakhstan society is still new country on the map of Europe, 
about its history and culture are only vague ideas, as well as the history of culture of 
Kazakhstan in Slovakia, and here is the great importance of public diplomacy of both 
countries.   
 
The Slovak Republic imports almost 90% of primary energy resources from abroad. 
This figure ranks Slovakia among the EU Members States with the highest share of 
external energy dependence. Slovakia imports 99% of oil, 98% of natural gas and 100% 
of nuclear fuel from Russia. The share of natural gas in the energy mix of Slovakia 
represents 35%, nuclear energy 25% and oil 18%. In other words, more than two-thirds 
(74%) of the current energy mix of Slovakia depends on supplies of primary energy 
resources from a single country – the Russian Federation. The necessity of 
diversification of natural gas supplies has become a priority of the policy of the 
Government of the Slovak Republic after the gas crisis suffered in January 2009. The 
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 UNRCCA – The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (Head of centre is well-known 
Slovak diplomat Miroslav Jenca) 
67 WTO – World Trade Organization  
68 OECD – The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
69 IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency  
70
 V-4 – Visegrad Group also known as Visegrad Four – reflects the common interests of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia 
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main challenge concerning oil supplies rests in the fact that, after 2014, there is a threat 
of termination of supply of Russian oil. 
It should be mentioned a close relationship with Kazakhstan, which is becoming more 
an important strategic partner for the EU, especially in the field of energy. This was 
underlined by President J.M.Barroso during his visit to Astana in June 2013
71
. EU 
representatives are working on the text of a new agreement to expand cooperation and 
partnership between the EU and Kazakhstan, which should open up further 
opportunities to expand cooperation, including in the energy sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
71 Statement by President Baroso following his meeting with the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. 
Nazarbayev http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-496_en.htm 
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Chapter IV 
 
The policy analysis in the region 
The influence of main actors in the region 
  
The contemporary geopolitical context in Central Asia is in active stage of 
transformation involving the preferences of different political actors, the strategic 
rivalry presented by the Russian Federation, European Union states, United States of 
America, Turkey, Iran and China.  
This chapter is primarily concerned with identifying the political actors in region 
and their influence on developing a systematic framework with which to evaluate them. 
Chapter presents the projects and instruments of influence of different actors.  
Actors may differ from each other in their influence and potential. A 
classic definition of power is the potential a person of group has to realize their 
own will in a social action even against the resistance of others’ (Weber, 2007, 
247) 
 Weber suggests that power is an attribute, power is reinforce or depends 
on the powerful actor’s decision on whether to use this power. Power is the 
potential or capability an actor has to influence other actors and decision 
outcomes. Influence is the proportion of the potential which the actor 
accomplishes on a given controversial issue. (Thomson, 2011, 189) 
There are many definitions may be used to explain the influence of actors in the 
geopolitical game which is taken place in Central Asian region.  Outside actors have 
impact of the integration processes in the CIS and Central Asia at the global political 
context in the Greater Central Asia. 
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4.1. Analysis of main actors’ roles in the Central Asia 
 
This analysis organized in three sections. First section describing the objectives of main 
actors in region, second section is about comparative analysis of former Soviet 
countries and contemporary situation after gaining the independence by five Central 
Asian countries, third section is a description of principal issues of formulation and 
regulation of actors’ politics in the region.  
 
4.1.1. The policy analysis activity in the region 
 
It is quite indicative that the factors influencing the course of Central Asian region 
development are distinguished by geopolitical principles of regionalism. This involves 
consideration of the region as a common geopolitical landscape, located in Eurasia; 
territory with a common political objective (including security priorities), economic 
(including transport) interests. In addition, these countries follow a specific political, 
economic line of conduct in the region carried out by taking into account its internal 
resources into the context of existing strategies of interests. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the energy potential of Central Asia has been an 
integral part of the geopolitical discourse, both inside and outside of the region. Despite 
the fact that the attention was initially focused on preventing potential leakage of 
weapons-grade uranium in a poorly protected places in Kazakhstan, at this early stage 
was formed commercial relations with International petroleum consortium (IPC), often 
with considerable diplomatic support. Unified Energy System of Central Asia has been 
built to provide supplies to Russian major cities and transportation routes and, through 
it, with limited inter-regional infrastructure, which would allow establishing joint use of 
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local resources.  This table represents some indicators of institutional changes in 
Central Asia after the collapse of Soviet Union: 
TABLE 8: INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CENTRAL ASIA  
Source: World Bank, 2013 
 
As is seen the Human development index and Education index were quite high in 
Soviet Union, in past 20 years of independence all Central Asian countries have lost 
their intellectual potential, and nowadays is present the situation of brain-drain in these 
countries.  
Data /  
Institutions  
USSR 
1991  
CA 
2013  
Strategy  
Human development Index  0.920 / Rank  
26  
Ranks 69, 
102-125  
support regional 
cooperation  and regional 
security fight against drug 
trafficking 
Political Stability  
(Comprehensive National 
Strength: A Basic Study) 
World Bank WGI 2013  
Percentile Rank 
(0-100)  
20  
KZ 36, KR 
20, TJ 15, 
TK60, UZ 30  
promote the reform of the 
internal policies  
Education Index  0.900/Rank 
22  
Ranks 35, 
67-84  
strengthen cooperation in 
protecting the 
environment, migration, 
education, health  
Pillars/Institutions by WEF  N/A Rank KZ 55, 
KR 133, N/A  
achieve more effective 
management as a 
complement to regional 
cooperation 
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To achieve the improvement in different social, political and economic areas is 
necessary to support the regional cooperation, regional security, educational programs, 
and provide more effective management control as well as the fight against corruption 
in all countries.   
After the collapse of the ruble zone in 1993 and, accordingly, any deprivation of 
recoverability the common post-Soviet economic space, the Central Asian governments 
have decided that the most obvious way for political and economic sovereignty is 
through the maximization of revenues from oil and gas through investments and export 
diversification.  
The economy of six former states of the Soviet Union, with a total population of almost 
75 million, grew with astonishing average speed of 19.7% than $ 200 billion in 2012. 
According to forecasts of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which increased 
fourfold over the last 12 years (up to $ 51 billion), Uzbekistan's economy will grow 
even faster, and ahead of Kazakhstan, will be the largest in Central Asia by 2035. 
Economy of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan showed an average annual growth of 23.9% 
and 22.7%, respectively, between 2000 and 2012. Economy of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, on average grew by 16.1% annually, from $ 2.23 billion in 2000 to $ 13.46 
billion in 2012, Kazakhstan's GDP, the largest regional economy has grown 11-fold to $ 
18.3 billion in 2000 to more than $ 200 billion in 2012 (ADB, 2014). 
 
By the defining in the geopolitical context in Central Asia after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which led to competition for oil and gas deposits in the region; the oil 
and gas industry is in a state of rapid and painful transformation. Estimated reserves of 
oil in Kazakhstan are at a level of 100 billion barrels, which puts it in third place among 
energy suppliers. The estimated reserves of natural gas amount to 5 trillion cubic 
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meters. Kazakhstan holds the world's largest reserves of barite, uranium, tungsten and 
lead. In addition, in the Asian region, it is in second place for deposits of silver, 
chromate, zinc, in third place - for the extraction of manganese, has found deposits of 
gold, iron and copper
72
. Estimated reserves of oil on the territory of Kyrgyzstan are 1 
billion tons
73
 For Russia the key is to keep a supply on its domestic market. 
Geopolitical interest of Western countries in the region becomes increasingly limited to 
security threats; the same way the EU countries view the development of the energy 
sector and with it a more diversified export portfolio as promotion of regional security, 
ensuring a smooth transition to a market economy, as well as resistance to Russian 
revanchism.  
In the first place, the Central Asian states quickly transformed from the consumers of 
established geopolitical game into its agents. The leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, all to a greater or lesser extent, have sought to balance the national 
sovereignty, the interests of the western capital and appease Russian “right of access” to 
the region. Nevertheless, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov was perhaps, the first 
Central Asian leader, which had actively sought to influence the broader geostrategic 
environment, using geography and resources of Uzbekistan for the national interest. 
After 2001, Karimov defunct status of Uzbekistan as a country on the “front line”, for 
the strengthening of relations in the field of security with the U.S., which, although 
subsequently worsened (mainly after Andizhan massacre in 2005
74
), and served as 
demonstration that geopolitical relations, to a certain extent, depend on the efforts of the 
regional subjects.   
                                                             
72
These data were presented at the 19th Kazakhstan International Exhibition and Conference “Oil and Gas” KIOGE 2011 5-8 
October 2011, Almaty, Kazakhstan  
73 According to data of Kyrgyz Agency KyrTAG http://forbes.kz/news/2012/03/30/newsid_2551 
74 According to witnesses in Andizhan were killed 5000 people (among them women and children) by governmental forces.  
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In the energy context, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have sought to balance the 
commercial links with Russia, selectively approaching the access to the western capital 
and technical expertise, in order to gradually diversify entry points on the world oil 
market and to establish gas trade in Europe, South Asia, China and Iran. In particular, in 
Kazakhstan the government has sought to actively use the proximity its raw material 
base for a number of markets through the gradual tightening conditions of work for IPC 
with 2003 by participating in such a strategic export projects, as well as pipeline Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the oil pipeline Kazakhstan-China. For Turkmenistan, 
maximizing capacity gas exports has become the leitmotiv of foreign policy, forming 
relations with Iran, Afghanistan (including the Taliban in period up to 2001, and, most 
importantly, with China, through preferential concessions on the mining and supply 
significant volumes of Turkmen gas through complex Central Asia-China. The second 
disadvantage pattern, at least, is in the energy sector was that the external geopolitical 
influence is already did not include providing direct or non-formal control of the local 
control, and the more receipt of any type of territorial hegemony, that had been 
anticipated in the concept of a big game by theoretician and conservationist 
H.J.Mackinder
75
. Given the historically existing Moscow's control over the region and a 
significant territorial proximity of Russia to Kazakhstan, Central Asia is perceived in 
Russia as a potential channel of transit security threats, such as illegal migration, drug 
trafficking and Islamic terrorism, as well as a potential source of external threats to 
internal security. For the Europe, China and US, Central Asia itself in many ways is not 
important. No one will provide meaningful safeguards or spend significant resources on 
the formation (or facilitating the coordinated management) of the internal geopolitics of 
the region. Thus, the importance of Central Asia lay not in the innermost being of the 
region, but rather in how it relates to outside interests, the main one of which is energy 
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   H.J.Mackinder Geographical pivot of history.  
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security. In general, energy geopolitics in the post-Soviet period has been built around 
two commandments: first, to maximize the sovereignty and independence of action of 
the Central Asian efforts of local and foreign actors, and secondly, the different 
perceptions of security and threats in the region that may affect foreign interests. 
While analyzing different points of view of Russian researchers, some of them 
treat certain aspects of the EU Central Asian policy as a “forcing away” Russia 
out of the region, a number of experts in the analysis of international 
cooperation in Central Asia are emphasizing based on the concept  that presence 
of a consolidated policy of the EU countries, as well as their interests in terms of 
economic and political expansion to gain control over energy resources of 
Central Asia
76 (Belokrinitsky, Sklyarov).  
Other researchers point to a conflict of interest and competition between the EU 
and the U.S. in various fields.  
This thesis does not purport to test the theory of great geo-strategic game; instead, it 
examines the relative importance of certain actors and its relevance to review process of 
cooperation of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in the region.  
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 Belokrinitsky V. Sklyarov, L., The current situation in Central Asia and Caucasus: A view from Iran, 
1996 
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TABLE 9: ANALYSIS OF MAIN ACTORS   
 Institutional 
presence  
Economical presence  Military presence   
Russian 
Federation  
EAEC (or 
EurAsEC), CIS, 
Customs Union, 
SCO,  
Eurasian Economic 
Community, Customs Union 
(market of 180 mln.) 
CSTO 
Military bases in 3 
countries*  
In 2014 Russia give 
Kyrgyzstan weapons 
worth $ 1.1 billion 
 
USA 
 
USAID, OSI 
(Open Society 
Institute),NDI 
(National 
Democratic 
Institute), IRI 
(International 
Republic Institute) 
CACI (The 
Central Asia 
Counternarcotics 
Initiative), The 
U.S. Embassy 
Democratic 
Commission, The 
Eurasia 
Foundation of 
Central Asia, 
Soros Foundation. 
Overall U.S. military spending 
in fiscal 2012 by country is as 
follows: 
Kazakhstan U.S. $ 137.3 million 
Kyrgyzstan U.S. $ 218.1 million 
Tajikistan 
U.S. $ 11.7 million 
Turkmenistan 
U.S. $ 820.5 million 
Uzbekistan 
U.S. $ 105.9 million 
Military base in Manas 
airport in Kyrgyzstan. In 
April 2013 it was 
reported that 
Kazakhstan is ready to 
provide NATO port 
Aktau in the Caspian 
Sea for the transit 
operations from 
Afghanistan. 
US Training center in 
Tursunzade, each year 
100 Tajik military get 
training  (45 km from 
Dushanbe)  
In article of Eurasianet 
American journalist J.Kucera 
informed that U.S. military 
spends in 2012 in Central 
Asia, more than $ 1.31 billion 
including 820 million dollars 
only in Turkmenistan. 
According to data provided by 
the Agency for Logistics - 
wing Pentagon's supplier of 
troops - the amount of 1.3 
billion dollars is a seven-fold 
increase over 2012.  
China SCO, CAREC The share of Chinese 
companies in the oil industry 
in Kazakhstan in 2013 
exceeded 40%. China has 
invested in the Kyrgyz 
economy more than $ 1 
billion. 
40% of loans of  Tajikistan 
belongs to China 
CETC International will 
supply to Kyrgyzstan 
small radar, 
communications 
equipment, as well as 
the opening of a joint 
venture for the 
production of military 
products. China is 
planning to provide 
Kyrgyz army military 
equipment and weapons 
for $ 17.5 million 
 
China Petrol Company 
Zhongda. 
In SCO area will be  
established a network of 
common satellite 
communication 
Turkey  TIKA (Turkish 
Cooperation and 
Development 
Agency), Turkic 
Council, Summit 
In the last 20 years Turkey has 
provided app. $1 bln. to 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan  
Nearly 2000 companies have 
been operating in Central Asia  
Turkish Prime Minister 
R.T. Erdoğan announced 
in February 2013 about 
possibilities to join  
the Shanghai Cooperation 
Turkish-Kazakh International 
Hoca Ahmet Yesevi 
University, Suleyman Demirel 
University in Kazakhstan, 
Turkish-Kyzgyz Manas 
University in Kyrzystan 
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of Turkic nations 
TURKSOY 
(International 
Organization for 
Turkic Culture) 
Turkish Gülen 
schools. 
Organization 
EU OSCE, IOM, 
KAS (Konrad-
Adenauer-
Stiftung), 
CERN, Aga 
Khan 
Development 
Network  
ODHIR, UNDP 
Kazakhstan 
World Bank, European Bank 
of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), 
European Investment Bank 
(EIB) 
NATO, CABSI (Central 
Asia Border Security 
Initiative) CARICC 
(Central Asia Regional 
Information and 
Coordination Center) 
 
NATO has Individual 
Partnership Action Plan 
for Kazakhstan since 31 
January 2006 
ODDA, Erazmus Mundus, 
Tempus,  
Vocational Education and 
Training,  
and the Central Asia 
Research and Education  
Network. NGOs 
Central Eurasia Project, 
International Alert, 
Amnesty International EU 
Office, East-West Institute, 
International Crisis Group, 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies 
 
* In Kazakhstan 
1) 5th State Test Cosmodrome (in the Baikonur) ;   2) Private transport aviation regiment of 
Russian Air Force aircraft (Kostanai);   3) Independent Radar Node Space Forces (Priosersk, 
Sary-Shagan) ;   4) State test site Sary-Shagan- strategic air and missile defense units.  
In Kyrgystan  
1) Russian Air Force Base Kant; 2) Testing Facilities of anti-torpedo (in Karakol, Issyk-Kul); 
3) 338th naval communications "Mirage" (station "Prometheus");   4) Seismic Station 
(working on behalf of the Strategic Missile Forces). The protocol was ratified between Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan on cooperation in the military field in the period preceding the entry into 
force of this agreement. This document will provide the effect of bilateral agreements 
governing the issues of presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russian military units to 29 January 2017, 
and the agreement - the Russian military presence on the territory of the Kyrgyz republic until 
2032. 
In Tajikistan 
1) 201st Russian military base (from 2004, with personnel of 7000 officers in Dushanbe, 
Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab); 2) Optoelectronic complex “Window” (“Nurek”) space control 
system. 
 
Russia and Kazakhstan have made a decisive step in creating a unified regional air 
defense system (NORAD). May 26, 2014 President of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev signed the law on ratification of an agreement with the Russian Federation. 
Agreement on the establishment of a unified air defense zone was signed by Moscow 
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and Astana in January 2013. According to this document, the forces joint air defense 
system will be led by a team appointed by the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan on 
the proposal of defense ministers of both countries. In addition, it is planned to establish 
rules of combat duty and exchange of information. Russia has consistently engaged in 
the creation of unified air defense zones with the CIS countries since 2007. For this 
project in February 2009 joined Belorussia. It is expected that to unified air defense will 
join Armenia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the future is planned to form Eastern 
Europe, Caucasus and Central Asian zones of air defense. 
Coincidentally, shortly before the ratification of the agreement on air defense, the 
United States conducted the first test of a missile defense system (NMD) “Aegis” 
ground-based, which is designed for placement in Eastern Europe. The U.S. military on 
the Hawaiian island of Kauai simulated launch, a goal of that has successfully 
intercepted antimissile Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IB. 
According to the head of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and 
Military Analysis A. Hramchihin - Unified air defense system of Russia and 
Kazakhstan has primarily political significance, due to Ukrainian events - is a very 
important moment for the Russian leadership. Russia in all ways shows that the issues 
of its isolation are out of question. And although the military sphere is not formally 
refers to the Eurasian Union, it is clear that any formats integration among the countries 
- members of the Eurasian Union are positive in formation of this alliance. 
 
According to the head revision of military information ITAR-TASS V. Litovkin 
- In the framework of CSTO
77
, there are three lines of joint air defense system - 
Western direction - it created a unified air defense system of Belarus and Russia, 
South direction, where the air defense system created by Russia and Armenia, 
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 CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization   
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plus Central Asian destination: a unified system of Russia and Kazakhstan 
(Litovkin, 2014). 
In this table are presented the analysis main actors in Central Asian region:  
 
 
TABLE 10: ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS OF ACTORS   
 
Actors  Objectives  Focus on 
security  
Focus on 
development  
Level of 
intervention  
Decision making  
Russia  Control of 
natural 
resources  
High focus on 
security  
 
Protection of 
Russia from 
extremism and 
drug trafficking  
Low focus 
on 
development  
 
Promotion of 
Russian 
language and 
culture  
High level 
long term 
interest  
Russian 
Government  
CSTO 
Customs Union  
Czech 
Republic  
1) Economic 
relations 
2) Energy & 
transport 
3) 
Environment 
and water 
resources    
 
Medium focus 
on security  
 
General Risks 
 
 
High level on 
development 
 
Education 
 
Human 
rights & 
democracy 
Low level 
long term 
interest   
EU common 
foreign policy 
Slovak 
Republic  
1) 
Diversification 
of 
hydrocarbons 
2) 
Environment 
and water 
resources  
 
Medium focus 
on security 
  
Preventive 
diplomacy 
 
 
High level on 
development 
 
 
Economic 
development 
  
Education  
 
Human 
rights & 
democracy 
Low level 
long term 
interest   
EU common 
foreign policy 
China  Control of 
natural 
resources  
Economic 
influence & 
expansion  
Avoid a 
destabilizing 
force in Central 
Asia  
Medium focus 
on security 
Control over 
Uygur 
separatism  
High level 
focus on 
development 
 
High level 
long term 
interest 
SCO 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation  
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4.1.1.1. The Russian Federation 
Russia yet had not the opportunity to develop a new complete strategy in Central Asia. 
Moscow following the Soviet stereotypes remains absorbed with its internal problems. 
Russian behavior in the region is characterized by an element of inconsistency, the 
priority of short-term interests over the long term ones. In this regard, the rates on the 
military presence remains more acceptable to the Russian approach cause is less 
expensive (compared, for example, with the development of economic and political 
ties) and quite effective.  
At the present stage of strategic importance to Moscow stands out the need to counter 
the Afghan-Islamic factor.   
Establishment of a Russian military base in Tajikistan (the information about this base 
was mentioned on page 100 of dissertation) is a clear indication of the choice of 
Tajikistan as a country to represent the Russian geopolitical interests in Central Asia 
and around it. This choice does not imply recognition of Tajikistan as a key state in 
Central Asia, but suggests that this republic is a link in the regional security. Russia, for 
reasons of geopolitical expediency, benefits from a convenient occasion without 
significant material and political costs for strategic foothold in the region. Moreover, 
Russia continues to show interest in the transportation of energy resources in the region. 
USA Geopolitical 
interest  
Prevention of 
emerging the 
influence of 
Russia and 
China  
High level long 
term interest  
Prevent Islamic 
fundamentalism  
Military 
presence & 
engagement  
Low level 
focus on 
development  
High level 
long term 
interest 
US Government  
Turkey  Geopolitical 
interest  
Economic 
relations 
Low focus on 
security  
Low level 
focus on 
development 
High level 
long term 
interest 
Turkish 
Government 
TUSKON 
Turksoy 
TIKA 
Turkish colleges  
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For Russia, as for the other countries participating in the development of oil and gas 
fields, construction and operation of pipelines, energy transportation is not as 
economical but more a political issue, primarily as the effective control over the 
situation in the region. In economic terms, the Central Asian region is not a priority for 
Russia now. 
Russia desires to play a special role in relations with the countries of the region, 
including as a guarantor of security stability, continues together with the tendency in the 
context of weakening Russian influence in Central Asia. The complexity of the socio-
political, economic situation currently diverts from Moscow forming a new strategy to 
develop relations with countries of the region, where core moment estimated to be 
mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Increased understanding of Russia's 
political, economic elite, the availability of new realities and occurred changes in the 
region, the desire to distance from the elements of the imperial approach, certainly will 
continue to be a powerful stabilizing factor in the geopolitical situation in Central Asia.  
 
4.1.1.2. United States of America  
 
U.S. foreign policy strategy for Central Asia is mainly based on geopolitical approach, 
considerations including its own strategic priorities and interests. These approaches 
remain dominant in the system of multiple assessments of the region from the United 
States. It is caused by a wide range of elements of relations with Russia, China, Iran, the 
Islamic world, due to, primarily, the need to maintain favorable for the formation of the 
U.S. balance of power, both at the regional and global levels. 
Certainly in the long term the U.S. would like to see Central Asia in their vital interests, 
however, at this stage, taking into account the existing realities, Washington seeks to 
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prevent from having the major impact of some countries (as Russia, China and Iran) 
which, because of their potential that could limit or reduce U.S. influence.  
The U.S. continues to encourage the activity of Turkey in the region, primarily 
through the concepts of energy transportation in the Turkish area. For some 
extent by following reasons: internal political character - a complex situation in 
Turkey, the possibility of strengthening the position here of some forces 
weakening pro-Western orientation; geo strategic considering Turkey as one of 
the reliable allies in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, including NATO attempts to 
secure Ankara as a key state of the conductor of Washington's policy in the 
region. 
In addition, the implementation of other transport projects (except Afghan, 
Caucasian routes) would lead to strengthening the position of one of the three 
regional leaders – Russia, China and Iran that, as was already noted, is not 
included in U.S. plans. Moreover, to some extent American policy in the region 
is a hostage of internal contradictions within policy-making circles of the United 
States. On the one hand, in the U.S., is exists strong position of those forces 
whose approaches are based on evaluation of advantage or disadvantage for U.S. 
of any actions abroad. On the other hand as in the state considering themselves a 
bulwark of democracy in the world, has a great influence of liberal approach, 
based on the desire to expand and support democratic values everywhere, to 
build a relationship with the outside world on the basis of the principle of the so-
called “democratic standards”. These approaches are sometimes are reflected in 
U.S. foreign policy “bipolar” strategy. This fact often causes fair international 
accusations and criticism of Washington
78
 (Lavrov, 2014). 
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 Lavrov Sergey, Minister of MFA of Russian Federation, Moscow 5, June, 2014. 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Vozvrata-k-prezhnei-modeli-ne-budet-16691 
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One of the reflections of the U.S internal issues  is so called the policy of “double 
standards”, it would seem, are similar, including in “democratic” country conditions, 
often considered in contradict positions. An important element of the U.S. approach is 
manifested in the context of the problem to ensure American competitiveness in the 
global economy, including international finance, at the regional level is caused by the 
formation of conditions for unhindered economic, financial access to Central Asia. The 
main object remains the energy potential; U.S. having an interest in the development of 
transport infrastructure in the region to the west (Eurasian corridor, East-West route), 
the values of which theoretical justification is given in the bill of “Silk Road Strategy: 
XXI Century”, approved by the Senate (March 1999).   
It should be noted that, U.S. policy plays a fairly progressive role towards maintaining 
the geopolitical balance in the region of integration into the international community. 
However, some approaches in contemporary Washington politics causes some 
skepticism, seems idealistic desire to “build a Western-style democracies in the short 
term”, common perception among some US representatives of policy-making circles, 
do not account for the presence of a whole range of threats to the security challenges in 
the region, which are destructive to the stability of Central Asia and the whole Eurasia. 
Certainly in this context, the consideration the specifics of the situation in region is 
welcomed, which can significantly enhance the credibility of Washington in Central 
Asia. 
 
The basic idea is in the concept of the “New Silk Road79” (The New Silk Road), which 
Washington intends to implement in order to strengthen trade relations in Asia and 
support Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces from the country in 2014. 
                                                             
79 In November 2012, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State of the United States of America, speaking at the Singapore Management 
University on “economic diplomacy”, once more mentioned about the development of transport corridors between Central and 
South Asia is a key element in Washington's long-term strategy for Afghanistan. 
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Planned development of infrastructure, installation of energy and transport, and paths 
that pass through Afghanistan and which will link the markets of Central Asia.
80
 
 As part of US Economic Statecraft (economic instruments of government) to use the 
economic instruments to strengthen US diplomatic course abroad and domestic 
economy by supporting US companies for developing opportunities in Central Asia. In 
the summer 2012 it has helped to bring 25 U.S. companies on the American-Uzbek 
Business Forum in Tashkent, and also participated in the organization of the 2
nd
 
Exhibition of U.S. companies in the Turkmenistan, the participants of which were over 
100 companies.”81 (EurasiaNet) 
Therefore basically the interest of US in region first of all concerned the policy of 
military presence, not only in Kyrgyz Republic
82
 and also in Caspian port Aktau in 
Kazakhstan for the transit from Afghanistan, this was stated by President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev in Almaty at the end of April 2013 at the Conference of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan
83
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
80
  Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168840.htm.  
http://news.tj/ru/news/klinton-novyi-shelkovyi-put-yavlyaetsya-klyuchevym-elementom-dolgosrochnoi-strategii-ssha-
po-af 
81  EurasiaNet: Why the U.S. is increasing presence in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan? Permanent address - 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354721820 
82 In Kyrgyz Republic are present following NGOs and analytical centers financed directly from US funds:  CAFMI – 
Central Asian Free Market Institute, Legal Clinic “Adilet”, “Center for Social Technologies”, Research consortium 
“Perspective”, “The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society”, “Foundation for International Solidarity”, the Human 
Rights Foundation “Interbilim”,  Human Rights Center “Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan”.  
83 Almaty Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, April 26, 2013  
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4.1.1.3. European Union  
 
The EU has been engaged with the five countries in Central Asia from the very moment 
states gained their independence in the early 1990s. By 2007 these relations had 
developed significantly and revealed closeness of values and of economic and security 
interests. The growing dynamics of the bilateral relations between the EU Member 
States and Central Asian countries also confirmed that there is a significant potential for 
strategic cooperation between the EU and the region. The EU Member States 
recognized that their bilateral relations would benefit from a coordinated, more focused 
common approach to Central Asia, hence the adoption of the EU-Central Asia Strategy, 
which had been provided the necessary blend of interests and values.  
It also took into account the specificities of the Central Asian countries and developed 
individual approaches to each of them, without leaving aside the regional cooperation. 
As a next step, action-oriented initiatives were developed in the priority areas, identified 
by the Strategy, such as: common security threats, rule of law, education, environment 
and water. Again, they combined the regional and bilateral approaches. 
Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together. It lies at 
a strategically important intersection between the two continents. The Central Asia 
states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
have known considerable evolution in political and economic transformation since 
attaining their independence. By signing the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
they set themselves ambitious goals. They would like to establish statehood, 
safeguarded multi-ethnic understanding and inter-religious communication. By joining 
the OSCE, they subscribed to the Organization’s values, standards and commitments.  
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At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the time has come for a new partnership between 
the EU and Central Asia states in a globalised world, but European position towards 
Central Asia is characterized as cautious restrained, largely due to ongoing 
comprehension of changes in Eurasia by EU policy-making circles. At the present stage 
there are no EU geopolitical interests in the region. In economic terms, the active 
development of relations between the EU and Central Asian region, prevented by not 
for distance to Central Asia to Europe, but for high transport costs throughout the 
European-Central Asian route, its insecurity, and ongoing contradictions between some 
countries.  
EU continues to show an interest in the ideas of integration cooperation between the 
countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. However, the interest of the 
European Communities towards the Pacific Ocean, increasing engagement with Asia-
Pacific countries, is weakening value of communication with the Russian Federation 
provides to European countries possibilities of full engagement territories of Central 
Asian states as a transport corridor. The emphases fact that the main guarantor 
(including financial) success of the transport (and not only energy) project “East-West” 
is precisely the European direction. Most infrastructure projects in neighboring 
countries in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, is organically integrated into a 
comprehensive program of the European Commission to establish a transport 
information highways Europe - Caucasus – Asia, which grants the EU a special place in 
their relations with the Central Asian republics. Furthermore, the ability of the EU to 
play a privileged role in the region also linked to the fact that European-Central Asian 
relations are not burdened by past ambitions. They are based on a more thoughtful 
realistic approach unlike relations with other countries.  
At the political level, primarily in the area of security, the importance of the EU's 
relations with the region already determined by the fact that all Central Asian countries 
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are members of the OSCE. Currently allows them to develop direct relations with 
European states, bypassing any intermediaries. According to experts, further expansion 
of relations with Central Asia will be uniquely useful for the EU in terms of economic 
policy prosperity. According to some European analysts, a strong economic, diplomatic 
involvement of the EU in Central Asia, especially in the Caspian region, would prevent 
Russia excessive exclusivity, the U.S., potentially, and the PRC, thereby fostering an 
element of stability, not only in the region but Eurasia in general. 
 
Despite the fact that relations between the EU and Central Asian countries are 
developing quite rapidly, there are some problems whose solution requires careful 
attention. In this thesis subsection we will look in detail at each of these problems.  
 
The first problem is the risk of conflict and instability in the Central Asian region.  
 
Serious and prolonged instability in one of the Central Asian countries can lead to 
dangerous consequences for the entire region. This applies primarily to Uzbekistan, 
where more than 25 million people and which is the most populous country in Central 
Asia. Borders in the region are, for the most part, transparent and poorly demarcated, 
and little can be done to prevent illegal border crossings by individuals or groups of 
people. Conflict escalation in one country can lead to refugee flows, which can quickly 
overwhelm the neighbors for their reception. Since the infrastructure against these 
countries is still heavily dependent on each other, the excitement in any country can 
have serious economic consequences for others. 
Leaving aside the humanitarian problems, instability in Central Asia may affect the 
interests of the EU and its Member States in different ways. As recent experience has 
shown, a potential target of refugees is Europe. There is also a more direct interest in 
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ensuring security in the region: the events in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere show that 
failed states and chronically unstable regions are ideal place for terrorist and criminal 
groups. European researchers identify other transnational risks in the Central Asian 
region: illegal arms trafficking, organized crime in general, and the degradation of the 
environment. Along with the illegal drug trade, terrorism, mass migration, in their 
opinion, they have a negative impact on both the individual components of the social 
structure of (undermining the legitimacy of state institutions, provide fertile ground for 
corruption, causes damage to the economy and prevent the successful implementation 
of reforms, promote the growth of social tension), and so in general destabilize the 
domestic and international situation, and thereby threaten the EU's strategic interests in 
Central Asia. 
 
In the Eastern European academic society the external EU policy in Central Asia is 
covered by different research centers and authors. One of the first few publications is a 
collective monograph, published in 1994; by the Brussels Association study of the 
Trans-European politics – “The European Union and Turkey in Eurasia”, a large part of 
which is made up of European researchers dedicated to EU policy, EU countries in the 
regions of Central Asia and Caucasus
84
. In subsequent years, some studies have been 
prepared on the implementation of EU regional strategy. In the 2006 in Paris went 
public the report of the Institute for Security Studies European Union by A.Matveeva 
“EU stakes in Central Asia”85.  In 2008 in Brussels a study was published by Centre for 
European Policy Studies “Engaging in Central Asia. The new strategy of the European 
Union in the heart of Eurasia”86. 
                                                             
84  The European Union and Turkey in the Eurasian Area, 1994 
85  Matveeva A. EU Stakes in Central Asia, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006 
86  Engaging Central Asia. The European Union’s New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia, 2008 
136 
 
Many European experts conduct research on related topics: EU policy and EU countries 
pertaining to the former Soviet Union and the Caspian region, international relations in 
Central Asia, the internal political development of these countries.  
In 2011, there were many publications on the use of energy resources in the Caspian 
region, many experts believe that the strengthening of political pressure on the issue of 
transportation of Caspian resources. In the 1990s - early 2000s, the most influential 
Western European Centre for the Study of Contemporary History of Central Asia was 
the London Royal Institute of International Relations. Its “Program for Russia and 
Eurasia” under the direction of R.Allison consolidated major British and other foreign 
experts on Central Asia as E. Herzig, S. Akiner, N. McFarlane, L. Johnson, G. Uinrou, 
S. Horsman and others who published works on political and military aspects of 
international cooperation in the region
87
 (Herzig). Some of the projects of research 
programs were sponsored by oil and gas companies, and are dedicated to the study of 
the developing energy resources of the Caspian states. 
According to some experts, the competition for gas supplies to Europe could lead to 
conflict in the Caspian Sea, whose identity still remains as a subject area of 
international disputes. However, in 2012 EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger 
mentioned that if Russia would use the tactics of threats, it will become a big problem. 
He made it clear that if Moscow will prevent the construction of the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline, then Europe will not allow it to build the “South Stream”, competing with 
other projects such as Nabucco, ITGI and TAP
88
. In 2012 Putin was solving the 
problems with Turkish partners.  
Moscow continues to urge the EU to provide the “South Stream” the status of cross-
border European network (Trans European Network, TEN). This status will bring 
                                                             
87 
 Herzig E. Iran and the Former Soviet South, 1995 
88 
 Speech by Günther Oettinger on South Stream, 
http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=2999 , accessed at 23 Jan 2013. 
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Gazprom pipeline under the EU antitrust rules. Differences, in particular, were outlined 
against the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline
89
, the agreement on the construction of which 
was signed in 2009
90
. 
In the changed situation are diversifying the methods of geopolitical game: if previously 
the main instrument control was access to the European “pipe”, then now would be the 
gas itself. It is well known that  for “Gazprom” it is  more and more difficult to fulfill 
the increasing demands of Europe's gas supplies in recent years (according to the 
consensus assessment of the leading international forecasting centers, the European 
countries’ need for additional import of gas may reach 80 billion cubic meters by 2020, 
and by 2030 it may exceed 140 billion cubic meters
91
), and if gas will be deprived of 
the Central Asian sources, it can be quite an impact on Moscow in order to control the 
supply of raw materials to Europe.  
In the past EU aid was delivered through the Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, which in 2007 was replaced 
by a broader regional instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument. DCI 
delivers aid to developing countries and has a broad range of objectives, including 
poverty reduction, governance and assistance in post-crisis situations to fragile states. 
Out of the EU programs and instruments applied to Central Asia, only DCI provides 
multi-annual indicative programming, which in 2007-10 amounted to €314 million and 
in 2011-13 to 321 million €.  
 
                                                             
89  Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline length of 550 km, the pipeline will be laid from the Turkish Black Sea city of 
Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The project was originally designed to pump annually 60-70 million 
tons of oil a year, and had to let her carry around busy Bosporus and Dardanelles. Energy Minister Alexander Novak 
noted that there is disagreement between the parties on the tariff for oil transportation. "In those calculations, which 
were in 2011, used the figures of around 55 dollars per ton. Far as I know, those calculations, which were made by 
the Turkish side to be about $ 77 per ton," – he commented. "I do not really understand why the oil pipeline project 
stalled. It is beneficial for both parties - Russia and Turkey - are perplexed head of investment analysis of" Univer 
"Dmitry Alexandrov. 
90  Putin solves problems with Turkish partners 12.03.2012 / Sergei Kulikov Source - Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
permanent article address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354511040  
91 
 http://www.south-stream.info/en/press/faq/ 
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TABLE 11: ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN REGION   
Countries  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan  Uzbekistan   
EU From 2007 to 2012, the EU 
committed to Kazakhstan 
an estimated €56.70 million 
under the Development 
Cooperation Instrument, as 
well as €3.15 million under 
the Non-State Actors and 
Local Authorities in 
Development (NSA-LA) 
thematic programs and 
€2.36 million through the 
European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIHRD). Of the 
total €62.71 million, 91 per 
cent was channeled to 
government agencies using 
a project-oriented approach. 
The remaining 9 per cent 
went to civil society 
organizations through 
grants and calls for 
proposals. 
From 2007 to 
2012, the EU 
committed an 
estimated 
106.15 mln. In 
addition, €21.11 
mln were 
allocated to DCI 
thematic 
programs (Food 
Security, Food 
Facility and 
NSA-LA) and 
€17.83 million 
through other 
instruments 
(EIHRD and 
Instrument for 
Stability (IfS)). 
Kyrgyzstan saw 
a boost in funds 
allocated under 
the IfS 
instrument after 
the April 2010 
revolution and 
subsequent 
ethnic violence 
in the south of 
the country in 
June 2010. 
From 2007 to 
2012, the EU 
provided €61 
mln through 
sector budget 
support. 
In 2007-2012, the 
EU committed an 
estimated €100.2 
mln under the 
DCI. In addition, 
€21.65 mln was 
provided through 
DCI thematic 
programs (Food 
Security and 
NSA-LA) and 
€2.7 mln through 
the EIDHR. As 
part of the DCI, 
the EU has been 
providing 
assistance 
through sector 
budget support, 
amounting to 
€47.75 from 2007 
to 2012.  
EIB and 
Tajikistan sign 
MoU to foster 
mutual cooperatin 
in April, 2013.  
EIB is conducting 
the review for the 
Kairakkum 
Hydro-Power 
Plant 
Rehabilitation 
Project in close 
cooperation with 
the EBRD. 
From 2007-2012, 
the EU committed 
an estimated 
€28.46 mln under 
the DCI. EIHRD 
and NSA-LA have 
not applied to 
Turkmenistan. 
In 2007-2012, the 
EU committed an 
estimated €38.6 
million under the 
DCI. As in 
Turkmenistan, 
EIHRD and NSA-
LA have not 
applied to 
Uzbekistan. 
European 
Investment 
Bank (EIB) is 
in region 
since 2008. 
EUR 100 m 
has been 
made 
available for 
use in Central 
Asia 
 
In 2013 trade 
volume with 
countries in 
the region was 
about 35,335 
million Euros  
Russian 
Federation  
Among 89 subjects of the 
Russian Federation there 
are 76 economic and trade 
partnership with Kazakh 
partners. Investments of 
large Russian companies: 
JSC "Lukoil" ($ 5 billion), 
"Gazprom" ($ 1 billion), 
JSC "INTER RAO UES" ($ 
The proposal to 
Kyrgyz army  
allocate by 
CSTO $ 1.1 
billion  
In August 2012 
considerably 
intensified 
Russian-Kyrgyz 
 By CSTO 220 
million to 
Tajikistan for 
upgrading and 
needs of the 
armed forces47% 
of Tajikistan's 
GDP is generated 
by the transfer of 
At present, there 
are operating 138 
companies with 
the participation 
of Russian capital 
implemented over 
120 projects in 
various sectors. 
Itera Company in 
There are 885 
entities with 
Russian capital, 
accredited 
representative of 
102 companies. In 
Russia there are 
489 entities with 
the participation 
In 2013 trade 
volume with 
countries in 
the region was 
about  
$ 30 billion, 
of which $ 
22.5 billion 
accounted for 
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0.2 billion) of "Rusal" ($ 
0.4 billion). Active 
investment activities carried 
out  by State Corporation 
"Rosatom", "Rosneft", 
OJSC "Bank VTB", VEB, 
JSC "Mechel", JSC 
"Severstal" and many 
others. Total volume of 
Russian investments in 
Kazakhstan is more than $ 
7 billion 
cooperation on 
major projects 
in the energy 
sector .In the 
2009 Russia 
granted loan of 
$ 300 mln and 
provided free 
financial 
assistance in the 
amount of $ 150 
mln. Singed 
agreement to 
write off $ 489 
mln 
Kyrgyzstan's 
debt to Russia. 
Tajik migrants. 
Russian 
investments in the 
Tajik economy is 
$ 1.5 billion92 
2010 completed 
the execution the 
construction of a 
gas pipeline in the 
Karakum Desert 
and is currently 
working with 
“Zarubezhneft” as 
major investment 
project of oil and 
gas fields in Block 
21 Caspian shelf. 
of the Uzbek 
capital. “Lukoil” 
is involved in two 
projects app. $ 5 
bln. “Gazprom” 
expects to invest 
in 2013, about $1 
mln to increase 
gas production at 
existing fields. 
Russia-
Kazakhstan 
trade 
Within five 
years of 
“Gazprom”  
will invest in 
Kyrgyzstan 
nearly $ 679 
mln at the 
same time, all 
of the assets 
of the national 
gas operator 
“KyrgyzGas”, 
including gas 
pipelines, gas 
distribution 
stations, 
underground 
fuel storage 
are transferred 
to “Gazprom” 
for  one dollar  
USA  Over the past 20 years, 
“Chevron” has invested 
about $ 20 bln. in 
Kazakhstan, including 
taxes, was about $ 77 
billion. In the social 
development of Atyrau 
region were invested $ 800 
mln. ConocoPhillips owned 
a stake of 24.5% in the 
prospective offshore project 
"N" near Aktau. 
ConocoPhillips owned 
8.4% stake in the 
consortium Kashagan. 
These shares were acquired 
by KMG in 2013 and was 
sold to China  
In Kyrgyzstan, 
are involved 40 
organizations, 
enterprises of 
U.S.  
CASA-1000 
project – 
Electricity 
transmission 
project between 
Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (477 
Km) and from 
Tajikistan to 
Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (750 
Km) 
As part of the 
Agreement to 
Promote 
investments in the 
country are 9 
Tajik-American 
joint ventures and 
8 enterprises 
entirely owned by 
U.S. investors. 
The assistance 
activities by 
construction of 
five bridges 
linking Tajikistan 
and Afghanistan 
in the frontier 
areas. 
In 2011, has been 
received $1.7 
million in anti-
terrorism 
program. 
The draft budget 
for 2014 the State 
Department and 
the U.S. Agency 
for International 
Development, 
reduced the 
amount of grant 
aid to 
Turkmenistan: $ 
6,1 up 9%less 
than the $ 6,8 
requested for 
2013. 
The agreement of 
implementing 20 
projects worth $ 
2.8 billion was 
reached during 
the Uzbek-
American 
Business Forum 
in Tashkent in 
2012 U.S. 
business 
representatives 
were invited to 
participate in the 
free industrial-
economic zone 
“Navoi” and 
“Angren”   
In 2013, the 
State 
Department 
has allocated 
$ 7 million to 
fund regional 
cooperation 
and activities 
of anti-drug 
agencies of 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan 
and 
Uzbekistan 
China  
 
Kazakhstan has become a 
major supplier of uranium 
to China. Chinese 
investments in the form of 
soft loans and direct 
In Kyrgyz 
Republic were 
registered 110 
Chinese 
companies. 
About $ 1 billion 
in soft loans for 
the construction 
of roads, bridges 
and power lines 
China has 
invested $ 8.1 
billion to develop 
gas fields and the 
construction of a 
China invested $ 
4 billion of 
Chinese 
investment and 
there are plans for 
In 2013 trade 
volume with 
countries in 
the region was 
about $ 40.2 
                                                             
92  Asia Plus Aug., 2013, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1375776360 Accessed at 06.08.2013 
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investment in oil production 
amounted to $15.5 billion.93 
In 2009 China extended $10 
billion loan to Kazakhstan 
International transit corridor 
"Western Europe - Western 
China" 8445 kilometers, 3.5 
times reduce transportation. 
After 10 years of 
transportation through 
Kazakhstan will increase by 
2.5 times*In December 
2011, on the border of 
China and Kazakhstan was 
opened the International 
Border Cooperation Center 
‘Khorgos’ 
Supplies of gas will expand 
up to 60 billion m3. Also is 
expanding Kazakhstan-
China oil pipeline up to 20 
million tons of oil. Xi 
Jinping’s visit in September 
2013 is regarded as a highly 
productive, the results of 
which were signed 22 
agreements worth about $ 
30 billion. China will 
allocate to Kazakhstan more 
than $ 1 billion of funds be 
directed to non-oil sector of 
the economy and 
reconstruction of the 
refinery. 
Total amount of 
Chinese 
investment has 
exceeded $1 
billion. Chinese 
have leased for 
50 years the 
largest deposit 
of iron ore 
Zhetim-Too. 
According to 
the agreements 
reached during 
the state visit of 
Chinese 
President Xi 
Jinping in 
September 2013 
Beijing will 
allocate nearly $ 
3 billion into 
the Kyrgyz 
projects. 
 
 
in exchange for 
mining of gold, 
uranium, rare 
metals. 
According to the 
State Statistics 
Committee of 
Tajikistan, in the 
country has more 
than 20 Chinese 
companies 
Tajikistan and 
China National 
Petroleum 
Corporation 
signed a 
cooperation 
agreement in May 
2014  
 
gas pipeline to 
China. 
According to the 
report of British 
Petroleum in 2012 
Turkmenistan was 
the largest gas 
supplier to China 
providing 51.4 % 
of import needs. 
Qatar, the 2nd -
largest supplier, 
provided 16.4%. 
And with start of 
production at the 
giant oil field 
Turkmen 
Galkinish, will 
import by 1833-
km gas pipeline 
crossing the 
territory of 
Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan up to 
65 billion m3per 
year.  
oil and gas, 
uranium, road 
construction and 
chemical 
industries 
 
Xi Jinping in 
September 2013 
signed other 31 
agreements worth 
about $ 15 billion. 
billion, 
increase of 13 
percent as 
compared to 
2012 
Over the past 
12 years, 
China's trade 
with Central 
Asia has 
increased by 
25 times. 
With $ 1.8 
billion in 
2000 to 46 in 
2012. 
Xi Jinping 
recalled plans 
to bring in 
2016 the 
mutual trade 
turnover with 
Kazakhstan to 
the level of $ 
40 billion 
Turkey  Turkish investments in 
Kazakhstan's economy 
since 1993 reached almost $ 
1.8 billion. In Kazakhstan, 
today been registered 3422 
companies with Turkish 
capital. Number of Kazakh 
companies in Turkey has 
reached 150. Have been 
discussed the possibilities 
of cooperation in the 
creation Kazakh-Turkish 
industrial zone in the South-
Kazakhstan region on 40 
Ankara has 
announced that 
will provide to 
Kyrgyzstan $ 
106 million 
loan. In 2011, 
Turkey has also 
written off 
Kyrgyzstan's 
external debt of 
$ 51 million 
In Tajikistan, 
registered 46 joint 
ventures. Direct 
investments of 
Turkish 
companies in 
total $11.5 mil. In 
Turkey registered 
and operate nine 
companies from 
Tajikistan with a 
total capital of 1.1 
mil Turkish liras. 
Turkish 
In recent years, 
Turkish 
companies have 
initiated projects 
in Turkmenistan. 
The total value of 
these projects was 
more than $21 
billion the 
contribution of 
Turkish 
companies has 
made a total of 
12%. About 600 
Tashkent after the 
Andijan massacre 
put pressure on 
the Turkish 
business, 
deportation and 
imprisonment of 
Turkish 
businessmen. In 
Uzbekistan, 
operate 516 
companies with 
Turkish capital. In 
2011-2012, the 
In 2013 trade 
volume with 
countries in 
the region was 
about $ 3.6 
billion, the 
number of 
investments of 
Turkish 
companies 
exceeded $ 
4.7 bil. Value 
of projects in 
region 
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 Verkhoturov D.Китайский фактор и вывод иностранных войск из Афганистана 
http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/62318.html Accessed at 18.07.2013 
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acres near the airport and 
route Western Europe - 
Western China  
companies 
implemented 31 
projects worth 
about $ 435 mil  
Turkish 
companies have 
been registered, 
total number of 
projects is  more 
than 600, March 
31, 1993 was 
established a joint 
Turkmen-Turkish 
Joint Stock 
Commercial Bank 
volume of 
Turkish direct 
investments in the 
implementation of 
the Public 
Investment 
Program of 
Uzbekistan 
exceeded $ 353 
million 
involving 
Turkish 
companies is 
around $ 50 
bln. 
TUSKON – 
Turkish 
Confederation 
of 
Businessmen 
and 
Industrialists 
is very active 
in region 
* Глава государства объявил проект "Западная Европа - Западный Китай" всенародной стройкой // 
http://www.bnews.kz/main/economics/glava-gosudarstva-obyavil-proekt-zapadnaya-evropa-zapadnyj-kitaj-
vsenarodnoj-strojkoj/ 
 
 
4.1.1.1.1. Kazakhstan  
Due to income from its energy resources, Kazakhstan has long been considered the 
most stable and promising Central Asian state. And yet there are warning signs. In 2013 
waiting for the 20th anniversary of its independence, in the Republic of Kazakhstan 
were organized series of terrorist attacks. 
Kazakhstan, formerly perhaps the most peaceful country in Central Asia, faced with the 
growing activity of extremist organizations that have embarked on the path of armed 
struggle against government. In 2011 – 2012 in different parts of Kazakhstan 12 attacks 
took place, which caused the deaths of many people. According to experts the 
activation of radical Islam in Kazakhstan is becoming systemic issue. Liquidated 
security forces fighting extremist groups are only the top of the iceberg. In the republic 
today operates a large number of radical Islamist groups, which are a breeding ground 
for terrorism, “the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan94”, “Jamaat Mujahideen Central 
                                                             
94 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - largest Islamist political organizations in post-Soviet Central 
Asia, appears in the list of U.S. State Department as one of dangerous international terrorist organizations. 
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Asia
95”, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir96”, Kyrgyz groups “Tablighi Jamaat97” and “Jaish al-Mahdi 98” 
and Uyghur “East Turkestan Islamic Movement99”, “East Turkestan Liberation 
Organization
100”, “Shark Azatlyk Tashkilati101”. In 2011 in Almaty region has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
IMU was founded in 1996, consists of a number of former activists of Islamist organizations in Uzbekistan, 
whose activities were banned by President Islam Karimov in 1992-93. Most members of the movement in the 
early 90s were members of Islamist organizations “Adolat Uyushmasi” (Namangan), “The Islamic Revival 
Party” (founded in 1990 in Astrakhan, the Uzbek branch - in January 1991), “wa Odamiylik insonparvarlik” 
(Kokand), “Islamic Party of Turkestan” “Islom Lashkorlari” (soldiers of Islam), etc. IMU leadership works 
closely with a number of international and regional organizations and Islamist movements, primarily with 
“Al-Qaeda”, “Taliban”, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, “Muslim Brotherhood”, etc. Its activities on the territory of Central 
Asia, as well as outside the IMU provides mainly due to the financial support of the international Islamist 
movement and donations of wealthy representatives of the Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia. In addition, the IMU periodically receives financial assistance from some special services, primarily 
from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence ISI. (The structure of this powerful intelligence organization, 
there are two departments that deal with Islamist groups the Central Asian region, in particular, work with 
IMU). 
95 Jamaat Mujahideen Central Asia – also known as “Islamic Jihad Group”, created by members of IMU, 
trained in camps of Al –Qaeda, in 2004 terrorist group was identified by National Security Committee of 
Kazakhstan (NSC) a terroristic attack was prevented in Kazakhstan. In 2006 UN Security Council on 
initiative of Kazakhstan included Jamaat Mujahideen Central Asia into UN list of terrorist organizations.  
96 Hizb-ut-Tahrir - accurate full name - Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (from Arabic - Islamic Liberation Party). 
Sunni religious and political organization founded in 1953 in Jerusalem, by Sharia Court judge Takiuddin en-
Nabhani. After his death in 1977, the amir (leader) of the party became a Palestinian Abdul Kadim Zallum, 
born in 1925 living in Jordan. Hizb ut-Tahrir proclaims itself a political party whose ideology is Islam. The 
party's goal is to facilitate the return of Muslims to the Islamic way of life (based on the norms of Shariah) 
and spread of the Islamic faith in world through jihad. At the same time declared that the realization of this 
goal is only possible by recreating a single (uniting the entire Muslim world) theocratic state - caliphate. The 
Hizb ut-Tahrir documents all Muslim countries are characterized as non-Islamic, and the cause of all the 
current problems of the Muslim Ummah is declared “no Islam in its daily life”, including “the absence of the 
Islamic system of government”. It is assumed that the struggle for the realization of these goals will include 
three stages, the first of which formed the core of the party, “preparation the people who believe in the goals, 
objectives and methods of the party”; the second is an active “interaction with the Ummah”; The third stage 
begins after the establishment of an Islamic state and includes, inter alia, “the mission reports of Islam to the 
rest of the world”. The party does not set deadlines recreate the Caliphate, hoping in this matter only on “the 
help of Allah”. 
97 Tablighi Jamaat is religious movement, founded in 1926 in India, by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. The main 
goal of the movement is considered to be a spiritual conversion to Islam through the work of participants to 
appeal to Muslims, regardless of their social and economic status in order to bring them to the religious 
practices of Islam, as Prophet Muhammad said. 
98 Jaish al-Mahdi – also known as Army of Religious Ruler in Kyrgyzstan, terrorist group formed in 2010 in 
2014 organization was declared as extremist by the judicial authorities of Kyrgyzstan. 
99 East Turkestan Islamic Movement –also known as Movement of Eastern Turkestan Islamic separatist 
group founded by Uyghurs in Chinese Xinjiang Province is listed as terrorist organization in 2002, 
responsible for terrorists’ attacks in China in 2001, 2013.   
100 East Turkestan Liberation Organization – also known as Free Turkestan, formed in 1996, Uyghur 
separatist organization fights against Chinese Government, is declared as terrorist’s organization in 
Kazakhstan and China.   
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detained more than 300 members of the “Tablighi Jamaat” and “Hizb-ut-Tahrir”. Often 
the arrests and trials against extremists Kazakh authorities prefer to hold in private; not 
wanting to reinforce the impression of a mass nature of such events. Burst of terrorist 
activity in Kazakhstan is directly related to Russia. Western Kazakhstan which is one of 
the main centers of the extremists is bordering the Russian North Caucasus. 
In 2011- 2012 in the counter-terrorist operations were killed 20 citizens of Kazakhstan, 
who fought on the side of the Islamists. In the future, this process can be reversed and 
when to get experience militants back to their homeland in order to apply it in practice. 
 
 
 
4.1.1.1.2. Kyrgyzstan  
In March 2005, President Askar Akayev was ousted after the population opposed the 
parliamentary election fraud. The government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was 
overthrown in 2010. These events as example of intense struggle for power and control 
of the limited economic resources of the country led to prolonged instability and caused 
sporadic outbreaks of violence. State institutions almost inactive, promised reforms, 
including constitutional change in the direction of limiting presidential power, the 
resumption of the campaign against corruption and efforts to improve living standards 
are not present, which further reduced the people’s support for government. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
101 Shark Azatlyk Tashkilati is Uyghur separatists group, part of East Turkestan Islamic Movement.  
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4.1.1.1.3. Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is, apparently, still under the impact of the civil war in the 1990s which is 
seen in the economic and political life. The country is classified as very poor and 
heavily dependent on remittances from hundreds of thousands of Tajiks working 
abroad. The level of corruption is very high, and the income from the Afghan heroin 
trade linked to the institutions of power. Fear of a return to civil war was the reason that 
the dissent in society was minimized, and the government of President Emomali 
Rakhmon quite successfully managed to push the opposition to a secondary position.  
However, that long-term stability is taken for granted, for appearing in a new generation 
of memories of war are much weaker and it is unlikely that it will justify the 
consequences of war as well as poverty and authoritarianism. It maintains a close 
relationship with Russia, but it caused problems in Tajikistan or in the Russian 
economy is accompanied by a reduction of work opportunities of migrant Tajiks, which 
can lead to dangerous social and economic consequences for Tajikistan.  
 
4.1.1.1.4. Turkmenistan 
 Turkmenistan is one of the most closed and repressive regimes in the world. Absolute 
control over political life and income from the rich reserves of natural gas in 
combination provide a semblance of stability. However, the systematic destruction of 
civil society, education, health systems and the complete absence of even the semblance 
of independent political institutions means that the country can experience the 
humanitarian crisis, and the state in the medium and long term may be on the verge of 
collapse.  
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4.1.1.1.5. Uzbekistan  
Serious instability is the greatest threat to Uzbekistan. This country is the second largest 
in Central Asia after the Turkmenistan on scale of political repression, and on the 
manifestations of explicit violence the regime of President Islam Karimov has 
surpassed the Niyazov’s regime102. For many years discontent of Uzbek population and 
exploitative ruinous economic policies forcing millions of people to fight for survival in 
Uzbekistan. In May 2005, Uzbek security forces crushed the uprising in Andijan, a 
town in the east of the country, where were killed numerous unarmed civilians. Since 
then, the government cracked down on independent journalists, activists, human rights 
and civil society. Relations with the Western countries were decreased in recent years, 
although relations with Russia and China, which agreed with the interpretation of the 
events in Andijan. After the events in Andijan in the country established semblance of 
calm, but the government shows no willingness to solve problems. As in Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, the combination of many years of authoritarian rule along with 
availability of resources, bringing high profits, suggests that after President´s death 
possible care from the scene will probably be accompanied by a fierce struggle over his 
legacy. Risk of further instability in the short and medium term is high. 
 
The second problem is energy security. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the 
annexation of the Crimea issue and energy security has become a subject of discussion 
at the highest political level in the European Union, and senior officials in Brussels and 
                                                             
102 Saparmurat Niyazov (Annaniyazov, was born February 19, 1940, in village of Kipchak, Ashgabat region – 
died December 21, 2006, Ashgabat), Turkmenbashi (head of Turkmens), was named Serdar (leader) and 
Eternally Great Saparmurat Turkmenbashi - Soviet Turkmen party’s statesman and politician, leader of 
Turkmenistan from 1985 to 2006 (in 1985-91 - the first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan in 
1990-2006 – “President for Life of Turkmenistan”). Niyazov's rule was characterized by the establishment in 
country personal dictatorial power, as well as a large-scale cult of personality, which declined after his death. 
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the EU member states capitals have begun to take steps to reduce dependence on 
Russia.  
Belatedly, the EU has begun to understand the potential importance of Central Asia. Its 
oil and gas resources that could be delivered directly to Europe through the Caucasus 
and Turkey are considered as at least a partial solution to the problem of diversification 
of energy sources. 
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4.1.3. Energy opportunities in Central Asia 
 
Three of the five Central Asian countries have significant reserves of energy. Resources 
of Kazakhstan most large oil reserves it among the top ten countries in the world, and 
the largest gas reserves - among the top fifteen. Turkmenistan has large untapped gas 
reserves; Uzbekistan is also a major gas producer. Almost all of its gas exports to the 
north Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, where part of it is 
supplied to Ukraine by Russia-controlled pipelines. Kazakhstani gas is exported mainly 
in Russia. Uzbek gas is consumed in the region, but significant amounts are also 
exported to Russia.  
In fact, except for Turkmen gas pumped south to Iran, Russia monopolized imports of 
Central Asian gas. In 2005, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan gave more than 
50 billion cubic meters of gas, which is more than 10% of its level of consumption in 
Russia. The reason for this lies in orientation of gas pipeline infrastructure inherited 
from the Soviet Union, and built for the transportation of hydrocarbons from Central 
Asia to Russia.  
Since the Russian gas transportation controls, these countries do not have sufficient 
leverage in negotiations, and they are forced to sell gas at well below market prices. 
According to a representative of a European energy company, Russia “bought” gas 
from Central Asia and resold it, instead of Russian gas to Europe with a significant 
margin. (ENI, 2013) 
Russia is highly dependent on gas supplies from Central Asia, both in terms of 
domestic consumption and for exports to Europe. Experts are skeptical about the 
possibility of Russia to use storage or backup power fields for domestic 
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consumption and supply in the international market, even in the case of short-
term disruptions in the supply of Central Asian gas. In this case, it would be 
faced with a dilemma involving the reduction or supply for domestic consumers 
or to neighbors
103
. EU member states have no strategic gas reserves (stockpiling 
gas, unlike oil, is not a common practice), and thus faced a dangerous power 
deficit if instability in Central Asia led to a halt of gas supply  
(D.Satbayev, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
103 Kazakh expert Dossym Satbayev’s interview to Interfax (Kazakhstan) 
http://www.interfax.kz/?lang=rus&int_id=quotings_of_the_day&news_id=6026 
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4.1.4. The competition for natural resources   
 
Besides Russia, many other countries like to access to Central Asian gas. Consideration 
of the US-backed proposal to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through 
Afghanistan to supply gas to Pakistan and India markets was delayed for several years 
because of the situation in Afghanistan. China, which is connected to the pipeline with 
Kazakhstan, also signed agreements with Turkmenistan on gas imports and signed an 
agreement on investments of $ 600 million in the gas industry of Uzbekistan. In 2014 
“Gazprom” and China's CNPC signed an agreement in Shanghai, Russian gas exports to 
China. Details of the deal were not disclosed, the total contract price is $ 400 billion for 
30 years. 
Decision by EU Member States on imports of gas from the region, which is home to 
some of the most repressive regimes require a balanced assessment of the situation of 
human rights, as well as strategic interests. If we assume that the obstacles to the 
creation of the infrastructure can be overcome, the actual supply of energy would 
depend on regional stability and economic cooperation would require attention to the 
problems of transparency and good governance. Finally, as shown by experience in 
Nigeria
104
 and other countries need to pay attention to the problems of local 
development in those regions where there are mining companies. 
In any case, that EU is going to have an impact on the development potential of Central 
Asia energy and related export sectors and routes, it should demonstrate activity will 
impact the influence in the region. 
 
                                                             
104 Odesola, I.F., 2012, Coal Development in Nigeria: prospects and challenges, International Journal of Engineering and Applied 
Sciences.  
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Third but not least important issue is the health care. 
Health care systems in Central Asia are in crisis. Potential occurrence of diseases such 
as HIV / AIDS and multidrug-resistant (MDR) is long term threat to the EU. In the near 
future, the EU should consider the potentially dangerous consequences of an influenza 
epidemic in the region, where the health care system is weak, overstretched and 
underfunded. Although the Central Asian countries have no common borders with the 
EU, bird flu had demonstrated its ability to quickly cross the expanses of Eurasia, by 
migratory birds fly to Europe every year from Siberia and Central Asia. 
In addition, the social consequences of the multiple crises of the health system in 
Central Asia, in particular HIV / AIDS threaten the overall stability and development 
prospects of the region, which may have implications for European security.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the quality of the health care system in all 
Central Asian republics have dropped dramatically as a result of growing poverty and 
the impact that has had a transition period for the social security system. In Tajikistan, 
these factors were reinforced consequences of civil war. In Turkmenistan, the health 
care crisis is the direct result of targeted disruption of the government health system, 
through measures such as dismissal in 2004 15 thousand skilled workers and the decree 
adopted by the president in 2005, the closure of all hospitals outside the state capital - 
Ashgabat. The government banned specifies in hospital sheets or reports a number of 
infectious diseases, including tuberculosis and cholera. After 1990 in all five countries 
life expectancy has fallen sharply, and by 2013 it was about ten years less than the EU 
average. Maternal mortality in 2010 is six - eight times higher than the level of the EU 
(in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan - ten times by UN Data
 105
).  
These trends are unlikely to soon change significantly for the better. All countries, 
except Turkmenistan, are unlikely to achieve goals in incidence of HIV / AIDS and 
                                                             
105 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=maternal%2Bmortality&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID:553#f_1 
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tuberculosis. The region is a struggle with the increasing number of infectious diseases, 
such as systemic diseases like cancer, in terms of the incidence of which it occupies the 
worst place in the developed and developing countries. Governments in the region are 
increasingly less able to meet the needs of health care. However, the main costs are 
borne by patients, and the already afflicted poverty.  
The spread of infectious diseases, especially HIV / AIDS and tuberculosis, is a key 
issue. Increased level of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly syphilis is an 
additional warning sign of potential HIV / AIDS epidemic.  
The incidence of tuberculosis has reached critical levels throughout the region, and 
significantly increased incidence of multidrug-resistant. The reason for this lies in the 
collapse of the health system and the lack of attention to out-patient treatment at the 
final stage. Since2 012, the incidence of tuberculosis has more than doubled in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (UN Data 2012 average 66-8: 
case detection of tuberculosis, highest rate 81 is in Kazakhstan
106
). U.S. and World 
Health Organization (WHO) interact in the initiative to promote the internationally 
recommended strategy for TB (tuberculosis) control (DOTS – “short-course directly 
observed treatment”) in order to limit the spread of forms of the virus with multidrug 
resistance. 
But such aid will not be enough to overcome the serious infrastructure failures destroy 
the health care system and the system of disaster management, which leaves Central 
Asian governments unarmed against the threat of serious epidemics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
106 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=tuberculosis+&d=WHO&f=MEASURE_CODE%3aTB_1 
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The fourth issue - radicalism and terrorism. 
 
Among the terrorist organizations operating in Central Asia are the following:   
 “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”- operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;   
 “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” (Party of Islamic Liberation) - operates in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;  
 “Muslim Brotherhood107” (JAMA 'AT / HARAKAT IKHWAN al - 
MUSLIMEEN) - groups of this organization is a network of autonomous cells 
acting under different names. With regard to the CAR interest are the following:  
 “Social Reform108” (JAMIAT AL - ISLAH AL - IJTIMAI) - has offices in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; “Islamic Call Committee” (LAJNAT 
AL - DAWAA AL - ISLAMIYA; “Dawa Islamiya” its radical wings.  
 “Committee of Muslims of Asia109” - was supported by “Labban Foundation”  
 “Islamic Center of Development110” - operates in Osh city, Kyrgyzstan;  
 “Akromidy” - for Islamic religious group of Uzbekistan acts in Fergana Valley 
(Uzbekistan);  
 “Adolat Uyushmasi111” (Justice Society) - a religious-extremist organization 
operating in Namangan, Uzbekistan;  
                                                             
107 Muslim Brotherhood - international religious and political association founded in 1928 by Hassan al-
Banna in Ismailia (Egypt). Since 1933 the headquarters of the organization was transferred to Cairo, it has 
strong influence in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and many other Arab countries. In 2013 by the Egyptian 
government was declared a terrorist organization, in 2014 was declared as terrorist organization in Saudi 
Arabia. 
108 Social Reform - JAMIAT AL - ISLAH AL – IJTIMAI – active group formed in 2003, connected to IMU 
and Movement of Turkestan, funded terrorist organizations in the North Caucasus.   
109Committee of Muslims of Asia acting under the International Islamic organization based in Kuwait. 
110 The center is responsible for training of radical group in Osh (south Kyrgyzstan) 
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 “Islom lashkarlari112” (Soldiers of Islam) - operates in Uzbekistan;  
 “Tovba113” (Repentance) - has supporters and activists in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan;  
 “Movement of Eastern Turkestan114” – acts in Xinjiang, China; implemented a 
series of attacks in Central Asian states;  
 “National Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan” - extremist organization, 
aims to create the territory of Uyghur’s Central Asia State;  
 “East Turkestan Liberation Organization115”;  
 “Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party116”.   
Discontent caused by repression, corruption and poor governance has led to the fact that 
radical Islamist groups began to use in Central Asia some support of the population. 
The most influential of these is the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a secret movement is active in the 
Islamic world, which seeks to unite Muslims as part of an Islamic caliphate. Cells of 
supporters are in most Central Asian states. They are engaged mainly in distribution of 
leaflets, audio - and video materials, which have criticized the activities of governments 
in the region and argue that achieving justice will only be possible when the caliphate. 
Representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir claim that their movement seeks to achieve its 
objectives completely nonviolent. Governments in the region reacted differently to the 
emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which began to be active at least since the mid-1990s. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
111 Adolat Uyushmasi – Justice Society, founded in 1991 by Takhir Yuldash, also known as Muhammad 
Tahir Farooq radical Islamist founder and leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
112 Islom lashkarlari - founded by radical Islamist Takhir Yuldash 
113 Tovba - paramilitary group was organized also by Takhir Yuldash and others.  
114 East Turkestan Islamic Movement –also known as Movement of Eastern Turkestan Islamic separatist 
group founded by Uyghurs in Chinese Xinjiang Province is listed as terrorist organization in 2002, 
responsible for terrorists’ attacks in China in 2001, 2013.   
115
 East Turkestan Liberation Organization – also known as Free Turkestan, formed in 1996, Uyghur 
separatist organization fights against Chinese Government, is declared as terrorist’s organization in 
Kazakhstan and China.   
116 Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party – extremist organization, connected with their peers in a number of 
countries - Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
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greatest movement undergoes repression in Uzbekistan, where persons accused of 
belonging to this movement, sentenced to long prison terms. Tajikistan, likewise, took 
an uncompromising stance towards the organization, which is particularly active in the 
Sughd region in the north of country. October 2013 President Emomali Rahmon 
received CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the sides discussed practical 
measures to help strengthen the Afghan-Tajik border.  
Recall that the decision on aid to the Republic of Tajikistan in border security, primarily 
in the military-technical sphere, was taken during a summit of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization, held in Sochi on September 2013, after a meeting with Tajik 
President, Bordyuzha informed about taking actions as by providing border guards in 
Tajikistan military equipment, including modern weapons, equipment and optical 
devices. 
 
Kyrgyz authorities produced only a few arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir members, Kazakhstan 
had also shown great tolerance, although more recently members of this organization 
are under increasing pressure. Turkmenistan is characterized as extreme closed country, 
so political processes are difficult to assess.  
Local residents, during Niyazov's government and society were often treated to drug 
tolerance, as “imperfections”. In many places, drug trafficking wore almost open, 
particularly in the area of Ashgabat or some southern markets provinces (regions). 
During G. Berdimuhamedov’s presidency authorities tried to change this situation. 
In 2008, in Turkmenistan, a new security protection service of a healthy society - a 
specialized structure designed to combat drug trafficking. Purge of personnel in 
government, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and indirect data of MFA. 
Repression exposed several previously “untouchable” officials and corruption 
protection mechanisms do not work. In 2009, a scandal sacked Interior Minister 
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Orazgeldy Amanmuradov, and the president publicly listed a number of major crimes 
related to drug trafficking, committed with the connivance of the Interior Affairs. 
Produced reshuffle could be partly explained by the logic of the political struggle in the 
top leadership of the republic, but anyway, they allowed a broad anti-drug campaign. 
Major drug traffickers were arrested republic, including underground millionaire 
Rahatay Razzakova, who died in prison. Later, a series of arrests of other members of 
the national business (Kuziev Y., Charyev N., etc.), but it is unknown whether they 
were related to drug trafficking or arrested in connection with other criminal acts. 
Were destroyed large narcotic retail point, and the operation in 2008 Khitrovka 
(Ashgabat – capital of Turkmenistan) accompanied by armed clashes, were killed by 
the security forces. In 2010, a campaign took place to eradicate illicit cultivation of 
opium that existed on the territory of Turkmenistan. 
These measures have undoubtedly positive effect. Polls residents of Ashgabat, Lebap 
and Mary provinces of Turkmenistan indicate that cases of open drug trade virtually 
ceased, “street” prices for drugs, opiates increased several times, markedly decreased 
drug use. Reported that along with the reduction of the national drug market it also 
qualitative changes occur: the main flow of contraband starts a circuitous route from 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a growing share in it begins to be at opiates of Afghan 
origin, and synthetic drugs. 
Losses incurred as a result of these changes, the Afghan drug trade, the assessment 
cannot be, but they seem to have been very significant and one of the factors that 
caused the deterioration of the situation on the Turkmen-Afghan border. 
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4.1.1.5. Current situation and prospects 
 
It would be a mistake to say that drug trafficking from Afghanistan is completely 
eliminated. Border guards in these places for a few attempts of illegal border crossing 
on the Afghan side, and there are cases of participation in smuggling as carriers and 
Afghan and Turkmen citizens. Turkmen “alternative press” writes that the wholesale 
buyers in the area and enjoys the patronage of local law enforcement (in Ashgabat – 
capital of Turkmenistan). 
Generally, in Turkmenistan problem of drug trafficking and extremism go hand in hand. 
Radical organizations penetrate into the country through migration flows from 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and try to create their own infrastructure on the territory of 
Turkmenistan. In particular, in December officially reported disclosure in Ashgabat 
National University cells, presumably belonging to the “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, headed by 
student B. Yagshymuratov previously studied in Osh (south Kyrgyzstan). In Lebap was 
disclosed the cell of “Salafi117”, led by H. Sahypov, bring promotional material from 
Dushanbe (capital of Tajikistan). 
Recently, the authorities began liquidation cell organization known as “Nurdzhalar”, 
which thanks to the patronage of some prominent representatives of Turkish business in 
Turkmenistan and even had almost official status. 
Undoubtedly, these measures will not remain without attention of terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan, whose confrontation with official Ashgabat will only get worse in the near 
                                                             
117 Salafi - branch of Islam that unites Muslim religious leaders, who in different periods of Islam history 
were calling to focus on lifestyle and faith of early Muslim community, on the righteous predecessors. Later, 
in Islam, emerged a radical religious and political movement - Wahhabism. Proponents of this movement do 
not consider it a political and exclusively religious. They call themselves Salafis (so called the true followers 
of the righteous predecessors - the Salaf). Today, Wahhabism is the dominant Islamic doctrine in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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future. The Turkmen side seeks to protect themselves from criminal and terrorist groups 
associated with IMT and the Taliban; Afghan armed opposition - is increasingly seen as 
one of the Turkmenistan military opponents. Already in advocating armed opposition 
increasingly traced emphasis on the fact that Turkmenistan is one of the suppliers of 
fuel for the Afghan army and international forces. 
Under these conditions, it would be logical Turkmenistan deepen anti-terrorism 
cooperation with Afghanistan, Russia and Tajikistan, however, the official Ashgabat 
fears that the intensification of official contacts violates “neutral” status of the republic 
in international politics.  
While the official statements of Hizb ut-Tahrir is often portrayed as an organization that 
represents a threat was not presented any convincing evidence that the members of this 
movement are related to terrorist acts. However, other radical groups have 
demonstrated their willingness to use violence. Among them is the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU), which arose after the suppression of the Islamist opposition of 
Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. In 2000s IMU organized a series of armed incursions 
into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from their bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These 
attacks were recorded, and the movement's supporters were expelled from Tajikistan. 
IMU then apparently joined in Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; leaders of IMU 
were probably killed during combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, when the U.S. 
started to liquidate the Taliban; survivors of the IMU, believed to be hiding in the areas 
adjacent to the Afghan-Pakistani border.  
Breakup IMU may have led to the emergence of small groups, "freelance" militants 
operating throughout the region. Their actions are largely criminal in nature, although 
they have certain religious overtones. In Tajikistan, many such groups and individuals 
have been harassed.  
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As far as the IMU is still a serious terrorist threat remains unclear; reliable information 
is not enough, and the governments of some countries, especially Uzbekistan, are 
showing a tendency to exaggerate the threat of terrorism to justify further repression of 
dissent. However, apparently, the threat of individual acts of violence by individuals or 
small, formerly united by the groups, although it is not clear how these groups are able 
to prepare a large-scale terrorist attacks. Over the past years, none of the representative 
of the European countries or European organizations does not become a victim of 
violence, especially against them and attributed to extremist organizations. 
Nevertheless, the current political situation, weak institutions, corruption endemic to the 
region, discontent largest religious institutions, extremely rigorous enforcement of laws, 
and varying degrees of restrictions on the expression of legitimate dissent, are the 
nutritional environment in which radical groups of all kinds, as terrorist and others may 
recruit their supporters. Desire to suppress radicalism by force alone, without having to 
remove the main problems posed by its probably only aggravate the situation.  
The main slogan of the representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir that Muslims will achieve 
justice only with the establishment of a caliphate in the region can find a receptive 
audience. 
 
The fifth issue - human rights and good governance. 
According to Freedom House’s 2014 report “Nations in Transit” the situation with 
human rights is different: some things are better in Kyrgyzstan worse - in Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan and very badly - in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Some problems are 
common to all countries, albeit to varying degrees: poor prison conditions, arbitrary and 
impunity of the security services, violence against women and discrimination against 
them, and corruption. Economic desperation leads to the fact that an increasing number 
of people becoming victims of trafficking: women and girls - for sexual exploitation, 
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men - labor exploitation. Forced labor, including child labor, is because for concern in 
the regions of cotton production in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is a major 
concern of torture, especially in Uzbekistan.  
According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 
Central Asian countries have yet to hold such an election, presidential or parliamentary, 
which would have been deemed fully free and fair, widespread corruption and abuse of 
power causing growing resentment, especially in the poorest regions.  
 
The sixth issue is the drug trade.  
The estimated annual consumption of heroin in Europe is 135 tons, with 90% of this 
volume is produced in Afghanistan. Central Asia is a transit route for 30% of Afghan 
heroin, much of which is designed to supply the Russian market (and the rest mainly 
routed through Pakistan and Iran to Turkey) (UN Data, 2011
118
) As a result, the Central 
Asian states suffer from drug-related system of organized crime and corruption, as well 
as drug addiction of its citizens and the related social and health problems. All this has a 
serious impact on regional stability.  
Sources: Afghanistan produces nearly 90% of the world's opium. It is increasingly 
being exported in the form of heroin or morphine, opiates and not raw, as it increases its 
price, while reducing the volume of cargo and reducing the risk of detection. In 2013, 
Afghanistan was produced more than 5500 tons of heroin and morphine
119
. This amount 
would be enough to provide heroin EU market for more than three years.  
About half of Afghanistan's GDP is provided by the production of opium, which is a 
growing obstacle to security and development. EU saw itself as one of the “general 
partners” Afghan administration, and the transition from the “Bonn process (2001) to 
the “Afghanistan Compact” (2006) and Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
                                                             
118 UN Data 2011, www.unodc.org  
119 http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?NewsID=16021#.U8azNfmSxqW 
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(2008) the international community gives the fight against drug trafficking 
“multipurpose priority”.  
Opium production prevents security and undermines the rule of law in Afghanistan, 
providing a source of funding for the rebel groups, which leads to increased influence 
of local drug lords to the detriment of the legitimate government and the growth of 
corruption. It also hinders the development of the legal industry due to high inflation 
and the fact that the infrastructure is mainly used for the production of opium, and not 
another, legal products. Limitation of drug trafficking in the Central Asian region would 
alleviate many distortions in the economy and stimulate reduction of the value of 
opium.  
 
Transit routes of Central Asia.  
 
Central Asia suffers from its strategic location as a point of intersection of global flows 
of drug trafficking. Traffickers have restored the ancient Silk Road for the 
transportation of opiates from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
where they are transported by planes, rail or road in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and 
then in Russia and the EU. Traffickers use weak border protection system affected by 
corruption, lack of adequate infrastructure and the lack of national and regional law 
enforcement cooperation. 
European Monitoring Centre for Drug and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Data:  
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Drug trafficking and the creation of new domestic drug markets have led to the growth 
of organized crime. Proceeds of drug trafficking invested in legitimate business, 
providing drug traffickers control local industry. Limited capacity and widespread 
corruption impede effective law enforcement structures. Bribery, especially among 
poorly paid border guards, was widespread, and generates economic relations impeding 
development. According to Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, 
all five Central Asian states are located at the end of the rankings. Saving negative 
regional political and economic trends would reduce the already limited opportunities in 
the fight against smuggling and drug trafficking and improve the prospect of radical 
groups on the use of the drug trade to finance their activities.  
Apparently, most of the drug flux passing through the central Asia, or in the region 
directly consumed or Russian is sent to, and only a small amount ultimately reaches 
Europe. This fact, according to a representative of one of the EU member states, led to 
“a lively political debate”, because the view was expressed that it would be useful to 
spend money on closing other drug-trafficking routes, which directly and deliberately 
reach the EU. However, concern for the European Union there is ample reason. As 
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noted, the income from the sale of heroin is a potential source of funding for terrorist 
organizations. 
The main objective of criminal groups around the world is to extend its influence 
beyond the region in which they were formed. We must evaluate the possibility of the 
Central Asian drug traffickers to establish links with groups outside the region.  
 
Seventh issue is situation in Afghanistan.  
If Central Asia once not of great interest for the European Union, after September 11, 
2001 its geographical location gives it a special significance.  
Since Afghanistan is an important priority for the European Union, the Central Asia can 
hardly be let out of view. Clearly, that stability in Afghanistan requires stable 
neighbors. May 2014 on the background of withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan government of neighboring Uzbekistan forward to continued cooperation 
with NATO. In the near future was opened in Tashkent NATO representation in May 
16. The opening ceremony was going to take part Appathurai, a spokesman for the 
NATO Secretary General for Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Like other countries neighboring Afghanistan, Uzbekistan concerned by the threats, 
paired with a significant reduction of foreign military presence in the region. Tashkent 
shared concerns about the spread of extremism outside the IRA. 
 
Currently Tashkent hopes to expand cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in 
return transit cargo from Afghanistan. It is expected that the Uzbek side will get part of 
exported weapons, military equipment and spare parts. 
 
February 2014 National Chamber of Entrepreneurs (NCE) of Kazakhstan plans to open 
a sales office in Afghanistan.  
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Head of the International Cooperation Department Rustam Abdusalamov made a 
statement at a business seminar “Export development in Central Asia. NCE 
representative in Afghanistan”  Arman Kassenov informed that Afghanistan imports up 
to 93% of goods, from food to medicine and diesel generators for home heating during 
the cold season and cars. He expressed confidence that Kazakhstan could put significant 
pressure on Turkey and Iran on the Afghan market diesel fuel
120
 (Newskaz, 2014).  
Also were raised the issue of establishing direct flights between Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan, the lack of which is a significant factor inhibiting trade and economic 
cooperation between the two countries.  
During the adoption of credentials from ambassadors of Afghanistan, Japan, Pakistan, 
the Netherlands and Oman President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the ceremony noted that 
Kazakhstan and Afghanistan friendly relations and expressed hope for further 
strengthening cooperation.  
Kazakh President mentioned that Kazakhstan participates in the construction of 
hospitals and schools, repair roads and bridges, humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, as 
well as an educational program for Afghan specialists
121
 (CA-News, 2014).  
In this regard, the reconstruction of Afghanistan will largely depend on the activity of 
foreign investors. 
 
April 2014 at the management level the Chamber of Commerce of Tajikistan and 
representatives of USAID trade prospects were considered a tripartite Business Council 
of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan.  
According to a press release from the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (CC RT), the signing of a tripartite agreement on trade cooperation between 
                                                             
120 A. Kassenov, Newskaz.ru http://www.newskaz.ru/economy/20140211/6118595.html 
121 CA-NEWS, 2014 https://afghanistan.ru/doc/category/vokrug-afganistana/srednyaya-aziya/page/3 
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these three countries would establish a dialogue on economic cooperation and bring it 
to the level of business representatives in these countries.  
Deputy Head of CC RT Asanali Karmal noted that Tajikistan is interested in increasing 
exports and finding new markets for their products, in connection with which regional 
trade agreements meet its interests
122
 (Asia-Plus, 2014).  
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are involved in CASA-1000 project
123
, which after 
implementation will allow these countries to supply surplus electricity in summer 
energy deficient Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
4.1.1.6. Turkey  
 
The whole complex of both internal and external problems, especially in relations with 
neighboring countries, indicate that Ankara's Central Asian vector of policies designed 
to resolve foreign policy priority challenges facing Turkey. At the present stage, the 
main aspect of the activity of Turkey remains its aspiration to become a full member of 
the Western community, and in real time - to join the European Union. Political line of 
Turkey in the region is largely (though not primarily) caused by its desire to strengthen 
its international image, to demonstrate the appropriateness of the West of its 
intermediary role in Central Asia, to prove the necessity of its inclusion into the EU.  
                                                             
122 Asia-Plus, 2014 http://news.tj/en/newspaper 
123 Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are the two countries in Central Asia, which account for some of the 
largest reserves in the world drinking water resources. Both countries have an excess of electricity in 
summer. Nearby, in South Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are lack of power and rapidly growing demands. 
Pakistan is not able to meet the needs of its citizens in electricity, especially during the hot summers, and this 
leads to frequent outages that harm industrial production, sometimes entail the closure of small businesses 
and lead to job losses. At the same time, millions of people continue to live without electricity.  
The new system of transmission lines (STL), which will connect the four countries - called the CASA-1000, 
will allow the most efficient use of environmentally friendly hydropower resources in Central Asian 
countries, giving them the ability to transmit and sell electricity surplus summer energy deficient countries of 
South Asia. In addition, the CASA-1000 project will support national actions to improve access to electricity, 
integration and expansion of markets for trade development, as well as help find sustainable solutions in the 
field of water resources management. The project launched among the Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  http://www.casa-1000.org/ 
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These conclusions can also be drawn from the mission statement Turkish government in 
which the priorities of the foreign policy course called: strengthening transatlantic 
cooperation, relations with the U.S. and NATO, EU integration and the development of 
comprehensive relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus.  
 
However, the Kurdish issue and the internal struggle between the supporters of Islamic 
and secular development and the growing contradiction with the EU on the adoption of 
European structures, divert significant material financial and political resources of 
Ankara from taking action in the region.  
 
Nevertheless, it seems that currently foreign policy activity of Ankara is becoming less 
significant factor for most of Central Asia. Demonstrated at the time Turkey's inability 
to provide the States of the region sufficient financial, economic and political support 
significantly limited its presence in Central Asia. Turkish ambitions (especially not 
publicized in government circles) for leadership in the region associated with ethno-
ideological slogan of Pan-Turkism, also do not find the appropriate response in the 
Central Asian states.  
 
In addition recently gaining ground facts about the participation of some Turkish 
representatives in an Islamic extremism and religious advocacy against the citizens of 
Central Asia as well as in Turkish territory; will definitely indicates that the 
development of the Central Asian-Turkish relations may be additional barriers, than no 
interest countries in the region, neither the Ankara.  
It appears that the implementation of the trans-Caucasus transport corridor project, 
especially its oil and gas element and turning Turkey into the crossroads of Asia, 
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Europe and the Middle East, yet supports in Ankara hopes to increase in the future of its 
economic and political influence in the region, and therefore the values for EU. 
 
The Russian influence in region is military presence in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moscow’s main strategic stronghold in the region is the Customs Union.  
The attention of the consumer of oil and gas focused on the shores of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. These two countries have common neighbor Turkey. Recent events are 
signifying the change of geopolitical perspective of Turkey and Europe. Istanbul is a 
crucial capital of the global economy and finance, a hub for trade, business and air 
transports (Flights to Central Asia provided mainly by Turkish Airlines). These events 
bring the entire region out of its isolation and not only oil and gas but technologies, 
environment policies, human capital enhancement, foreign direct investments in non oil 
sectors will be growing at high rates as already seen in the last years. The international 
community starts now to perceive this new event and emerging power conditionality in 
the full region and in the all Middle East. The “neo-Osmanic” policy pursues a new 
Turkish strategy in Central Asia, common Turkic origin may simplify fulfillment of 
Turkic Union scenario, which has quiet reliable future in the region. Even more 
interesting scenario is the effect of joining Turkey to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization as a dialogue partner. On the one hand, the dialogue partner status is not 
observer status at the SCO. In particular, the dialogue partners do not participate in all 
the meetings and do not have access to confidential information, but nevertheless there 
are involved in the preparation of documents and strategies of the SCO
124
. Turkey 
ambition in region may promote the following tasks: 1) the possibility of penetration in 
Central Asia, where is strong influence of the SCO, 2) activation of bilateral relations 
and joint economic projects with China (although for Beijing there is some risk - the 
                                                             
124 SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
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Turks are long-time partners of Uighurs) and 3) the strengthening of the position in the 
Middle East in opposition with Iran. Advance of Turkey in SCO at all the precipitancy 
is limited to an accurate framework.  Nevertheless, the status of the observer in the 
organization for Ankara should not be excluded.  General conclusion is that by 2023 
Turkey has every chance to take place as the influential power on crossing of strategic 
ways of Eurasia. On the one hand, without having chances to enter EU, Turkey will be 
able to strengthen influence on Brussels, having become the key player in the Black Sea 
and Balkan regions. On the other hand, in process of the expanding in SCO, Turkey 
becomes the important competitor of China and Russia for influence in Central Asia. 
Nowadays SCO is not just an influential international organization, its main value is the 
ample control of the Eurasian continent. At the moment no other organization in the 
world is dominated in Eurasia, as SCO does.  
Turkey's fledgling motivated to vote in the world is its increased economic strength and 
international influence. It is no accident in one of the replicas of Erdogan's address to 
the EU Council; He was referring to Turkey's rapid development and the financial crisis 
and stagnation in the European Union. There are issues of expanding the cooperation 
between Turkey and the United States. And it is highly increased the role of Turkey in 
the region, in which it drove to the provisions of Egypt's leading power. For that Ankara 
is easily sacrificed existed in the past, economic and military ties with Israel. Effect of 
Ankara strengthened in all countries that were part of the past of the Ottoman Empire. 
For the moderate Islamists, who raised heads in the Arab region through the spring, the 
existing political system in Turkey is an example. Turkish leaders are encouraging a 
desire to emulate. Left aside the political setting of Ankara, proposed not to have 
quarrels with their neighbors. Turkey has actively participated in the events in Syria. In 
Turkish territory, not only firmly established the Syrian armed groups, but, according to 
some reports, the rebel forces. Moreover, increasingly in NATO circles expressed the 
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wishes of liberated areas in the contiguous zone of Syria and Turkey. Recall that 
Turkey has the second largest army in NATO. It should also be borne in mind that the 
further Turkish involvement in the affairs of Syria could lead to a deterioration of its 
relations with other neighboring countries - Iran.  
Scope of activity in Turkey is not limited to the adjacent region. It is very 
noticeable in the former Soviet Union, especially in countries with Turkic-
speaking population. There, in addition to strengthening the economic position 
stronger cultural influence of Turkey, Ankara, having overseen the schools, 
increasing the flow of graduates entering the universities in Turkey. For the first 
time held the summit of Turkic-speaking countries. All of this suggests that the 
broader framework of Turkey's interests in the region, it's as if inter-regional 
power (NG, 12.2011).  
 
 
4.1.1.7. Chinese People's Republic (PRC) 
 
China, showing its inherent realistic approach, prefers a cautious policy toward Central 
Asia. Externally, China's strategic interests in Central Asia appear insignificant (that 
does not show the real approach). In geopolitical terms, China is aware of the 
undesirability of prematurity demonstrate its ambitions in the region. 
While the view of the international community was locked on Russia and the U.S. 
around use of chemical weapons in Syria, Beijing with its usual pragmatism strengthens 
its position in Central Asia. In September 2013 Xi Jinping and his Turkmen counterpart 
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov announced the start of commercial operation of the 
second largest gas field in the country Galkinish, whose reserves are estimated at 21.2 
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trillion meters
3
. Prior to that, the two leaders signed a formal agreement to build 
extended pipeline between Turkmenistan and Chinese Xinjiang. In December 2009, the 
predecessor of Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have opened gas pipeline Turkmenistan- China , which can run about 
40 billion meters
3
 of gas per year . Due to China’s plans to increase gas purchases in 
Central Asia in 2020 to more than 65 billion meters
3
, local leaders increasingly see 
Beijing as a privileged economic partner and they believe that it is more important than 
Russia and any other foreign actors. In Central Asia China is promoting many economic 
projects; on this matter there is worth of interest to review the issues of CAREC
125
 - 
Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation. The projects 
of CAREC are being competitive with other projects which are launched in the Central 
Asian region by other countries.  
The Chinese leadership has repeatedly emphasized that supports conservation with 
Central Asian countries friendly relations between themselves and Russia, does not seek 
to fill any vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The involvement 
of China in the case of Central Asia is also largely driven by the preservation of such a 
problem for China as the unstable situation in the eastern part of Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region, which already delivers Beijing troubles growth of Islamic 
nationalist sentiment with the advent of contagious example for creating national-state 
formations and the situation of separatism enhancement tendencies in China. However, 
there is a view that one of the central elements of passivity China in the region by 
Beijing being not interested attracting international attention to the problems of 
                                                             
125  CAREC (The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) is a proactive facilitator of cooperation on the basis of 
projects in transport, trade, energy and other key sectors of mutual interest. It is a partnership of 10 countries and six multilateral 
institutions working together to promote development through regional cooperation, leading to accelerated growth and poverty 
reduction. Countries: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Institutions: the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Program and the World Bank. The Asian 
Development Bank also serves as the CAREC Secretariat. 
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Xinjiang. So, the situation in some other regions of China, such as Tibet, the complexity 
of the market issues already undermine the international credibility of the stability of 
the PRC, and are the cause of Western “interference” in the internal affairs of the 
country. It seems that the situation in the east of China does not allow using this area for 
active geopolitical penetration in the Central Asian region. Is difficult to predict the 
possible consequences of (inter-ethnic, inter-civilization, interreligious plan etc.) that 
can occur after Beijing’s a deeply thought-out foreign policy moves in Central Asia. 
However, there are different estimates of the Chinese influence in Central Asia. For the 
most part it is common to several Kazakh and Kyrgyz political scientists who argue that 
for their countries from China carried out the so-called “expansion” accompanied by 
high migration activity of Chinese population.  
At the same time, it appears that migratory pressure of China, observed around its 
perimeter, mainly due to the internal situation in the country has not yet elevated to the 
rank of state policy. In addition, an important point of understanding the Beijing 
doctrine of the Central Asian is the fact that recently observed increased activity in the 
region.  
Growing Chinese interest is noticeable, especially in the economic sphere, on a 
background investment growth of trade, increased attention to transportation projects, 
including the construction of a network of pipelines from Central Asia, also settling on 
market issues. It appears that based on the current interest in PRC foreign policy level is 
the desire to protect its eastern rears for more active line in the Asia-Pacific region 
(APR), to prevent the possibility of their flashpoints, form stable conditions for the 
further development of relations with the new states of the region, at the domestic level 
- to stabilize the situation in Xinjiang and tie it to China via pipelines and intensification 
of the economy. Furthermore, the growing interest of China in cooperation with the 
171 
 
fledgling united Europe now dictates the need to find a reliable form of communication 
links with the EU.  
In this regard, the development of transport infrastructure elements China with Central 
Asia in the future serve as a foundation capable to broad engagement of China (as APR) 
with the European countries.  
 
China's approach to Central Asia is inherently strategic long-term, does not focus any 
immediate priorities. Analysis of recent trends in the Chinese political line suggests that 
the current level of China's influence in the region will continue with wide range of 
relationships, primarily with the countries themselves to Central Asia, Russia, the U.S., 
and potentially the EU. Beijing's role in the region, it seems, will gradually increase in 
the near future in proportion to weaken of Russian influence, strengthening Sino-
European cooperation. In the longer term strengthening of the China position in the 
Asia-Pacific region (including, it is possible due to the decision in favor the number of 
Chinese territorial disputes), improving the socio-economic situation in the eastern 
regions of the country, it seems, would have far-reaching implications for the future of 
Central the entire continent of Asia. 
 
Major logistic projects: 
 May 2014 in the Chinese port of Lianyungang began construction of Kazakhstani 
logistics terminal, which should be one of the elements of the economic zone of the Silk 
Road.  
This port is used by the Republic of Kazakhstan for freight traffic in 1995 under an 
agreement with China, and last year on the results of President Xi's visit to Kazakhstan 
has agreed to provide to Kazakhstan territory at the port for the construction of its own 
terminal. And between JSC “National Company Kazakhstan Railways” and 
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Lianyungang Port Company in February 2014 signed an agreement on joint 
management of logistics terminal through a joint venture, the Kazakh-Chinese 
international company Lianyungang city. Kazakhstan in the joint venture will be owned 
49% of shares and China - 51%.  
Cost of construction of the logistics center will be 99.3 million US dollars. It is planned 
that by the end of 2015, the terminal will be able to cater for loads in excess of 250,000 
twenty-foot equivalents with the prospect of increasing capacity in half by 2020. 
May 2014 during the 9
th
 session of the Kazakh-Chinese bilateral cooperation in railway 
transport with China an agreement was reached on the need for transcontinental 
transportation between China and Kazakhstan. During the meeting were discussed 
issues of increasing transit traffic through border crossings Dostyk - Alashankol and 
Altynkol - Khorgos.  
 
Now to this zone will join Kazakhstan logistics terminal in the port of Lianyungang. 
This port is notable for its geographic location, the shipping lines with the Japanese port 
of Osaka, South Korean port of Busan, as well as rail links with several major Chinese 
ports.  
 
These activities are carried out as part of the industrialization of Kazakhstan and the 
Republic of turning into a logistical hub in Central Asia, as previously established and 
now operates a special economic zone “Khorgos - East Gate” with a focus on logistics 
and trade with China. Kazakhstan also plans to build a grain terminal on the border of 
Turkmenistan and Iran to export grain and commissioning of a new railway line that 
will connect Kazakhstan with Iran via Turkmenistan.  
Furthermore, the introduction of the terminal in the system and start its full operation 
will reduce the role of Kyrgyzstan as an intermediary in trade between China and 
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Central Asian countries, as well as seriously worsen already joyless perspectives 
Kyrgyz market “Dordoi” and will stimulate the elites in Kyrgyzstan turn to Eurasian 
integration. Kazakhstan seriously strengthens its position republic hub in the heart of 
Eurasia. 
 
CAREC projects  
In October 2012 was held the 11
th
 Conference of CAREC in Wuhan (China) where has 
been approved by one of the most ambitious plans for the development of transport 
infrastructure in Central Asia for over the past few decades. It includes the construction 
and rehabilitation of roads, railways, airports, ports, providing the necessary service 
infrastructure to the tune of $ 22.5 billion plan, called plan of Wuhan (Wuhan Action 
Plan), estimated up to 2020 and will be implemented on through multilateral 
cooperation CAREC member countries and international financial institutions
126
. 
Essentially, CAREC is a regional organization dedicated to the integration of the region 
into the global economy. In this sense, the organization is largely opposed to the 
Customs Union. The report “CAREC-2020 Strategic Framework” states: “In view of 
the general population, numbering more than 320 million people., The domestic market 
of the CAREC region has an impressive size. Customs Union between Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, offers the opportunity for further expansion of the market for another 
168 million people. While Kazakhstan stands as a point of access to the markets of the 
Russian Federation and Belarus. In other words, the strategic objective of CAREC is to, 
through Kazakhstan, members of both organizations, to subordinate its economic 
impact of Customs Union, draw it in the market for other countries. Despite the fact that 
Russia is not part of CAREC, in the organization of many of the documents are 
                                                             
126 Competing integration organization CAREC was established at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), back in 1997, and set a 
goal of economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China (mainly Xinjiang), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
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prepared in Russian and in all initiatives include the impact of the Russian economy. 
This clearly shows the importance of Russia for the integration of the organization. 
Threat to take over of the market by the Customs Union so strong, that CAREC is based 
on the major international financial institutions. Capital is only the one at the beginning 
of the ADB (Asian Development Bank) in 2012 $ 165 billion, while the capital of the 
Eurasian Development Bank, established by Russia and Kazakhstan is $ 1.5 billion; in 
the development of the CAREC region may be directed major investments that will 
ensure its economic growth, and while Eurasian integration organizations that cannot 
oppose a comparable investment resources. However, the absorption of the market of 
the Customs Union - this is the case, obviously, in the distant future. In the period until 
2020 CAREC poses another problem. Deputy Director of the IMF's Middle East and 
Central Asia Juha Kähkönen in his report at the 11
th
 Ministerial Conference in Wuhan, 
said that the macroeconomic outlook for the region is encouraging, but there is need to 
strengthen the economic integration of the countries, and also to strengthen the budget 
and the banking sector, to eliminate barriers in trade and capital flows. Wuhan plan 
includes three major projects: the development of transport, trade and customs 
regulations and the development of CAREC Institute's work plan for the 2013-2017 
years. Of these, the most ambitious and important project is transport projects. Roads 
determine the economic development of the countries Transport plan in general was 
developed at the 11th meeting of the Committee for the Coordination of the transport 
sector in Manila in May 2012, as recorded in “Implementing CAREC 2020: The Wuhan 
Action Plan”127. To 2020 will be developed and signed by the pilot agreement between 
the participating countries, in which they commit themselves to work together to 
increase the capacity of individual roads and highways. Behind all this activity was 
                                                             
127  Approved in Wuhan, this plan is in the organization's strategy 2020: "... in order to facilitate the 
implementation of an effective cross-border transport links between the countries of CAREC". Wuhan plan emphasizes 
that Member States on a voluntary basis, in the framework of the six corridors CAREC, will lead the construction and 
development of its transportation infrastructure 
175 
 
observed and the Secretariat of the ADB CAREC. The scheme resembles the metro 
corridors. On the one hand, it is built on the basis of the existing system of roads and 
railways in Central Asia. But on the other hand, it must establish a system of links 
between Urumqi and Kabul, with the off to the neighboring regions of arteries. So, 
corridor 1 forms bond southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Xinjiang and Russia. 
Corridor 2 forms of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. 3 forms a corridor link 
northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Iran. Corridor 5 forms 
a transit line from West China to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is one of the most 
important, because it connects almost all countries of CAREC. Corridor 6 connects 
northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan to Russia and Iran. Under this scheme, it is clear 
that the economic center of CAREC accounts for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and northern Afghanistan, because there is a big part of the corridor, and they are 
numerous crossings to facilitate cargo handling and transport services. The other 
countries in the periphery of the proposed scheme are that integration organization. 
Judging by the fact that this center is the most populous CAREC, there will also create 
the most favorable conditions for investment in the production of goods and services. 
This small sub-region focuses more cheap labor from the significant potential of this 
population growth - one of the most important conditions for investment. Other 
countries in the CAREC will supply raw materials and to ensure the transit of goods to 
foreign markets. In the future, obviously, the main inflow of investments from 
international financial institutions have just this, the central part of CAREC, and it is in 
the long term of 15-20 years can get ahead in its economic development. This is a good 
example of how the planning of roads and transport corridors generally determines the 
economic development of countries. The focus of road in the development of the 
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transport system focuses on the development of roads. There are 70 projects listed in 
Wuhan plan, 39 are related to the construction or rehabilitation of roads
128
. 
TABLE 12: LOGISTIC PROJECTS IN REGION  
 
Countries  Highways  Railways  Sea ports Airports Service infrastructure  
Afghanistan 5 3 1   
Azerbaijan  2 1    
Kazakhstan  4 1    
Kyrgyzstan  4 1  1 1 
Mongolia  2    3 
Pakistan  14     
Tajikistan  3 2    
Turkmenistan   2    
Uzbekistan  5 5  1 9 
Total 39 15 1 2 13 
Source: CAREC, 2012 
If an analysis of the size of investments in individual areas of the transport system CAREC, the 
emphasis on roads will become even more pronounced. The development of roads has 66.2% of 
all the funds planned for the implementation of infrastructure projects. The development of the 
railways sent 27.5% of the planned funds. 
TABLE 13: CAREC PROJECTS IN REGION  
Countries Highways Railways Sea ports Airports Service 
infrastructure 
Afghanistan 802 650    
Azerbaijan 1478,6 795 50   
Kazakhstan 2784 2007    
Kyrgyzstan 370 415,6  105 4 
Mongolia 2360    137 
Pakistan 5426     
Tajikistan 876 270    
Turkmenistan  654    
Uzbekistan 847 1510,5  5,8 1044,7 
Total ($ mln.) 14943,6 6288,1 50 110,8 1185,7 
Source: CAREC, 2012 
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Dmitri Verkhoturov, a political scientist  “New Eastern Outlook” 12.03.2012 Source - New Eastern 
Outlook Permanent address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354516620 
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Although previously China's regional diplomacy was limited to trade and energy issues, 
the tour of Xi Jinping provided a new political dimension. Following the example of 
Russia, the U.S. and the EU, Beijing launched its own regional initiative called the 
Great Silk Road.  During his visit in September 2013 to the “Nazarbayev University129” 
the Chinese President urged his Central Asian colleagues to strengthen international 
cooperation to modernize road infrastructure, expand cultural exchanges and to conduct 
a coordinated political dialogue. During his visit there were singed many official 
documents, only in Kazakhstan were singed 22, it must be mentioned that Xi Jinping 
emphasized as priority to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and 
Kazakhstan in 2015 to $ 40 billion. Chinese initiative contradicts not only the idea of 
Washington's New Silk Road, but also the European strategy for the New Central Asia 
Partnership, as well as long-standing Russian tradition to maintain their dominance 
through a number of regional organizations. Even if Beijing continues with Moscow 
adheres to the strategic course of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it tries to 
increase its economic influence in the SCO, offering to Central Asian republics 
programs of economic assistance, low-interest loans and other forms of support. 
In respect to an analysis of studies of European experts has allowed tracing the 
evolution of the academic community views on the situation in Central Asia, which 
could affect the perception of the situation and the political decision-making circles in 
the EU countries. A number of European experts on Central Asia acted as consultants 
of EU countries and EU institutions in the formulation of regional policies. 
In addition to British experts in Germany, Federal Institute of East European and 
International Studies specialized on a study of Central Asia in the 1990s, as well as 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, Institute of Turkic Studies at the Free 
                                                             
129 One of the best universities in Central Asia, named after President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Narazbayev, the university situated 
in capital of Kazakhstan Astana.    
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University of Berlin. Various aspects of the development of Central Asian countries 
studied in the works of French experts - O.Rua and A. de Tengue (CNRS, Paris), and 
A.Dubuenne,  D.Ellii (Institute of Political Studies, Paris), a Swedish specialist 
S.Kornell (University of Uppsala, Sweden), the Belgian analyst B.Koppieters (Free 
University of Brussels, Belgium) and others
130
. 
Since the late 1990s in a deterioration of the military-political situation in Central Asia, 
interest in the region in the European scientific community has grown significantly. The 
study of military and non-military aspects of regional security is a priority for the 
Centre of Conflict British Royal Military Academy
131
. The International Crisis Group, 
which has representation in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, was to focus on the analysis of 
internal threats to stability in Central Asia within the framework of the research 
program “Asia”132. 
Among the Central Asian specialists in international policy studies of the European 
Union in Central Asia, took place in Kazakhstan. It addresses some aspects of the work 
of researchers from the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research (KISR). Overview of 
the bilateral relations formation between the EU and Kazakhstan for 1992-1997 is 
contained in publications of M.Laumulin
133
. In a paper prepared in collaboration with 
M.Laumulin, T.Seyfullina stand out stages of the Central Asian policy of the EU, the 
European Union considers the reaction to the deteriorating situation in the region in the 
late 1990s, attempts to outline the scope of the common interests of the EU countries in 
Central Asia
134
. The authors of these publications in the analysis of EU policy focused 
on the views of German political and academic circles in the international situation in 
Central Asia. The main results of research and M.Laumulin, T.Seyfullina were 
                                                             
130 Roy O. Tensions etniques, instabilite regionale, Le monde Diplomatique. 1993   
131  Available on: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/ca/  
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 Available on: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index 
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 Лаумулин М.Т. Казахстан и Запад: ретроспектива отношений в 1990-е гг. Центральная Азия и 
Кавказ.2000 №2(8). Available on: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-08-2000/07.laumill/shtml 
134  Лаумулин М., Сейфуллина Т. Интересы и политика Европейского Союза в Центральной Азии и 
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reproduced in 2002 in two collective publications KISR, on international cooperation in 
Central Asia in the areas of security and energy
135
. 
Of particular concern in Europe caused a situation that has arisen because of the rivalry 
with the neighboring countries of the region - most notably Turkey and Russia, as well 
as Iran, China and Pakistan - on the new directions of trade and transport and energy 
routes from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea (Gumpel V.) 
 
It is time to analyze the progress of the strategy over the first decade of EU Strategy in 
Central Asia, identify new trends and challenges, lessons learned, to focus on the early 
warning of conflicts, adjust priorities. Strengthening the EU Strategy for Central Asia 
on the basis of appropriate tools and funding will allow strengthening the EU's position 
as a necessary and desirable partner for stability and security in this fragile region. 
 
In the area of environmental and water resources, where leadership role for the EU play 
Italy and Romania, the cooperation programs of the EU and some Member States 
provides for the implementation of major measures to address serious problems in the 
region, as well as further support measures for regional cooperation, activities under 
this program, with the support of new structures (high-level dialogue on environmental 
issues and working groups on environmental management, water resources and climate 
change), as well as deployable now the new platform support. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
135  Нефтегазовые ресурсы Казахстана в системе мировых и региональных отношений. 2002.Алматы; 
Центральная Азия до и после 11 сентября: геополитика и безопасность. 2002. Алматы. 
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TABLE 14: Analysis of Czech and Slovak Republics programs: 
Priorities/ 
Country  
Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Turkmenistan  Uzbekistan  Whole 
region 
Human 
rights and 
democracy  
Slovak 
Republic 
     
Education Czech 
Republic 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovak 
Republic 
Czech  
Republic 
 Czech 
Republic 
 
Economic 
development  
Slovak 
Republic 
     
Energy and 
transport  
 Czech 
Republic 
    
Environment 
and water 
resources   
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovak 
Republic 
Czech 
Republic 
  Czech 
Republic 
 
General 
risks  
Czech 
Republic 
    Czech 
Republic 
 
 
There was a significant strengthening of relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, as 
reflected in the EU's efforts to overcome the crisis in the country in 2010 and thereafter. 
Full opening of the EU Delegation in Bishkek in 2010 was a major step forward in the 
relationship and will be a key component in the implementation of measures to further 
support the stability and development of the country. EU intends to support the success 
of the country's ongoing democratic and legal reforms, as well as measures to promote 
post-conflict reconciliation. 
All five Central Asian countries play an important role in the international efforts to 
promote stability and development in Afghanistan, reflecting a common interest in 
ensuring the success of these efforts. The solution to this problem of international and 
regional importance will be a key priority in relations between the EU and Central Asia 
in the coming years. In this context, the EU urges the countries of Central Asia to 
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support the process of the “Heart of Asia”, initiated at a conference in Istanbul in 
November 2011. This process aimed to promote regional political and economic 
cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. For its part, the EU actively 
collaborates with partners to support such regional initiatives to be monitored countries 
in the region. 
In the field of development cooperation the EU prepare a framework agreement for the 
period 2014-2020 period. Development of the program will be based on new 
approaches to the organization of EU development cooperation (“Agenda for Change”), 
in accordance with which the EU needs to improve the setting of goals and objectives 
of the organization of its aid, forming activities and actions in accordance with such 
tasks in including activating measures for donor coordination. The EU step up its efforts 
in the countries with the lowest level of income. 
Cooperation in the energy sector is one of the priority areas of cooperation between the 
EU and Central Asia. Central Asia is rich in energy resources and the region is 
becoming a major source of oil and gas to the world markets. Diversification of energy 
supply and export routes, as well as the integration of energy markets of mutual interest. 
Central Asia has a huge potential for energy savings and use of renewable energy 
sources such as solar, wind and hydropower. Region can play a big role in the transit of 
energy resources. 
EU and several Member States have made a significant contribution to the 
implementation of integrated programs for environmental protection and management 
of water resources in accordance with the Strategy of cooperation between the EU and 
Central Asia. The first-ever joint communiqué EU - Central Asia, published in 
November 2009 in Rome, was the starting point for joint action to regulate relations in 
the sphere of nature and climate change, and water resources management. In particular, 
one of the main activities of the EU is to assist Central Asian partners to overcome the 
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consequences of climate change for the region and to assist them in adapting to climate 
change. Other priority areas are environmental education and participation of civil 
society. 
Analysis of key areas of activity 
 
 Creating broad support for large-scale climatic events in the partner countries; 
support in translating international commitments into concrete action at the 
country level to mitigate the effects of climate change and the transition to a low 
carbon economy , continue to support the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDN); 
 
 Intensify coordinated efforts at the EU level, including with the European 
Agency for the Environment, to assist Central Asian countries in their efforts to 
improve institutional and capacity- building to combat climate change in an 
integrated manner at the local , national and regional level; 
 
 Expand the dialogue and increase the number of activities in the Working Group 
of the EU - Central Asia on environmental management and climate change, to 
ensure the participation of civil society in this dialogue in order to address their 
knowledge and experience, and use climate change as matters of common 
interest for the development of regional cooperation in Central Asia; 
 
 Facilitate the implementation of measures to integrate environmental policy with 
regard to the conclusions drawn in the 2011 Ministerial Conference 
“Environment for Europe”, to promote the inclusion of the Central Asian 
countries in the EU -led Unified Environmental Information System (SEIS) in 
the region covered by the European Neighborhood Policy; 
 
 Support for the implementation of Dialogues national water policy and the 
complex legal acts with all five countries, will increase the level of involvement 
of the EU and the visibility of the EU; 
 
 Provide further support for the approach for water management based on the 
“principle of basin river management" in devising measures of cross-border 
cooperation in the field of water resources management, to support the role of 
the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) for interregional 
cooperation. 
 
 Promote measures to further ensure compliance with the provisions of 
international conventions and legal principles in respect of shared water 
resources, which provide the basis for developing solutions specific to the region 
, including in particular the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes , and the Protocol 
Convention on water and sanitation and to promote the ratification of other 
relevant environmental conventions all Central Asian states; 
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 To support the region in addressing toxic industrial waste to support measures to 
restore areas contaminated by uranium waste. 
 
 
 
The following analysis had been applied from the work of professor A.T.Losada “La 
politica del mar”136 (2000). This dissertation is quoting the main passages with his 
permission. 
 “The analysis of the behavior of actors serves as an interpretive tool to 
establish which the role is played by each one. The methodology 
proposal contains no exclusionary encourage, six main or most common 
types of roles: that or those who exercise or have control and validation 
functions on the politics or results (goalie), or that or those who exercise 
de facto or hold the responsibility to lead the process and get a result set, 
which is this is (director), or those who have that ability to filter or select 
proposed policies and solutions (filtering), or that or those that promote 
or use their resources for a particular type of policy results (promoter), or 
that or those who act in a manner contrary and direct their actions to slow 
the consolidation of policies driven by the promoter or promoters 
(opposition), and finally, that or those who choose the search for ways to 
negotiation and consensus among different actors involved (mediator)” 
end of quotation (Losada, 2000).   
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 The unique location at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Eurasian geopolitical 
relations, the trend is the increasing interaction of world and regional powers 
determines that the region can rightly be considered one of the main elements of 
security in the former Soviet Union and, in general, to identify as a certain element of 
stability in Eurasia.   
It appears that the approaches to Central Asia by Russia, the U.S., China, the EU, 
Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and India will continue to some extent based on the principle of 
geopolitical regionalism and the desire to make the most of their internal and external 
resources to secure the region. Unfortunately, some factors will continue to demonstrate 
unpopular choice in the modern world, but effective policy instruments, such as power 
(military) and ideological approaches.   
TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVES OF ACTORS.  Source: adopted from Losada, 2000 
Actors  Objectives  Regulation  Implementation  
Central Asian 
Local 
governments  
Director 
(caretaker)  
Director 
Promoter  
Director 
Mediation  
Filtration 
EU 
Czech and Slovak 
republics  
Mediator  Director  Promotion  
Mediation  
Russian 
Federation  
Control  Opposition  
Filtration  
Opposition  
Mediation    
China  Opposer  Opposition  Opposition  
Mediation   
USA  Opposer  Opposition  Opposition  
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Central Asia once again became perceived as an area of Russia's vital interests 
and as its sphere of influence. Accordingly, any non-consensual penetration with 
Moscow or external interference in this area was seen as a geopolitical challenge 
and threat to Russian interests
137
 (Zvyagelskaya, 2003).  
 
However, it is obvious that the sesquicentennial Russian dominance in the region is 
faced with pressure from other global and regional actors. 
 
The main direction of Turkey's policy towards the Central Asian states has been 
the gradual retraction of economic interests in Ankara ‘orbit’ by connecting to 
the existing regional associations and the creation of new economic groups 
followed a political rapprochement. It should be noted that after the collapse of 
the USSR in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries which recognized the 
independence of former Soviet republics, and was first among those countries 
that officially established diplomatic relations with all the countries of Central 
Asia. Turkey tried to deploy the model “Turkic world” to include the countries 
of Central Asia
138
. Besides, the Central Asian countries with large reserves of 
minerals, faced with the problem of transportation of energy to world markets. 
Energy transportation routes began to depend mainly not on the technical 
capabilities, but on the whole group of interstate relations transit countries and 
world powers (ORSAM – Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, 2012) 
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 Zvyagelskaya I., Makarov D. Russian perceptions of Western policy in Central Asia / / Southern flank of 
the CIS. Central Asia - Caspian Sea - Caucasus: Opportunities and Challenges for Russia / Edited by M. 
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138 ORSAM Report: #135, 27 November 2012. FEATURES TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH 
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Beijing abstains from all kinds of confrontations with Russia (as opposed to the militant 
approach of China towards its neighbors in the East and Southeast Asia), China's 
influential politicians, of course, take advantage of the oversights of the Kremlin and its 
limited capacity.  
 
China takes into account Russia's stagnated economy, which gradually loses its 
position in the region; Beijing has become a major trading partner of the Central 
Asian states. Chinese-built pipelines increased regional integration in Central 
Asia, without decreasing any of the sovereignty of states. Oil and gas pipelines 
in China help Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to redirect their energy routes away 
from Russia, and reduce their dependence on Moscow. By 2020, China will 
become the largest consumer of oil and natural gas of Central Asian region. In 
addition, funded by the Chinese refinery, which was built in Kyrgyzstan must 
break the Kremlin’s monopoly of fuel supply139 (Beshimov, 2014) 
 
The European Union considers Central Asia as a region in a state of transformation, 
within programs of cooperation the European Union, on the one hand, is trying to 
pursue a value-oriented policy of cooperation with the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, and on the other hand, to ensure compliance with its economic and geopolitical 
interests in the region. As a result, a conflict arises between values and interests of EU's 
policy in the region.  
 One of the main factors determining the development of the situation in the Central 
Asian region in 2014 is expected withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. 
Transfer activity of radical Islamists from Afghanistan to other countries in Central 
Asia most heavily hit Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Threat of Islamism will 
                                                             
139
 Beshimov B., 2014 The struggle for Central Asia: Russia vs. China.  
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also affect Kazakhstan, but much success radicals are unlikely to be able achieve, 
because Kazakhstan has learned to deal with such phenomena, including cooperation 
with Russia and China. The main objective of foreign policy alignment Astana will 
equal relations with Russia, China, U.S. and EU.  
 
Virtually all of these factors show increased interest in transporting in a favorable 
direction of energy resources in the region. Moreover, it should be understood that this 
strategy has specific geopolitical goals. Thus, control of fuel and energy resources and 
their means of transport play an increasingly important role in determining the 
geopolitical position of a country.  Analysis and planning of energy routes, impact 
preference for any of them, clearly understand that their route will determine regional 
alliances, external influence and the geopolitical situation in Central Asia and Eurasian 
region.  Definitely, dynamic and sustainable development in Central Asia, increasing its 
value to the global community can only occur in conditions of stability and geopolitical 
balance. Among the priorities for improving the region's geopolitical situation will 
remain the desire to neutralize the adverse processes in Central Asia: the threat of 
entering the region in the sphere of influence of powers hatching any regional or global 
ambitions and will definitely spread the ideas of Islamic radicalism.  One of the main 
conditions for stability in the region is the tendency to further intra-and inter-regional 
integration and cooperation (including in areas such as coherent policies in the field of 
transport and communications, the use of energy and water resources, increased 
attention to the problem of religious moral education of the population, the fight against 
Islamic extremism, etc.).  
The same purpose and meets the further formation of high-grade bonds to diversify the 
countries of Central Asia to the outside world, including the restoration of “Silk Road” 
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that will give the region its former communications within the meaning of the entire 
Eurasian continent.   
I would like to believe that Central Asia, in collaboration with all actors, especially such 
as Russia, the U.S., the EU, as well as regional leaders as China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, 
India, etc., will allow achieve results for the stability and prosperity of the peoples of 
the region and the whole of Eurasia. 
Currently, lots of controversial issues in the cooperation of Central Asian region and 
EU, for example, the same strategy because of its one-sided focus on the dynamics of 
the implementation of tasks in particular the European Union and Central Asia is 
somewhat secondary action. The document is essentially a mere declaration of 
principles and intentions. Some awkwardness Strategy gives a clear prioritization of its 
areas of cooperation, reflected in the provision of “enhanced approach” to the countries 
of Central Asia.  
However, the Central Asian countries are waiting for the EU investments, projects to 
diversify energy supplies and support initiatives aimed at regional integration. If the EU 
mired in lengthy discussions and presentations of strategies with no clear goals, Russia 
and China will take the initiatives.  
In terms of economic and political transition in countries the situation can be found in 
mutual support. The European Union is a good example (example of non-statehood) of 
how one region with countries many were able to put aside their differences and 
ambitions for absolute leadership by building a common space for the future of its 
citizens and future generations. 
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6.1. The military presence in Central Asia and its relevance to security situation  
In an era of global challenges and threats the struggle for world influence in 
countries, continents, markets, natural resources, products, services, and 
communications became more visible. Currently geopolitical confrontation revolves 
around Eurasian continent, the largest on the planet with a varied geographical 
landscape, rich fauna and flora, essential part of the world's natural resources. 
 
For Central Asia the U.S. Atlantic plans involve refocusing on countries that 
traditionally belonged to Russian sphere of influence – is Central Asian region. 
The former Soviet republics in Central Asia will be included in the United 
States’  sphere of influence, coupled with American control over Afghanistan 
allows to close circle around the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, increase 
the effect of external pressure, economic and trade embargo can be carried out 
fast military operation against Iran
140
 (Invissin, 2012).  
Despite the existing plans for U.S. and their allies troops’ withdrawal in Afghanistan, 
there is not any predicted settlement of situation around the country.  
Nowadays, the most important military-political blocs and institutions of security in 
Central Asia are: Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).  
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In mid-November 2013 in Kyrgyzstan within a joint project with the OSCE was 
destroyed by the detonation of more than 50 man-portable air missile systems “Arrow 
(Strela) 2M” and about 100 missiles, which are used in an anti-complex “Baby 
(Malutka)”. In the future to be destroyed 2 million units of light firearms. In 
anticipation of withdrawal in 2014 of NATO troops from Afghanistan, OSCE Centre in 
Bishkek increased its support to Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies in the protection of 
borders, the reflection of possible terrorist attacks, as well as effective control of 
existing weapons. As part of a joint projects work is underway to destroy unsuitable for 
further use surpluses arms and light firearms and ammunition.  
OSCE Centre in Bishkek also implements projects to improve the operational readiness 
of the antiterrorist entities of Kyrgyzstan. Also it assisted in the construction and 
equipping of training centers, purchase of special equipment. Since the beginning of 
2013 at command and staff for tactical counter-terrorism exercises worked out different 
attack scenarios and different versions of problematic situations. One of the exercises 
was devoted to the possibility to takeover of hydroelectric station by terrorists. With 
support of OSCE Centre in early November 2013 at Bishkek opened a modern training 
center for customs officers of Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. It is expected that during 
2013-2014 there will be trained over 350 Kyrgyz and Afghan officers. Special attention 
is paid to courses suppression of drug trafficking. Because through Kyrgyzstan passes 
so-called northern route of Afghan drug trafficking; trafficking related to activity of 
different groups of people
141
. 
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At the present stage of globalization, most regional and local problems become 
transnational issues or even international conflicts, therefore regional partnerships and 
regional networks, including those involving governments, sub-regional and regional 
organizations are becoming crucial actors for implementing solutions of these conflicts. 
The contemporary situation in Afghanistan is alarming for all Central Asian countries, 
even though not all of them share common borders.  
In general the conflict in Afghanistan and threats emanating from this country are 
forcing states in this region to take additional measures to enhance security, diverting 
resources needed to address socio-economic problems, to implement development 
plans, transit potential and modernization of the region. 
The borders with Afghanistan are poorly controlled. The drug trade in this region is part 
of the picture of instability, especially as it provides income and transit routes for 
Taliban and other extremist groups. The porous Tajik-Afghan border made Tajikistan a 
major transit point for transporting Afghan heroin to Russia and Europe. Other routes 
are via the Uzbek-Afghan and Turkmen-Afghan borders. According to a UN report, in 
2013, opium cultivation in Afghanistan was increased up to a 36% against the previous 
year. The opium was planted on 209,000 hectares, which has increased from 2012 total 
of 154,000 hectares
142
 (UNODC). A diffusion facilitated by the number of Afghani 
refuges in Iran and Pakistan already numbering some millions that one day will return 
to their homeland.  
According to many Russian experts, the U.S. are preparing the foothold in Afghanistan, as 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional 
Development, an expert on Afghanistan Yuri Krupnov says:  “it's important for the U.S. to 
control the transit in Afghanistan, through which no one can lay oil and gas pipelines from 
the Persian Gulf and Iran. No gas, no petrol supplies to India and China without addressing 
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the U.S. - that's the essence of this process. Given that Americans may rigidly structure 
Central Asia, this will be a reliable barrier to any transit fantasies of the Central Asian or the 
Persian Gulf states”143. 
In 2012 Washington and Kabul signed agreement on strategic partnership - 2024. White 
House managed to sign a bilateral agreement in Kabul with Afghan leader Hamid Karzai on 
strategic partnership between two countries. In response, Taliban, while U.S. was trying in 
every way “to outline the path to peace”, made a powerful series of attacks in the Afghan 
capital. Simultaneously, thousands of Afghans marched, accusing NATO troops of killing 
four children in a firefight with insurgents’ movement Taliban in the southern province of 
Zabul. The demonstrators blocked road leading from Kabul to Kandahar, shouting anti-
American slogans. 
It should be noted that the visit of the American President was timed to the anniversary of 
the destruction of the leader of the terrorist network “Al Qaeda” Osama bin Laden, who was 
eliminated as a result of an undercover operation of U.S. Special Forces on the night of 1 to 
2 May 2011
144
. 
According to Panovkin, “the Agreement reminded a symbolic document and it did not 
contain any specific issues, but the treaty defined Afghanistan as the U.S. key partner 
outside of NATO for the long term. Although stipulated that the United States does not seek 
to establish permanent military bases in Afghanistan, but, instead, U.S. offers its military aid 
to the Afghan people and their education. 
U.S. and NATO will continue to work with Afghan authorities since December 2014, when 
international troops leave the country. A significant portion of the funding the Afghan 
armed forces, starting from now, will be provided by the United States, which among other 
donor states will annually allocate Afghanistan $ 4 billion over ten years. The funds will 
support the combat capability of the national army. 
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It is known that after the withdrawal of coalition forces, the United States is ready to 
leave there about 20 thousand soldiers. Of course, this is not the amount that can be 
critical in eliminating the terrorist threat or contribute to the maintenance of peace 
and stability in Afghanistan. But this is enough to ensure the normal operation of the 
network of various military facilities, including Afghanistan, which according to the 
agreement, the United States have the right of access” (Panovkin, 2012). 
 
In principle, this means that the Americans were able to do what could achieve at the time 
neither Britain nor Russia - to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, while possessing a variety of 
opportunities for political, military and economic control over the region. 
“Of course, this is only one aspect of a “strategic partnership” the U.S. and Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, in this partnership lies very unpleasant moment for U.S., which, over time, can 
not only greatly complicate bilateral relations, but also to call into question the very idea of 
need for any cooperation. Instead of Western-style democracy is increasingly looming threat 
of the emergence and spread of theocratic Islamist formations. And it appears that political 
Islam does not need an alliance with the United States. 
“But in the Arab world, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and some other countries, 
political Islam raises its head. And it turns out that an American victory is a Pyrrhic 
victory” (Krupnov, 2012). 
 
According to Evseenko, Obama's visit to Afghanistan resulted more than the widely 
commented event by Russian experts. But most of these comments were in the spirit 
of “politically correctness” and, therefore, did not focus attention on the 
consequences of the agreement for the region and for Central Asia (Evseenko, 2012). 
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In this thesis we are not going to do a complete analysis of consequences of the US-Afghan 
partnership for Russia, but it makes sense to highlight a few aspects of it. 
NATO leaders reaffirmed the plan of the international military mission in Afghanistan; 
President Obama gave a specific strategy of withdrawal from an unpopular war in 
Afghanistan. 
The strategy, which was based on the withdrawal of U.S. and other troops from Afghanistan 
in 2014, had risks for Obama and could jeopardize achievement of the U.S. military, which 
they achieved in ten years of war, it complicated by unresolved dispute with Pakistan, which 
refused to open land routes for rapid withdrawal of international troops.  
 
The plan means a clear turn for the international force to the final phase of the war, which 
began after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Afghanistan is the second of two wars that 
Obama inherited from previous presidents and their ability to complete their positive impact 
on the campaign and increase the chances of re-election. NATO leaders agreed on a plan for 
the gradual withdrawal of troops, after which all the responsibilities to protect civilians will 
take the Afghan security forces. International troops will provide support to the final 
withdrawal in 2014. 
Each country will determine the plan and the pace of withdrawal, which will be coordinated 
with NATO planners. In Afghanistan are based 132 thousand soldiers, two thirds of which 
are American soldiers. 
After 2014, instead of the military operations international troops will be involved in 
missions to train and support. However, prolonged presence that would entail financial 
support to Afghan forces will cost billions of dollars a year after the withdrawal. 
The agreement means that Afghanistan is fully integrated into the American structure of 
Greater Central Asia (New Silk Road). Moreover - as part of the agreement of Afghanistan 
becoming a tool of U.S. policy in the region, the leverage with which the U.S. and its allies 
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would manipulate regional stability, handling benefited from a level of threat to states 
bordering Afghanistan. 
 
The agreement is quite similar to Gandamaks agreement in 1879 that deprived 
Afghanistan right to pursue an independent foreign policy and put Afghan Emir 
Yaqub Khan under the control of the British representative in Kabul (Evseenko, 
2012). 
 
Some Russian commentators tied to emphasize the two provisions of the Agreement - first, 
by the end of 2014 should leave all the American soldiers, except for instructors dedicated 
to helping the Afghan army, as well as group special forces for “counterterrorism 
operations” against “Al –Qaeda”; the fact stands out that these instructors and special forces, 
who remain in the country after 2014, they will be posted on the Afghan military bases. As 
an example of “good will and respect for the sovereignty of Afghanistan” is enshrined in the 
Agreement on the belief that the two most problematic topics for Karzai administration - 
night raids and a prison at Bagram air base placed under “full control of Afghan law 
enforcement”. 
First of all, the number of instructors Agreement did not specified. Also, no mention of 
employees of private military companies and the number of “housing recovery”, under 
cover of which, if necessary, can be placed in any number of Afghan troops. The number of 
instructor corps includes (according to previous agreements), also the British and Indian 
instructors, that is reasonable doubt about the sincerity of the “small number of foreign 
instructors”.  
With “Afghan military bases” is even more interesting. According to the agreement, all 
assets and property that are in the possession of U.S. troops will remain so for an indefinite 
period of time. Thus, it is only the fact that the military infrastructure created ISAF, the 
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Afghan government is transferred for temporary use, and it, is hard to call the strengthening 
of sovereignty. 
A similar story is a prison on Bagram Air Base. The fact is that for the past year, the U.S. 
side release from prison people in high position in Taliban and other group’s ranks, in 
negotiations with the Afghan armed opposition, held in Qatar. Realization "of the program 
of strategic release" U.S. had two objectives: to support operational channels of 
communication with the armed opposition and - strengthening its influence among Islamic 
extremists.  
Talking about the “subtleties” of the Agreement commentators overlooked another position 
that completely negates the talk about “the increased independence of Afghanistan” - the 
position that control of the air space of the country will carry the American experts and 
behind also remains uncontrolled right to any form of air movement throughout 
Afghanistan. 
The separate issue is a financial support by the U.S. and NATO assist the Karzai 
administration and the Afghan national security forces in the long term. The agreement 
provides for the U.S. commitment “to support social and economic development of 
Afghanistan” for the period till 2024. However, the organization of such funding does not 
provide specific amounts. It is assumed that each year, the President's administration will 
ask Congress for a certain amount, and this amount will be calculated on the basis of their 
specific political realities of Afghanistan. 
In fact, this allows the U.S. to use the socio-economic needs of Afghanistan to 
finance the entire foreign policy in Central Asia, from the program of New Silk Road 
and finishing operations of the security services. The representatives of Karzai 
administration do not understand this point and suggests that “the Afghan side would 
like to see the U.S. take on more specific commitments to provide financial 
assistance to Afghanistan”, they genuinely believe that the Agreement has been 
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developed for the needs of Afghanistan. In fact, this agreement has a completely 
different purpose - strengthening the U.S. position in the region and the use of 
Afghanistan as a base for American expansion into Central Asia (Evseenko, 2012). 
 
Russian expert Evseenko continues that Barack Obama and former Afghan Ambassador to 
the U.S. Tayeb Jawad spoke with remarkable candor. Ex-ambassador said bluntly that the 
agreement demonstrates America's intention to remain in his country, and could not resist 
the terrible hint: “If any of the neighbors have bad intentions to Afghanistan they should 
know that the U.S. is going to be here anymore”. 
 
Analysis of the history of U.S. relations with “Al-Qaeda” allows any impartial observer to 
conclude that it was no longer a question of destruction of the organization, and 
establishment of full control, over a Sunni radicalism, and include it in the toolbox U.S. 
foreign policy. And if “Middle East Al-Qaeda” is already working in the right way to 
Washington by announcing its main adversaries Tehran and Damascus, for the Central 
Asian, Afghan, Pakistani and Xiang-Uighur extremists control was not achieved. And yet, 
without subordination extremists in these regions, the further advance the U.S. in region will 
be difficult and a step towards the achievement of strategic objectives, which is the US-
Afghan agreement remain unfulfilled (Evseenko, 2012). 
 
The agreement is not a purely bilateral and it has significant challenges to other countries in 
the region. Its first effects will be felt by Central Asian states, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. 
And next in line is China. 
Strategic interest of China to Afghanistan is ensuring its security issues. 
Actually, this is the main characteristic of modern foreign policy of Beijing, 
which is dictated by the interests of a strictly internal development of China. In 
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the case of Afghanistan, it is primarily the impact on the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region which is a long-term ‘Achilles' heel’ of China.  
 
The presence of zones of instability not far away from areas is contrary to the 
interests of China, especially as members of Xinjiang separatist organizations 
have been repeatedly seen in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The latter factor 
gave rise to talk about the possible presence of bases in Afghanistan for 
militant training activities in Xinjiang
145
 (Kaukenov, 2012).  
 
Leaving aside the “Chinese” and “Pakistan” perspective, there is some challenges of the 
Agreement for Iran and Russia. 
During the years of NATO forces in Afghanistan, heroin production there has grown a few 
dozen times, that now there is 90% of the world's opium consumption.  
 
According to Russian expert Panovkin, “In reality, this is a new opium war waged by 
the United States (as British Empire did in China). Afghan opium became part of 
U.S. foreign policy strategy, in fact - it has become a tool of the economy. 
It is, in fact, is precisely what is U.S. policy to drug trafficking in Afghanistan – is 
providing enrichment of drug trafficking current Afghan administration. Opium 
poppy cultivation and extraction of raw opium is happening today all over 
Afghanistan, and in the provinces of Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, Helmand, Kunar, 
Balkh, Kunduz and Faizabad create a closed industrial cycle, including opium 
cultivation, extraction of raw opium and its processing into morphine base and 
heroin continue to the end product - heroin hydrochloride its storage and placing on 
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heroin markets – Pakistani Chitral and Afghan Kandahar. By the way, in the same 
Kandahar is officially launched a full network of banks lending of opium poppy 
under future crops. By July 2011 in Kandahar was run by the local head of the 
provincial council - Ahmad Wali Karzai, half-brother of Hamid Karzai. 
Most of the profits earned through drug trafficking, runs through American banks. 
And out of these funds the U.S. partially offset their costs of operations in 
Afghanistan and the implementation of the expansion in the region” (Panovkin, 
2012). 
 
 
Particularly promising strategic projects are the development of transport 
communications, passing from the Central Asian region through Afghanistan to the 
South of Asia. Uzbekistan participates in building railroads, bridges and social facilities 
in the northern Afghan regions, which have improved the condition of the road 
infrastructure.  The Afghan transport system is increasingly integrated with the Uzbek 
transport communications. In December 2011 at the newly constructed railroad 
Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif the first train started to connect the northern border of the 
country.  “This is a welcome development which should facilitate the transport of 
supplies to Afghanistan, and contributes to the development of trade relations in the 
region. The train arrived without a load on the newly constructed station in Mazar-i-
Sharif after a 75-kilometer distance from the border with Uzbekistan”, told the deputy 
minister of public works Afghanistan Noor Gul Mangal, who supervised the project. 
The railway is the first step in an ambitious project that will link Afghanistan with the 
neighboring countries and pave the way for the development of trade relations between 
Europe and Asia.  IRA never had a functioning railway, since projects have been 
abandoned for various reasons, but the civil war of recent decades has made it 
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impossible to build railways.  In the short term the railway will help to relieve the 
internal terminal port Khairaton.  
Due to the geographical position Afghanistan has the potential of becoming a trade, 
energy and transport hub of the region that will promote its long-term sustainable 
development.  It could also become an important hub connecting the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia in the network passing through a corridor. Creating a Trans-Afghan 
corridor by constructing new railways to connect cities in Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Pakistan will carry freight coming from Southeast 
Asia to Europe. This is shorter than passing through Far Eastern rail corridors and 
generally will expand the transport and communications and transit opportunities of this 
region.  
 
 Kazakhstani expert Dosym Satbyev has stated that Uzbekistan is interested to 
expand the zone of influence in Afghanistan, because it is in its vital interests. 
Such attempts on the part of Tashkent were made before, when it supported the 
Afghan warlord general Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek.  
 
As for Turkmenistan, Ashgabat is taking interest in Afghanistan as a country 
through which to implement the transit of natural gas. The history of this interest 
goes back to the 90s, when the gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond, through which Turkmen gas will flow, not 
only was lobbied by Ashgabat but also by United States (Čech  2011).  
 
According to the press service of the government of Turkmenistan, at meeting between 
Turkmen and Afghan sides issues of strengthening stability and economic development 
of IRA, the expansion of cooperation in region in transport transit, agriculture and 
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power generation were discussed “at meetings was pointed out the value of a number of 
projects initiated by Turkmenistan, in particular TAPI gas pipeline and railway 
Atamyrat-Imamnazar-Akin-Andhoy and construction of a power line rail Mary-
Atamyrat Andhoy . This would increase the export of electricity to Afghanistan five 
times and meet 70% of the neighboring country's electricity needs, “- said 
representative of the Government of Turkmenistan. 
Tajikistan also supplies electrical power in small amounts to Afghan city of Kunduz. 
However, chronic problems with Uzbekistan, such as the mutual personal dislike of the 
two presidents, impair Tajik trade, energy self-sufficiency and economic development. 
Afghan fighters could threaten the security of Tajikistan through long and transparent 
borders. Another issue is a major hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan which is controlled by 
Russia; the dam has now become a source of contention between the two countries. 
 
Unlike Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more interested to promote 
infrastructure projects. In this connection the CASA-1000 project should be 
mentioned, with the construction of a power line from Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Satbayev, 2012). 
 
Kazakhstan also constructed factories and will continue to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Afghanistan, supplying grain, flour, rice and other goods. The government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan provided $ 2.3 million for building schools, hospitals 
and roads in Afghanistan.  
In 2012 Kazakhstan allocated $ 2 million on development of Afghan police patrols
146
. 
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Since 2010, every year up to 200 Afghan students come to study in Kazakhstan. 
A total of 1,000 Afghan students will get education as doctors and teachers at 
Kazakh universities under a special 50 million dollar program that runs from 
2010 to 2018
147. Afghanistan’s socio-economic rehabilitation is an essential 
guarantee of regional and international security and stability,” told Kazakh 
Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov, as he pledged Astana continues support for 
more robust international efforts to assist this country return to the peaceful life 
(MFA of RK, 2014).  
 
According to MFA of RK, Kazakhstan supports the New Silk Road initiative for 
creating infrastructure such as roads and rail lines to link Afghanistan with its neighbors 
also by building Kazakhstan’s portion of an international highway corridor that will 
connect Western China with Western Europe through Russia.  
Kazakhstan government and their Afghan counter partners stressed out the need for 
concerted efforts to fight terrorism and extremism in this region, adding that regional 
cooperation is the main key to the success of this goal, as well as economic prosperity
148
.  
The president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said: Afghan drug trade is the main 
threat to Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). Drug trafficking from Afghanistan is a major 
threat to countries of CSTO. 
The President noted that he sees no threat of war for country and other members of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, as a really serious problem is the illegal drug 
trafficking. “This distribution is increasing - Nazarbayev said. - Afghanistan continues to 
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annually increase the production of drugs and their products and the event of the completion 
of ISAF mission is unknown what kind of power is established in Afghanistan, and what 
policies will hold the Afghan government (CA-NEWS
149
) 
  
No doubt there is another factor. As a result of implementation of Agreement will activate 
terrorist underground in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  
 
The results are obvious, for example in 2014 another group of 16 Kazakhstan’s citizens 
went for jihad in Syria; they joined organization named “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant”.  
 
These people posted on a video in which display weapons and talk about their purposes. 
This video is thoroughly studied by domestic diplomats and security officials of 
Kazakhstan, supposedly these people are forming part of “Free Syrian Army”.  
 
  
 
The so-called “Free Syrian Army” is considered moderate group. It’s quite officially 
supported by the U.S., France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. First, the main purpose of this army 
of insurgents was the struggle against Syrian President Bashar Assad, now they are taking 
part in the war for the establishment of the Middle East, the Islamic Caliphate. Major 
fighting extremists are now in Iraq - they even managed to take under control a few large 
cities.  
 
Only in the last few months of 2014 in the war zone were already more than a hundred 
citizens of Kazakhstan. Most of them are dead - they died for the geopolitical interests of 
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some particular groups. And it is quite obvious that the channel recruitment in the Middle 
East is still in force, and citizens of Kazakhstan continue to be killed in this armed 
conflict
150
.  
 
In fact, the core of preparation centers lead by people closely associated with the 
residency of American and British intelligence agencies operating in Afghanistan.  
Evseenko also states, that “some sources indicated of mass support of people of  
Central Asian republics, supposedly based on Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks common 
interests and common aspirations of their “brothers” on the other side of border in 
Afghanistan is nothing more than widespread misconception, this is a myth that was 
created. Even through exist a common history and language, but their interests and 
geopolitical orientation diverge farther. Tajikistan's population tends to integrate 
with Russia, and Afghan Tajiks increasingly migrate to other countries, where 
material assistance is presented” (Evseenko, 2012) 
 
In Iran negative effects of the Agreement are more than obvious. First, using its exclusive 
position in airspace, the U.S. will use this fact to maintain aircraft and electronic intelligence 
on Iran. Secondly, the flow of aid to terrorist’s “Jundallah”151 will be increased in the 
funding programs and support anti-governmental groups in Iran. 
 
                                                             
150 Permanent address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1406007060 
 
151
  Jundallah (Iran) is a militant organization, claiming to fight for rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran.    
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The strategic partnership agreement as part of the New Silk Road is against the idea 
of Eurasian integration within Customs Union and Common Economic Space and 
plans to create by 1 January 2015 of Eurasian Economic Union
152
 (Evseenko, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
152 Evseenko, N., 2014 http :/ / www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1336652220 
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6.1.1.1. Chinese factor of geopolitics  
 
Along with plans reformatting of geopolitical map of vast region from Suez 
Canal to Tibet is taken measures to neutralize geopolitical potential of leading 
countries of continent and, above all, China. Around China is set to a “double 
game”. On the one hand, the U.S. and Britain are considering a “geostrategic 
partnership”153 with China as an effective tool to establish control over the 
entire Eurasian continent, solutions to global financial and economic problems. 
On the other hand, work is focusing on destabilization of the inner political 
situation in China, undermining the foundations of its territorial integrity. ‘To 
get’ to China is more convenient through control of Central Asian states, as 
well as Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Tibet, which are 
geographically adjacent to this region and with strong separatist sentiment in 
favor of secession from China.  
 
Beijing makes attempts at political and trade-economic penetration in Central 
Asian region. In this regard, now is becoming more important China initiative 
to revive the Silk Road infrastructure in the context of China's Asia Pacific 
strategy. According to Beijing's view,  development of Asia Pacific cooperation 
as opposed to Euro-Atlantic model of trade and economic cooperation will 
allow China greatly strengthen its position in the global market for resources, 
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goods and services. Currently, new trade and economic opportunities are 
limited by the lack of transportation alternatives to land resources and goods.  
Volume of trade between China and Central Asia is growing rapidly and has 
been increased cooperation mainly in fossil fuels. Chinese energy companies 
involved in development of oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the old forms and extent of cooperation are no longer 
satisfied neither China nor Central Asia. 
In 2011-2015 China's military budget doubled and exceeds the total defense 
spending of all other key nations in Asia-Pacific Region (APR), except for the 
United States. 
With additional funds Beijing intends to spend on the modernization of the 
army and its equipment with more modern types of weapons. In particular, it is 
about investing in development of fifth generation fighter jets and unmanned 
aerial vehicles; in addition, increased spending on development of space 
technology. This assumes a reduction of the armed forces of China, which will 
increase defense spending in terms of each individual soldier. This will ensure 
a qualitative transformation of the Chinese army.  
 
Thus, China is seeking to gradually reduce the level of military spending, 
the United States, where the budget in this area for 2012 is 531 billion 
dollars will take a long time to China failed to come close to the volume of 
U.S. military budget
154
 (Bezrukov, 2012).  
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China ranks third on volume of investments in the economy of Kazakhstan. In 
terms of investor countries in 2010, most investments are drawn from the 
Netherlands (5.7 billion U.S. dollars) and France (1.5 billion U.S. dollars). 
China is third, with size of 1.2 billion U.S. dollars investment slightly ahead of 
the United Kingdom. The latest 1 billion U.S. dollars investment took place in 
2013.  
European trend becomes even more pronounced when we look at the 
geography of foreign participation in the forced industrialization. By Map of 
innovative industrialization (Kazakhstani Governmental program of 
development since 2010
155
) had to connect investors from 13 different 
countries in 29 projects worth 20.5 billion US dollars. (3 trillion tenge – 
Kazakh currency). The vast majority of European capitals have first place 
(France, Germany, and Turkey). The second position is occupied by Russia and 
Belarus. China, South Korea and Japan are in the third position. 
Of the total foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the export-
import operations with China accounts for about one-third. 
In an effort to prevent the dominance of China in Eurasia exists tendency to 
create a clash of interests between Beijing and other major Eurasian countries, 
in particular Russia, India, and Iran. In Russia, currently vying two 
fundamental geopolitical approaches towards China. First by largest energy 
companies in Russia and China recently announced the signing of a 
                                                             
155 The main objectives of innovative industrialization to consolidate business and government efforts and 
concentration of Kazakhstan's resources on development of priority sectors of the economy; creation of a 
favorable business environment and investment climate; increase in the intensity and productivity of the 
national economy.  
The main priorities are: development of traditional export sectors with diversification of products and 
continuation of process chain to deep processing; development of innovative industries, products with high 
added value and high productivity. 
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revolutionary deal, which will initiate the joint development of the huge energy 
deposits in Eastern Siberia.  
 
Foothold in Central Asia, the U.S. and the UK are not without reasons 
expect to take direct control of the Straits of Malacca, which, along with 
Taiwan and the Strait of Hormuz has geostrategic importance for Beijing. 
Through the Malacca Strait, which connects the Pacific Ocean to the 
Indian in China receives about 80% of its oil. The plans remain Atlantic 
geo-strategy scenarios incite the Indo-Pakistani conflict. According to 
reports in the mass media, after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
2014 intend seriously to gain a foothold in the Indian subcontinent. In this 
regard, China is eager to prevent the development of such a scenario in 
vast region of its traditional interests. Chinese intend to place a naval base 
in the Pakistani port of Gwadar
156
 (Centre of strategic studies, 2012).  
 
In order to contain China's geopolitical ambitions are prerequisites 
heightened tensions in Sino-Indian relations
157
 (Deviyatov, 2007) 
 In Washington and London are well aware that current level of trade and 
economic cooperation, in which trade has already reached tens of billions of US 
dollars, creates good prospects for rapprochement between Beijing and Delhi in 
the political and economic sphere. It is necessary to keep in mind that India has an 
observer as part of continental political bloc SCO strongly influenced by Beijing. 
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For these and other reasons, the United States and the United Kingdom intend to 
emerging strategic alliance with New Delhi used as a counterbalance to Beijing is 
gaining influence in Eurasia. U.S. Senate ratification of a nuclear agreement with 
India is tantamount to recognition of the nuclear status of the country, which 
makes it a member of the club, which is composed of only five powers - the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council - the U.S., Russia, Britain, France 
and China.  
At the same time is achieving the goal of the transition process under the control 
of Washington's military development in India and as a consequence in the 
military and diplomatic policy of this state (Centre of strategic studies, 2012). 
In recent years, Chinese leadership began to actively use the “soft power” in 
conducting internal and external policies. First, Chinese authorities began to 
seriously consider role of non-traditional instruments of influence on the world 
community when Hu Jintao took the leadership. From this point in work in 
creating a positive image of China abroad got different accents. Beijing's 
foreign policy was aimed at supporting peace returns, and the condemnation of 
the uni-polar world of power politics.  
In Hu Jintao's report at the XVII Congress of CPC Central theme of “soft 
power” got a specific place, it was stated that “in our day culture is 
becoming an increasingly important element of competition in the total 
power of the state and development of culture in country must be 
accompanied by an increase in its international influence
158” (Hu Jintao, 
2011) 
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Subsequently, new China's leadership led by Xi Jinping had developed a 
number of foreign policy programs designed to attract the world public 
opinion, promoting thesis of peaceful development path of China; for example, 
a new policy initiatives such as “public diplomacy” (公共外交), and 
“peripheral diplomacy” (周边外交). Since inclusion of the concept of “soft 
power” in program material of Communist Party, Chinese authorities have 
decided to actively export Chinese culture to neighboring countries. At 6
th
  
Plenum of 17
th
 CPC Central Committee convocation, held in October 2011, 
was already adopted by a key policy document entitled “Decision of CPC 
Central Committee some of important issues of deepening reform of cultural 
system, to promote development and prosperity of socialist culture”. 
Also in the ruling CPC Central Committee plenum pointed need to “implement 
an exit strategy outside culture, enhance the international influence of Chinese 
culture, to show the world a new way of reform and opening up of China
159” 
(China & US focus, 2014). 
 
In concept of Chinese policy of soft power to include specific mechanisms 
aimed at creating a favorable image of the country abroad, among which we 
can highlight the following points:  
 
First, conduct multilateral policy to ensure global security, prevent 
deterioration of the international situation and the strengthening of global 
political and economic stability. Thus, China's foreign policy is directly linked 
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to principle of “harmonious world”. China's foreign policy in recent years 
shows that Beijing strongly support removed from any action that could lead to 
new conflicts. However, it should be noted that when it comes to territorial 
disputes, Beijing may take a ‘tough’ stand. Evidence of this can be controversy 
about supplies several islands in South China Sea between Japan, Vietnam, 
Philippines and China;  
 
Second, is to cooperate by providing assistance in economic, social, health, 
educational spheres, and also in area of humanitarian assistance. At the same 
time, highlighting the Beijing’s great credit, unlike most Western countries, 
does not tie interstate relations to political and ideological issues;  
 
Third, carry out various cultural actions, which require the most fully represent 
the positive features of Chinese culture with a focus on achievements of PRC. 
In this context, China offers the world its own understanding of development of 
interstate relations. Permanent promotion of Chinese traditions and strategic 
lines for several years, a project creating worldwide network of Confucius 
Institutes, the first of which was opened in 2004 in Seoul. Of key importance is 
attached to activities of such institutions in the United States, where at the 
moment there are about 400 institutes, centers and classes of Confucius.  
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The project to establish Confucius Institutes abroad is supervised by Office of 
PRC government to spread Chinese language in the world (Chinese Hanban
160
). 
According to data for 2012 in 96 countries and regions of the world operated 
358 institutes and 500 Confucius classes, including in Asia - 65, Europe - 73, 
America - 51, Africa - 16 Oceania - 6, in Russia - 12. To 2020 is planned to 
bring the total number of Confucius Institutes in the world until 1000. 
Confucius Institutes open when operating abroad education. Thanks to 
extensive financial and personnel support from Beijing, Confucius Institutes 
are able to offer attractive conditions for those who wish to learn Chinese. As a 
rule, there are low study fees. According to some reports, Hanban annually 
allocates about 100 thousand US dollars in funding of each institute
161
.  
 
Recently, there are increasing negative assessments of Confucius centers, 
especially in Western countries. So, in newspaper Globe and Mail authors 
called Canadian universities and colleges to refrain from partnership with the 
Confucius Institute, justifying it by the fact that these structures promote 
elements of Chinese policies that are incompatible with liberal education. Their 
introduction into the learning process helps to ensure that there is beginning to 
take a stand in Beijing on sensitive issues such as Tibet and Taiwan situations, 
activities forbidden in China “Falun Gong” teaching. As a result, according to 
                                                             
160 Hanban – is short for the Office of Chinese Language Council International, is a non-governmental 
organization, affiliated to the Ministry of Education of China.  
161
 Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban) - http://english.hanban.org/ 
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Canadian researchers, Confucius Institute purposefully promotes political 
views of Communist Party of China in foreign educational institutions
162
.  
 
At the present, Chinese authorities are making efforts to implement an effective 
policy of “soft power”. The main directions of the implementation of such a 
policy in the foreign policy concept of China are Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin 
America and Central Asia. 
Despite all measures to contain Chinese ambitions, Beijing does not intend to 
abandon its geo-historical expansion plans on the mainland and in particular, 
the increment of its territory to neighboring countries. In 2013, Chinese 
newspaper Wenweipo published an article entitled as “six wars in which China 
must participate in the next 50 years”.  Among them, the “war” for unification 
with Taiwan (2020-2025), the return of Spartli islands (2025-2030.) 
Dyaoyuyado (Senkaku) and Ryukyu (2040-2045), Association Outer Mongolia 
(2045-2050) return islands off Russia (2055-2060)
163
.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
162 According to Canadian Association of University Teachers’ Confucius Institutes are operated by an 
authoritarian government, it is a propaganda of certain ideas, which contradict with academic freedom and 
human rights freedom.   http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/01/01/confucius-institutes/ 
163 Six wars in which China must participate in the next 50 years [electronic resource] / / Military Review 
[website]. URL: http://topwar.ru/34758-shest-voyn-v-kotoryh-kitay-dolzhen-uchastvovat-v-sleduyuschie-50-
let.html 
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6.1.1.1.1. New tools of Beijing's Central Asian policy  
According to some Chinese analysts, today in Central Asia unfolds competition 
between the U.S., EU, Russia and China for access to energy and politico-
economic potential of this region. A significant role in determining the leaders 
in this rivalry play sympathy of population and local political elites. To achieve 
this goal Beijing tries to form and actively use all the components of policy of 
“soft power”, thus counteracting the plans of Washington and Moscow.  
 
Unlike countries of Southeast Asia, Central Asia is not observed large-scale 
Chinese cultural influence of mass political action, broad financing of 
educational and other programs. Given presence in Central Asian countries of 
sustainable concerns about rapid growth of China's power, it is obvious that 
initial target of PRC leadership is weakening anti-Chinese sentiment in region.  
 
Moreover, given the uncertainty of further development of countries of Central 
Asia and Kazakhstan, instability in Afghanistan can have a destructive impact 
on the entire Central Asian region, creating a zone of instability along western 
borders of China, which will seriously constrain its development. It should be 
noted that Beijing encourages rapid development of Xinjiang which largely due 
to economic cooperation with Central Asia.  
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Modern Chinese diplomacy in Central Asia differ pragmatism and emphasis on 
prioritizing the implementation of economic, transport and communication 
projects. Chinese leadership has not yet developed a formal program to 
promote its policy of “soft power” in the region. Nevertheless, according to 
Chinese activities in conducting widespread cultural and educational events in 
the region, we can assume that authorities will soon take a policy document. 
While it can be argued that increase of financial credit, expansion of economic 
ties and deepening cultural and educational programs form the core of “soft 
power” in China's relations with Central Asian states. This strategy includes 
three areas:  
 
1) Education. In recent years, number of students from Central Asian countries 
studying in China is increasing because Chinese authorities create favorable 
conditions for them. An increasing number of students are enrolled in the 
Central Xinjiang. For example, Xinjiang Normal University (SPU), located in 
Urumqi, aimed primarily at students from the neighboring republics. In 
addition to universities in Xinjiang also functions courses for foreigners who, 
after training courses get education in only Chinese language. The University 
for Foreign Students organized a free half board and free hostel 
accommodation. The number of students enrolled in higher education 
institutions across China only from Kazakhstan, is more than 7.5 thousand.  
 
An integral element of Chinese influence’s spread remains through Confucius 
education institutions. A common practice is to open all kinds of funds at 
institutions sponsoring exchange programs for students and support 
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development of educational programs about China. In particular, the Institute 
has a foundation called “Chinese Bridge”, which annually with assistance of 
dozens of Confucius Institutes of the Central Asian republics provides courses 
in China at the expense of host organization; more than two thousand Chinese 
teachers working in educational centers of Central Asian countries.  
 
Currently in Kazakhstan there are operating 4 Confucius Institutes: in Almaty, 
Astana, Karaganda and Aktobe cities. A similar number of institutions open in 
Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, an increasing number of students here, studying 
Chinese language, as well as leaving to study in China. According to the 
Ministry of Education of Kyrgyzstan, in Bishkek only in universities more than 
two thousand students are taught in Chinese. Annually to China sent about a 
hundred students. According to Director of the Confucius Institute at National 
University Jay Wang, Beijing financed two more programs by SCO, enabling 
about 50 students of Kyrgyzstan Chinese speakers during academic year to be 
able to be trained in China.  
 
In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the Confucius Institute situated at National 
Universities of these republics. Today, Turkmenistan in Confucius Institutes, 
and Chinese universities enrolled more than 1.5 thousand Turkmen students;  
 
2) Culture and Media. One of the main engines of China's “soft power” is to 
promote Chinese language and culture abroad. For these purposes are all sorts 
of programs and projects aimed at enhancing the positive image of China. In 
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particular, site of scientific, technical and economic information of China 
announced introduction of Central Asian Confucius Institutes a new curriculum 
called “China on the tongue” purpose of this program is - promotion of Chinese 
culture to the world through learning Chinese culinary arts. Under this 
program, China will send cooks to Central Asian republics. Another effective 
form of promotion of cultural influence is revitalization of Chinese media in 
Central Asia. In terms of reducing criticism about human rights violations in 
China, the Chinese authorities have relied on strengthening work in field of 
propaganda abroad. To do this, the PRC government, strengthen activities such 
Chinese media as news “Xinhua” overseas edition of party newspaper 
“Zhenminzhibao” Chinese television with international channels. They are 
designed to increase awareness of foreign citizens about China. Today, in 
Kazakhstan there are representatives of newspapers “Zhenminzhibao” and 
“Guanminzhibao” agency “Xinhua” China Radio International, and China 
Central Television CCTV.  
 
Additional channel of cultural influence on Central Asian countries is the 
activity of public funds and other Chinese institutions, organizing large-scale 
events at the expense of Chinese government.  
 
 
3)  Business and Politics. In Chinese diplomacy towards Central Asia 
considerable importance is attached to intensify business ties. Special role in 
the implementation of policy of “soft power” and expanding sphere of 
influence in Central Asian markets play an annual exhibition EXPO “China – 
219 
 
Eurasia”.  It contributes to development of numerous business contacts and 
helps the Chinese state-owned companies, small and medium enterprises to 
invest and cooperate with business community of the republics.  
September 2, 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao at the opening of second annual 
exhibition EXPO “China – Eurasia” in Urumqi encouraged Chinese 
enterprises to increase investment in tcountries of Eurasia and to explore 
possibility of creating new platforms for economic relations in framework 
of Economic Cooperation Fund “China - Central Asia” and Foundation for 
cooperation in agriculture
164
 (Kaukenov, 2012).  
 
As a sign of “soft power” using by the Chinese authorities is enough flexibility 
in Central Asian-Chinese relations. As practice shows, implementation of 
bilateral projects in this region Beijing presents soft conditions here unlike 
other non-regional powers. In particular, for all the discussion of railway 
project “China - Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” Chinese authorities have shown 
great restraint and patience. It is known that Kyrgyz authorities changed the 
draft several times. Originally Kyrgyzstan agreed on condition give access to 
China for its large deposits of non-ferrous metals, signed the agreement on 
formula “resources in exchange for investments”. However, August 8, 2012 
Kyrgyz President Atambayev said that this scheme is not appropriate, and 
decision was accepted by the Chinese authorities quietly, moreover, in course 
held in Beijing of 9
th
 meeting of Intergovernmental Kyrgyz-Chinese Committee 
on Trade and Economic Cooperation they suggested considering other schemes 
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 Kazakhstani expert Kaukenov A., “Chinese diplomacy”, Regnum, 2012 
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of Sino-Kyrgyz-Uzbek railway project
165
, in particular by establishing a joint 
venture project.  
 
Chinese policymakers’ flexibility is also reflected in distancing themselves 
from participation in projects that could potentially lead to a conflict between 
Central Asian countries. So, for example, China's leaders initially agreed to 
participate in construction of power plants in Tajikistan Zarafshan. However, 
subsequently, at design stage of this project, suspended all work. Thus Beijing 
did not provoke further deterioration of relations between Dushanbe and 
Tashkent. As compensation, China invited to participate in other projects in 
Tajikistan, in particular, in the same year, Chinese banks provided Tajikistan 
with a loan of $ 1 billion for infrastructure projects, including the 
reconstruction of Dushanbe - Khujand tunnel and to seal tunnel Shahristan 
Anzob. In subsequent years, China has participated in implementation of 
dozens of infrastructure and transport projects in territory of Tajik republic.  
 
Finally, it is appropriate to note recent initiative of Beijing to build “economic 
corridor along the Silk Road”. This project is actually a response to China's 
existing regional integration associations.  
                                                             
165 For project of Sino-Kyrgyz-Uzbek railway, the Chinese side offers two route options. First: China - 
Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan may transit through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and then back. Further access to the 
railways of Turkmenistan and from there the road goes into Iran, then to Turkey, and then through the ports 
and rail ferry connects with the European part. This means only one thing - any technical operation increases 
the cost of transportation and increase the time of delivery. 
 
The second route option: from Uzbek Railways route goes to Kazakhstan and through the port of Aktau on 
the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. This option for China is most profitable, because it already has two ways to 
Kazakhstan. Simply put, in terms of trans-Eurasian continental transit it is an important project. But if the 
Chinese and Uzbek sides are willing to pay 5 billion US dollars, all becomes very clear, it is not in favor of 
Kyrgyzstan, also if they will get control over mineral deposits and the mining industry of Kyrgyzstan. 
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Despite Beijing's efforts to create a positive image of China in region, 
population of Central Asian countries is still inclined to see a threat in the face 
of China.  Simultaneously with intensification of contacts between Central Asia 
and China in mass media of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics in 
general more frequent publication on “Chinese threat” that fuel public concerns 
about Beijing's imperial ambitions. Such materials will strengthen the anti-
Chinese sentiment among population. This, in turn, has a negative impact on 
process of implementation of joint Kazakh-Chinese projects. As an example, 
frequent cases of fights between visiting Chinese migrant workers and local 
residents
166
.  
 
Thus, to date, increasing economic strength of China allows it to occupy a key 
position at the summits G20, G7, and at meetings of UN Security Council. 
Against this background, in order to convert the economic success in political 
field the country's leadership has decided to intensify its efforts to use “soft 
power” in foreign policy. According to Chinese experts, main reason for using 
“soft power” of Chinese diplomacy is not to convince the world of moral 
superiority of Chinese way of development and versatility of proposed 
solutions to PRC or other problems, and to reconcile with fact that the world 
community about inevitable rise of China. Today, main directions of 
implementation of this policy in foreign policy concept of China are Asia 
Pacific, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia;  
 
                                                             
166 http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakh-chinese-workers-fight-atyrau/24677945.html 
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China focuses on strengthening its own power by gradual formation of a 
positive image and its image of a reliable economic and political partner in 
minds of the elites and population of the region. Given intensification of 
Central Asian-Chinese relations in almost all spheres, we can assume that in the 
future the extent of China's “soft power” in Central Asia will rise sharply. From 
this it follows that the expansion of China's economic, political and cultural 
influence in Central Asia - is an objective process. 
 
It seems that behavior of new generation of Chinese politicians due to complex 
endogenous and exogenous factors should include desire to transform the 
existing model of economic development in the direction of reducing export 
dependence. China needs to stimulate domestic demand-supply system to 
reduce dependence on disasters world economic and financial situation. So in 
order to stabilize first wave of the crisis in 2008-2009 Beijing was forced to 
adopt a package of measures to support export-oriented domestic producers in 
amount of 600 billion US dollars
167
 . Thus according to the Chinese department 
of the Swiss bank UBS, China has means to another complex of such measures, 
but does not use them. In this regard, it appears that on the one hand, Beijing 
wants to avoid a “credit inflation bubbles” that led to the crisis in Europe and 
the U.S., on the other - to reallocate their investments.  
 
In latter case, probably most promising avenue is to invest in transport and 
energy projects in Central Asia, which will enable China:   
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- To prompt economic ties strategically important in terms of economy and 
security issues of region and promote development of its western provinces 
that can turn into major consumers of Central Asian hydrocarbons and 
importers of finished products.  
 
-  To reduce price of necessary resources for the Chinese economy due to 
increased competition among suppliers because of time constraints of their 
commodity needs. In particular, Beijing is forced to buy  hydrocarbon 
feedstock in the Russian Federation at market prices, while Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan do it by a more favorable rates
168
 that instability in the Middle East 
and North Africa, where China gets more than 50 % of total energy, acts as an 
incentive to expand its presence in Central Asia. 
Probably the trigger for this shift in foreign policy rhetoric of Beijing served 
following external determinants:  
 
- Firstly, the Crimea annexation by Russia, it is understandable that there is an 
unspoken agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Central Asia and 
Russia, ultimately, against the background of design structures of China and  
Eurasian Union may cause to lose of region as its sphere of influence.  
 
- Secondly, the need for China to be a reliable in Central Asian region in the 
light of military build-up (primarily manifested in the form of deployment 
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authentication system defense in Southeast Asia due to tendency to use tools of 
real politics in international relations (the war in Libya, Syria, Ukraine).  
 
Meanwhile, there are a number of external economic conditions for 
amplification of China in Central Asia; “ricochet” is introduced 
competition in triangle of China - Russia - United States in other regions of 
the world. As one of the prerequisites for such failure should be identified 
projects totaling 3 billion US dollars for construction of a deepwater port in 
the Crimea in accession of Russia. This port has strategic importance to 
China, because it becomes a sea international maritime hub on the route of 
goods from the East to Europe under the “Economic Belt of Great Silk 
Road”. On the other hand, there is a gradual escalation of the Sino-Russian 
competition in the Arctic region, which serves an additional irritant issue in 
relations between Moscow and Beijing, while in Central Asia, land routes 
through which along with Northern Sea Route are an alternative to the 
existing southern China Sea post to Europe via the Suez channel
169
 (Blank, 
2014).  
At the same time China is indisputable leadership in Central Asia can provide 
its independence from Russia in its relations with the EU, as the northern route 
due to geographical position of Russian Federation with all hands will be 
linked to the need to agree on conditions of its operation with Moscow. 
However, in Southeast Asia through establishment of the United States intend 
to formalize partnership Pacific economic blockade of China, which makes last 
to force search for alternative southern sea routes to Europe Railways.  
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The role of SCO in context of Afghanistan is largely due to the specifics of 
SCO hopes to fill, which is lacking in this organization. Since achieving 
stability of Afghanistan is common interest of all countries of the SCO, it is 
most appropriate point of contact. Therefore, for many years offered a “security 
belt” by SCO around Afghanistan. This idea, by the way, eventually failed 
because no one offered any distinct mechanisms of its creation, or on need to 
participate actively in SCO, etc. Because of organizational problems, more than 
making Afghanistan the status of an observer is not moved forward. And with 
gaining momentum of competition between China and Russia in Central Asia, 
prospect of real SCO cases remains very elusive. 
 In SCO to combat international terrorism was created Regional 
Antiterrorist Structure in 2002, designed to coordinate interaction of competent 
authorities of the participating countries in fight against terrorism and extremism 
and conduct anti-terrorism exercises, and participate in preparation of 
international instruments against terrorism, collecting and analyzing information, 
and others. Though Russia does not consider the SCO as a military organization, 
it is generally appreciates the work in this direction. The SCO has documents on 
cooperation with Organization of Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), which is now the main international instrument for coordination of 
anti-terrorist activities in Russia and three other SCO member states 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). 
SCO conducted the most extensive military exercises in the past 10 years, 
maneuver called “Peace Mission 2014” held in Chinese province of Inner 
Mongolia 24-29 August 2014; military exercise was attended by seven thousand 
troops. These most extensive in recent years, apparently maneuvers held on 
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background of growing importance of the SCO and deterioration of relations 
between Russia and Western countries. 
Thus, China is very interested in strengthening their positions in Afghanistan, for 
which Chinese government uses all possible mechanisms:  first of all economic 
leverage, making special emphasis on traditional Chinese spheres resource 
extraction and infrastructure construction. Also, China is trying to use SCO in 
their interests in Afghanistan, killing two birds with one stone: strengthening the 
organization's position and hence it in Central Asia also is using the multi-format 
to strengthen its capabilities in Afghanistan. 
Thus, new policy of China in Central Asia is determined by a number of 
external and internal factors. The external factors include: escalation of 
geopolitical competition in format of proposed land transport and energy 
projects, instability in the Middle East and North Africa - main energy 
suppliers in China, events in Ukraine in connection to Crimea - one of major 
transit areas in Chinese project revival of Great Silk Road, geographical 
advantages Russia to operate Northern Sea Route, the militarization of 
Southeast Asia, as well as U.S. plans for an economic blockade of China in this 
region. Internal factors refer to Chinese leadership's desire to reduce the 
economy's dependence on the global economic situation by reducing exports 
and increasing investment in internal and external infrastructure projects, 
“drain” competitors of Chinese companies, reducing their access to its domestic 
market, and reduce price of imported inputs, initiating increased competition 
between them.  
The concept of economic belt of the Silk Road was first announced during visit 
to Central Asia President Xi Jinping in 2013, who during his regional tour also 
agreed on investments and contracts worth tens of billions of US dollars. 
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Russian officials seem to be concerned that SCO is primarily a security 
organization; can play a role in promoting economic initiatives. Such fears are 
understandable, given the fact that Russia is going through difficult times 
because of need to conduct economic competition in this region, with China 
being the largest trading partner of four of the five Central Asian states. 
So, despite the fact that China and Russia approaches to regional security issues 
on principle matters do not contradict each other, strategic objectives of Russia 
and China in SCO should be considered largely as a formality, by virtue of 
significant differences between national interests of both countries on a number 
of regional aspects, mainly on economic affairs and competition for leadership 
in organization.  
 
 
At the same time, Beijing is interested in monitoring situation in Central Asian 
republics and the possibility of a timely response to certain changes in region, 
which would prevent realization of its interests.  
USA and EU are ‘suspicious’ of SCO, considering organization of a new 
incarnation of a multi-polar world. EU may got late to “energy pie” of Central 
Asia – a region controlled by SCO. Despite the fact that goals and objectives of 
SCO and NATO are close in this region, organizations fighting against 
extremism and terrorism, relations between them are not effective (Suzdalcev, 
2009).  
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a unique experience of sub-regional 
and inter-civilizational dialogue, the main trends in the development of which 
will find use in XXI century. 
 
The superposition of these factors determines features of proposed PRC 
economic integration in Central Asia within framework developed by large-
scale project “Economic Belt of Great Silk Road”. Dynamic start its 
implementation, as well as showing interest in Beijing to ensure military 
security of this region an indicator of fact that China will gradually turn into 
regional superpower.  
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7.1. The role and place of Afghanistan policy in the region 
 
This part of analysis deals with actual topic Afghanistan's relations with countries of this 
region and importance of these relationships for settlement of situation in Afghanistan, 
explains how difficult legacy that has developed over many decades and ruinous civil war, 
and opposite, sometimes conflicting goals and objectives of neighboring countries of 
Afghanistan as well as other members of geopolitical process.  
 
Priority for Afghanistan is comprehensive strengthening of relations with countries of South 
and Central Asia and formation of a regional community where Afghanistan would occupy 
central position.  It is obvious, that development of Afghanistan's relations with major world 
powers will be determined by significance of these relationships in order to stabilize Afghan 
position in Asia.  
Methods of regional foreign policy in Afghanistan should be based on economic 
cooperation with neighboring countries and that, accordingly, should lead to the formation 
of strong common interests and, ultimately, to the creation of robust mechanisms for 
regional security.  
Key features of foreign policy in modern times should be based on:  
 
1) National interest, taking into account the interests of countries in this region;  
2) Belief in obvious key role in Afghanistan in regional arena, which is defined as features 
long history and tradition, and location of country;  
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3) Consideration of a direct link between unfriendly policy of some foreign countries and 
domestic instability that these states seek every possible way to exploit, and it could 
minimize the negative impact.  
 
 
The main components that determine conditions of Afghan security at the present stage:  
Invaded by the troops Afghan state and its very existence with its cultural and political 
foundations might be put under the question.  
 
Afghan specialists in international relations are stressing out those main features that might 
affect situation in Afghanistan after troops’ withdrawal. First, it has already started growing 
contradictions between USA and EU, and secondly, intensification of U.S. policy in Central 
Asian Region (CAR), and here main movement of U.S. strategic interests, thirdly, a 
permanent increase in importance of China and Russia in regional and world stage, and 
finally, more obvious importance of Afghanistan in regional and global processes. 
  
According to Limin (Chinese expert) “in foreseeable future, system of international relations 
will come to state of relative stability. Agree with opinion of Chinese experts: despite the 
fact that the structure will remain where coexist one superpower and several major powers, 
the United States is supposed to be too dispersed their resources and strategic approach edge 
of exhaustion, which will allow each of regional actors, achieving local equilibrium forces 
with U.S., successfully defend their specific interests at regional level. Ultimately U.S. local 
containment of each of actors will cause global strategic balance
170
 (Limin, 2012).  
As for Afghanistan, it seems to be necessary, first of all, reestablishment of a new system of 
relations with international community, which should resort to a qualitatively new 
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relationship with donor countries. The concept of “aid to Afghanistan” by foreign actors, 
and instead offer them concept of “cooperation and mutual interests”.  
The foreign presence in country is not only, and perhaps not so much in favor of 
Afghanistan, but in the interests of countries involved in so-called “Afghan conflict" and 
“small handouts” as provided material assistance to Afghanistan is not needed.  
 
It's no secret that most of the country is occupied by foreign troops, which even high-
Afghan officials cannot access, not to mention country's population. If all the time those 
foreign troops are in Afghanistan, Afghan leaders came to concept of mutual interests and 
needs of population.  
 
Secondly, to strengthen combat capability of national army, police and intelligence services. 
However, since achievement of superiority over armed opposition, supported by Pakistan in 
near future is impossible, it is necessary to develop such a tactic in which Afghan security 
forces would have advantage over local anti-governmental forces and its allies, which would 
prevent their spread to neighboring provinces.  
 
Third, in order to achieve stability in Afghanistan is necessary to develop cooperation with 
regional bodies, such as for example the SCO, CSTO, Eurasian Union. Not only 
Afghanistan should be involved in these organizations but also Pakistan, India and Iran.  
 
The fourth – security policy in Afghanistan should be to improve its role in this region's 
economies. This will require all efforts in implementation of planned regional projects such 
as TAPI and SASA-1000.  
Another component is development of logistics. In this case, development of road systems 
of Afghanistan, especially railway system and its connection to systems of Uzbekistan, 
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Tajikistan, Iran and Pakistan would give an additional impetus to countries in region to 
ensure security of Afghanistan. And indeed, the creation of region's countries joint projects 
in economic, energy and cultural areas will be a good chance to prove in Afghanistan.  
 
The restoration of peace in Afghanistan is impossible without comprehensive interest and 
participation in the process of all countries, especially Pakistan.  
In foreign policy, Afghanistan is advisable to set two main goals: to create favorable 
external conditions for modernization of the state and approval of the country as a focus of 
interest in this region.  
Therefore, to solve problem of Afghanistan’s rescue involved in armed conflict requires 
development of trade and economic contacts for attracting investment and technology. From 
this perspective, most important targets for Afghan diplomacy are, firstly, perhaps the most 
productive development of economic ties with Central Asian region. Secondly, main actors 
in region, who are can be the source of capital and most significant, the trading partners. 
Afghanistan has more possibilities to influence economic relations between countries of 
region, than major powers, which, respectively, are less likely to consider their interests.  
But many Afghan analysts see a policy of strategic partnership is with the U.S. and Western 
countries because of possibility of more influence on stabilization of situation in country 
and attract Western capital. For objective reasons, such an approach is the most realistic, 
based on the limited capabilities of today’s Afghanistan.  
 
The “mythical version” of forming a regional community assumes “conquest of informal 
leadership i region”. Thus, can been seen as desire of Russia and China for regional 
hegemony which is regarded as a condition of security in the region and a multi-polar 
system of international relations.  
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The way to achieve this goal is the formation of a regional community in which Afghanistan 
geographic reasons and potential would be a natural center of gravity. Such an approach is 
not very well fit into the traditional scheme of foreign policy in this region, but it fits the 
need to resist U.S. attempts to contain China and Russia with help of situation in region, and 
in the future and will help to solve Afghan problem as lead fast-growing China and Russia, 
guarantees their right to a casting vote in regional and global processes, and consequently, 
Afghanistan must be ready for the development of such a scenario
171
.   
However, the main motive of foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan after withdrawal of 
foreign troops should be considered a desire to promote emergence of a new system of 
regional relations, in which Afghanistan, regardless of wishes and preferences of other 
countries, would occupy a good position, without being isolated, would not be a subject to 
pressure and manipulation and rightfully could count on keeping their interests along with 
interests of other states in the region.  
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Chapter IV, section B 
 
The development of trade-economic, technological and cultural cooperation 
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia with Central Asia countries 
 
1.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Kazakhstan  
Kazakhstan is economically the most developed country of the former Soviet countries 
of Central Asia. Currently belongs to a major regional exporter of oil, gas and wheat. In 
1997, President N.Nazarbayev adopted the country's development strategy till 2030 
with the aim of creating an economically developed, safe, healthy and educated society. 
In accordance with the development plan, in 2010,  was admitted a five-year plan for 
industrial diversification, focusing on the development of transport, pharmaceutical, 
telecommunications, petrochemical and food sectors of the economy. In 2012, the 
President called for the development of transport infrastructure with a view to the 
creation of Kazakhstan's regional transportation center of the new Silk Road.  
According to the Statistical Yearbook of BP “World Energy Report” of 2012, 
Kazakhstan has verified oil reserves in the amount of 3.9 billion tons mined and 1.8 
million barrels of oil per day, which are 2.1 global productions. Proved reserves of 
natural gas are 1.9 trillion m
3
 and ensures production of 19.3 billion m
3
 of gas per year. 
In 2015 it is expected that mining will reach 3.5 million barrels / day, of which 3 
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million will go for export. Geological reserves of the largest Kazakh Kashagan field are 
estimated at two billion tons of gas and oil. Oil and gas export to Kazakhstan is a major 
source of revenue to the state budget and ensuring economic growth of the country. 
Kazakhstan is an important trading partner for the EU. More than half of the foreign 
trade turnover of the country accounted for by the EU and 47% of investments in 
Kazakhstan comes from the EU.  
November 20, 2013 Brussels hosted the 7
th
 ministerial meeting of countries of Central 
Asia and the European Union. Kazakhstan was represented by Foreign Minister 
Y.Idrisov. Sides discussed issues of interregional cooperation within the EU Strategy 
for Central Asia, as well as identified promising areas for further cooperation. 
Furthermore, the parties reviewed and discussed the key initiatives of the European 
Union in Central Asia aimed at reforming the judicial system, improving standards and 
quality of education, improving environmental protection, increase mutual trade and 
investment flows. 
In December 2013 in Brussels during the XII meeting of the Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee EU and Kazakhstan were considered the issues of trade and economic, 
political, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, as well as the possibility of a new 
agreement on partnership and cooperation, also were discussed prospects of 
simplification of visa regime between the EU and Kazakhstan
172
. It was noted that 
Kazakhstan has been actively involved in the activities undertaken within the 
framework of a regional EU Strategy. In particular, the next meeting in the framework 
of the European rule of law Initiative in Central Asia was invited to take place in Astana 
in 2014, which was supported by all participants. On meeting were discussed legal 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism, corruption and organized crime. In this 
context Y.Idrisov noted the progress made on the issue of accession of Kazakhstan to 
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 http://www.zakon.kz/4589361-v-brjussele-obsudili-uproshhenie.html 
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six key European conventions in the field of criminal proceedings and the fight against 
corruption, calling on all European structures to support the initiative of Kazakhstan 
aimed at further harmonization of national legislation in line with best international 
practices. One of the priority areas of partnership with the EU Foreign Minister of 
Kazakhstan has identified cooperation in attracting Kazakhstan innovation and 
technology, as well as cooperation in the field of education. Kazakh diplomat called on 
EU management to join the partnership program “Green Bridge” by supporting the 
transfer of innovative ‘green’ technologies in the Central Asian region. In addition, at 
the meeting had been discussed security issues in Central Asia, including in the context 
of the forthcoming withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, the fight 
against new global threats and poverty, and to promote the Central Asian states. 
Kazakhstan is one of the most important trading partners of the Czech Republic in the 
area of Central Asia and belongs to the 12 “priority countries” in terms of export 
potential of the Czech Republic. 
 
1.1.1. History of Diplomatic Relations between the Czech Republic and 
Kazakhstan  
January 1, 1993 diplomatic relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
Czech Republic were established. April 1997 is opening date of diplomatic mission of 
Kazakhstan in Prague. November 4, 2004 – The diplomatic mission converted to the 
Embassy. From February 2008 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in the Czech Republic is Karashev Anarbek Baktygazovich. 
From April 2008 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Kazakhstan to the 
Czech Republic is Bedrich Kopecky.  
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Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic is maintained a regular 
political dialogue. Both states have a common approach to issues of peace and security 
at the global and regional level, close cooperation between the European Union and the 
countries of Central Asia in economic and human terms. September 8-10, 2004 the 
official visit of the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan took place, during this visit the Czech leader held meetings with the 
governmental officials of Kazakhstan, discussed the issues of political, trade and 
economic cooperation. In May of 2009  Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Lower House of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Ya.Gamachek MP and 
member of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic P.Lebeda participated in 
the conference “Modern Kazakhstan and Path to Europe “, held in Astana. In July, 2010 
was formed by the parliamentary group of friendship with Kazakhstan headed by the 
leader KSCM V.Filippov and the parliamentary groups including the influential Czech 
politicians, including former Mayor of Prague P.Bem (GFC). In the Majilis is also a 
group for cooperation with the Czech Republic consists of 33 members, the Chairman 
of the group is Rogalev VP In June of 2010. Astana visited by the Deputy Minister for 
National Minorities of the Government of the Czech Republic Ch.Valek to participate 
in the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination. In February 2011. 
during the visit of the Executive Secretary of the MFA R.S.Zhoshybaeva signed two 
inter-governmental agreements on the abolition of visa requirements for holders of 
diplomatic passports, and the return of persons with illegal stay (readmission), one 
interagency protocol to the last agreement. In March 2011, Grigory Marchenko the head 
of the National Bank of Kazakhstan visited Prague to participate at the European 
Banking Forum. December 1-2, 2010 Astana OSCE Summit was attended by First 
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs K.Shvartsenberg. The official 
authorities of the Czech Republic supported the stated priorities of Kazakhstan and gave 
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a positive assessment of the OSCE chairmanship. In April 2011 Advisor to the Speaker 
of Kazakhstan Ya.Kogout as an independent observer of the progress of the early 
presidential elections visited the Czech Senate on international issues.23-24 October 
2012 at the invitation of the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus, the first 
ever official visit of President Nazarbayev to the Czech Republic took place. At the 
meeting, Heads of States summarized the bilateral cooperation in 20 years which 
formed the legal basis of the Kazakh-Czech relations. 
 
TABLE 2.1: List of valid official documents in the economic sphere  
1. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
signed on October 8, 1996, entered 
into force on April 2, 1998; 
 
2. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and assets 
signed on April 9, 1998, entered 
into force on October 29, 1999; 
 
3. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on cooperation in international road transport 
the process of its ratification was 
finished in 2003; 
4. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on economic, industrial 
and scientific cooperation 
signed on September 8, 2004, 
entered into force on November 21, 
2006; 
5. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the fight against 
organized crime and illegal distribution of drugs and other intoxicating 
substances 
signed in April 1998; 
 
6. Protocol between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan 
on Amendments to the Agreement between the Government of the 
Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
signed by November 25, 2010 in 
Astana; 
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7. Agreement in the field of tourism between the Czech Republic and 
Kazakhstan 
signed in Prague on November 3, 
2011. 
Documents are currently being prepared for signing: 
1. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital (originally 
was signed in April, 4 1998) 
To comply with EU law requires 
the signing of the Protocol (as well 
as the Agreement on the promotion 
of investments).  
2. Agreement on civil aviation between the Czech Republic and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. In the field of civil aviation Ministry of 
Transport has an interest to clarify the procedure for the conclusion of 
an intergovernmental agreement on air transport and air services. 
At the meeting in Prague in March 2011, representatives of the 
Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications of Kazakhstan signed the Memorandum of 
cooperation of the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan in air transport. 
At the end of March 2012 the 
Czech side handed over a draft text 
of the Kazakh Air Agreement.  
 
3. Agreement on cooperation in the field of health - it is the agreement 
between the health ministries of both countries. 
 
4. On Social Security Agreement – Czech authorities submitted in 2010 
to the Kazakhstani party the Czech model draft of social security 
agreement. 
 
5. Czech side expressed readiness to sign in the near future interstate 
treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The Prosecutor 
General of Kazakhstan emphasized the importance of signing a 
document that would ensure further consolidation of the efforts of the 
two countries to fight transnational crime. 
 
6. In June 2010, Kazakhstani party has confirmed the interest of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of Kazakhstan to 
sign the Agreement. 
 
7. The Arrangement between the Ministry of Education of Czech 
Republic and Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan on 
cooperation in the field of education - at the end of April 2011 the 
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Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science informed the Embassy 
of the Czech Republic in Astana that its draft agreement have been sent 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
providing it to the Czech party. 
 TABLE 2.2: 
 List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan  
1. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
cooperation in the military sphere 
signed in Prague 23.10.2012 valid 
from 23/10/2012 
2. The Arrangement between the Ministry of Health of the Czech 
Republic and the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
cooperation in the field of health and medical science Type – bilateral 
agreement 
signed in Prague 23.10.2012 valid 
from 23/10/2012 
3. Agreement on cooperation in tourism between the Ministry of 
Regional Development of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of 
Tourism and Sports of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Type – bilateral 
agreement 
signed in Prague 03.11.2011 
entered in force 3/11/2011  
 
4. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and on income. Type – bilateral 
agreement 
signed in Almaty 09.04.1998 
entered in force 01/26/2000  
 
5. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on economic, industrial 
and scientific-technical cooperation. Type – bilateral agreement 
signed in Almaty 09.08.2004 
entered in force 06/08/2009  
 
6. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the fight 
against organized crime, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, terrorism and other dangerous types of 
crime. Type – bilateral agreement 
signed in Almaty 09.04.1998, 
entered in force 20/8/1999 
 
7. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. 
signed in Prague 08.10.1996 
entered in force 2/4/1998 
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Type – bilateral agreement  
8. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Type – bilateral agreement 
signed in Almaty 13/09/1993 
entered in force 13/09/ 1993  
 
9. Protocol between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech 
Republic and the Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on the implementation of the Agreement between the 
Government of the CSSR and the USSR on Cooperation in acquiring 
Jamburgsky gas deposits173. Type – bilateral agreement 
signed in Prague 10.09.1996 
entered in force 01/15/1997 
 
10. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on international road. 
Type – bilateral agreement 
signed in Prague 12.13.1999 
entered in force 10/13/2005  
 
Source: MZV ČR 
TABLE 2.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN  
 
According to: MZV ČR 
 
 
                                                             
173 
Jamburgsky gas deposits inherited from Former Soviet Union agreement between Kazakhstan 
and Czech Republic  
 € -    
 € 200.000  
 € 400.000  
 € 600.000  
 € 800.000  
 € 1.000.000  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turnover between Czech Republic and 
Kazakhstan in thousands EUR   
Export Import  Trade Balance  Turnover 
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The economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic is based on the 
intergovernmental agreements; bilateral trade volume has stable growth (In 2012, 
turnover amounted to 903.8 million USD, Czech exports rose by 346.7 million USD 
and Czech imports decreased in 2012 to 557 million USD). Kazakhstan exports to the 
Czech Republic produce oil and gas industry, the chemical industry, in particular, 
yellow phosphorus, and metals. Imports from the Czech Republic consists of a variety 
of equipment, component parts, water treatment facilities, electrical appliances, 
pharmaceutical products, furniture, glass, ceramics and other consumer goods. By 2012, 
the Czech direct investment in Kazakhstan reached 205.8 million. The development of 
mutual relations will be prompt to more efficient way by the inclusion Kazakhstan to 
the list of the 12 most promising trade partners to the Czech Republic. This decision is 
one of the measures of the Czech government to gradually shift the center of gravity of 
foreign trade to the Eastern markets. There is reason to believe that the Czech Republic 
considers Kazakhstan as one of the most promising markets for Czech products in the 
Central Asian region. Increased interest remains in developing cooperation in the 
energy sector, which is associated with the intention of the Czech Republic to diversify 
its sources of energy imports. For Kazakhstan for the implementation of the State 
Turnover between Czech Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €         
102.033  
 €         
134.281  
 €           
90.953  
 €         
127.869  
 €         
153.280  
 €         
270.044  
 €         
296.486  
Import  
 €         
144.033  
 €         
371.523  
 €         
203.810  
 €         
317.840  
 €         
466.155  
 €         
433.937  
 €         
471.870  
Trade 
Balance  
 €           
42.000  
 €         
237.242  
 €         
112.857  
 €         
189.971  
 €         
312.875  
 €         
163.893  
 €         
175.384  
Turnover 
 €         
246.067  
 €         
505.803  
 €         
294.762  
 €         
445.709  
 €         
619.435  
 €         
703.981  
 €         
768.355  
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Program of Forced Industrial-innovative Development
174
 important to attract 
engineering technology from the Czech Republic, as this industry is the most strong 
point of the Czech economy, the basis of its export potential. In Kazakhstan are 76 
enterprises with the Czech capital and 20 representative offices of accredited Czech 
companies. In April 2007, the opening of a direct flight “Prague - Almaty – Prague” 
performed by the airline “Czech Airlines” three times a week. Of “Asia Auto” of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and A.S. “SKODA Auto” Czech Republic started line to 
assemble cars “SKODA OKTAVIA” and executive cars “PRESIDENT EDITION”. 
Since the launch of the plant has manufactured more than 1,500 cars. The biggest Czech 
company “Codeco” in 2010, launched the project in Almaty for elite residential 
complex of apartments “Czech terraces”. The project involves extensive use of modern 
developments in the field of building technology. In May 2011, one of Europe's largest 
producers of phosphorus, the Czech company “FOSFA” signed with JSC 
“Kazphosphate” agreement on a joint venture with the subsequent construction of the 
plant in 2012 to produce special products of yellow phosphorus. The company 
“Ecofluid” in Kazakhstan continues to implement projects for the reconstruction of 
treatment facilities. In 2010, the company won the tender for the replacement of utility 
systems in the Karaganda region. In health care, the Czech company “PURO KLIMA” 
implementing a project for the construction of public hospitals in Aktau city. The 
company “LINET” completed the project delivery of the latest medical equipment as 
part of the reconstruction of hospital emergency medical care in the Almaty city. The 
company “LAB Pharma spol.sro” launched a project to build a manufacturing factory in 
Astana on release dosage forms (2010 - 2011). In June 2012 the Czech company 
                                                             
174 The State Program of Forced Industrial-Innovative Development has been approved by the Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev No.958 dated March 19, 2010. The goal of the program is to guarantee sustainable and 
well-balanced economic growth of the Republic of Kazakhstan by means of diversification and improvement of its 
competitiveness. 
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“FAVEA” Kazakhstani Company “Romat” signed agreement to build a factory for $ 30 
million for the production of medications in Semey city.  Intergovernmental 
commission cooperation: From 2005 was held 6 meetings, as part of the 6th session of 
the meeting was three working groups: general (issues of cooperation in the fields of 
industry, agriculture, health, tourism, environment, technical regulations, etc.). On 
cooperation in the energy sector the parties agreed to hold the next meeting of the 
Working Group on Energy Cooperation (EWG will discuss proposals from Czech 
companies to participate in the implementation of projects in Kazakhstan in nuclear 
power, power generation, oil and gas industry and the industry of renewable energy 
sources (EKOL, VITKOVICE MG, MAVEL, CKD Group, PSG International, VAE 
CONTROLS Group, SKODA JS, ERIELL, SOLENA Group, WIKOV, Ankaba). It was 
stated that, the company VITKOVICE MG is considering their participation in the 
construction of HPP-4 in Karaganda. For a more substantive discussion of investment 
projects in Kazakhstan in November 2014 planned a visit of Czech energy companies’ 
representatives in Astana and Almaty. On cooperation in the field of industry, the 
Czech side confirmed the interest of Czech companies to participate in the 
modernization of industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan in the framework of the existing 
industrial programs, it was agreed to increase the skills (by employee training and 
education) of the Kazakhstan Agency “KAZNEX Invest” on promoting export and 
attracting investments in the Czech Agency for Export Promotion “Czechtrade”. In the 
framework of the IGC meeting, June 12-13, 2012 in Almaty and Ust-Kamenogorsk, 
events were organized with the participation of Kazakh businessmen and Czech 
business delegation, during which a Memorandum of Cooperation between the 
Kazakhstan Agency “KAZNEX Invest” and Commerce and Industry of the Czech 
Republic; after the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission was signed the final 
protocol. October 24, 2012 during the first official visit of President of Kazakhstan 
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Nursultan Nazarbayev was held in the Czech Republic, and was organized Czech 
business forum in which 13 documents were signed by more than 150 million Euros. It 
was also noted that in terms of direct investment in Kazakhstan Czech Republic takes 
31
st
 place. In the second half of 2011, the number of Czech companies that opened 
offices in Kazakhstan was increased to support its business activities in Kazakhstan. 
Currently Embassy in Astana already registered 30 distributors of Czech goods in 
Kazakhstan. Most Czech representations are in Almaty and the capital Astana. Interest 
of Czech companies also focuses on participation in international trade fairs such as 
tourism fair KITF, Kihei Fair for Medical Technology, and Energy Power Fair in 
Kazakhstan, World Food Fair, and agricultural fair AgriTek Astana etc. In October 
2013 the Czech company “FANS a.s.” won a contract in the amount of 100 million 
Euros for the supply of refrigeration equipment in the engine room of the new plant 
complex in Kokshetau city. Construction work is scheduled during 2014. 
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1.2. Development cooperation with Slovak Republic  
Prospects for the development of business relationship determines the Strategic 
Development Plan of Kazakhstan adopted in 2010, which ran from 2020 onwards and 
also legislative changes designed for use the natural wealth of the country. The plan 
provides economic diversification and preference for the following priorities: crude oil, 
building infrastructure in the oil and gas, metallurgy, production of finished steel 
products, pharmaceuticals, defense industry, food industry, construction and 
manufacture of building materials, energy, transport and telecommunications. In order 
to support industrial and innovative development the Government plans to invest in the 
period 2010-2014 40 billion USD. 
Above mentioned plans of the Government of Kazakhstan, according to which  up to 
2020, an increasing proportion of non-resource traded export from 10% to 45% require 
massive investments to upgrade the technological and industrial base. This area creates 
space for Slovak companies to supply of technological equipment. Business entities 
from Slovakia can be implemented in Kazakh projects relating to the development and 
modernization of infrastructure (railroads, power distribution networks, and transport 
communications). There are possibilities also on the projects of construction of small 
hydropower plants, thermal power stations and the energy sector projects in general. 
Joint ventures, designed as the final assembly plant, can greatly modify the plan in a 
positive percentage of the Slovak export to Kazakhstan. Interesting area for Slovak 
companies are engineering, construction materials, transportation and logistics services, 
including printing, packaging machinery, processing of agricultural products, but also 
innovative areas (solar panels, wind turbines, water treatment, waste disposal). Due to 
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the regularization of the ‘Kazakh content’ (under current legislation, public 
procurement, a state-owned enterprises or state fund Samruk-Kazyna, as well as 
investments in the mining sector prefers goods of Kazakh origin, respectively, provides 
its minimum share of investment) will be more complicated to succeed entities direct 
delivery of finished products. One possible way could Slovak companies to resolve the 
situation, on the other hand use it to their advantage is the creation of joint ventures 
with Kazakh partners for the supply of production technologies, where part of the 
production will be based on the territory of Kazakhstan. 
 
SlovakAid
175
 operates in Kazakhstan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has 
implemented ODA in Kazakhstan through a UNDP Trust Fund during this period was 
implemented 9 projects / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western Balkans 
and Asia /.In Kazakhstan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, rule of 
law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and 
infrastructure development. In 2007 SAMRS contracted 1 project worth 116 178.72€, in 
2008 1 project worth 108 630 €. In 2009, no project has been contracted. Together from 
2007 to 2009 SAMRS
176
 contracted projects totaling 224 808.72 €. 
Until 2010, Kazakhstan belonged to priority countries of Slovak official development 
aid (ODA). The official development projects are implementing in Kazakhstan due to 
the realization of EU Strategy and the Commission’s assistance program for the period 
of 2007-2013 (Slovak Aid, 2010). In the period 2004-2009 there were 13 projects
177
  
                                                             
175 
SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development (SAMRS in Slovak abr.) is a governmental 
organization established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, SAMRS mission is to ensure the 
implementation of the Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the programming 
and conceptual documents prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, binding documents of the European Union, 
the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international 
obligations. 
176 SAMRS in Slovak abr. - SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development 
177 
 Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci na rok 2009, MZV SR, Bratislava, 2009, ISBN 80-
88726-16-9 
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approved for Kazakhstan. Projects implemented so far were in line with government 
priorities such as civil society support, development and restoration of basic 
infrastructure, and support to integration of the country to international groups and 
organizations. Projects approved for Kazakhstan mostly focused on supporting small 
and medium enterprises, civil society support and water and energy management. 
Comparative Slovak advantages used for their implementation especially in transfer of 
know-how from a state-run economy and political dictatorship to liberal democracy 
with market economy. Among Slovak organizations active in Kazakhstan are the Office 
for normalization, metrology and testing, Astraia, a.s., Slovak Hydrometeorology 
Institute, Elteco a.s., Proﬁng s.r.o., Timan s.r.o., Pame Impex s.r.o. Výskumné centrum 
SFPA, and others. Slovak entities that implement ODA repeatedly concluded that 
Slovak assistance was not always received with gratitude because Kazakhstan has been 
experiencing a period of huge economic growth and, especially in large urban areas, 
where large investments concentrated. One of successful and positively assessed 
projects, it is useful to mention the project of the cooperation between Kazakhstani 
regional government authorities and Slovak self-governing regions, in particular, the 
Trnava Self-Governing Region and East-Kazakhstan Region and the Almaty Region, 
aimed at development of infrastructure for environmental monitoring networks and 
establishment of a political forum for sharing of transition experience. The goal of those 
projects was to intensify Slovak-Kazakhstani cooperation in the field of research and 
university cooperation, exchange of students and sharing know-how. Among 25 
certification authorities of Kazakhstan 23 organizations have been accredited by the 
Slovak Accreditation Service in accordance with the ISO 17 025 standard (Report of 
Embassy of RK, 2011). 
In 2008, the “Genetics for Kazakhstan” project was approved for Kazakhstan 
(Slovenské biologické služby a.s., project main purpose was to increase production of 
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milk by means of top genetics supplied from the Slovak Republic, as well as purchase 
of tomography equipment and training of staff). The Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan 
have not signed any bilateral agreement on providing ODA; however, Slovak activities 
in the country were actively promoted as a part of the so called Week of Europe in 
Astana, in various lectures at universities or at press conferences. (It is assumed that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic will reduce the number of countries 
supported by ODA from 19 to 10 due to cuts of state budget.) 
The aforementioned implies that none of Central Asian countries will be included in 
ODA projects. The resources will have to be replaced by other ones, the most important 
potential of mutual relations for the following years is the field of economic relations.
178
 
The main importers of goods from Kazakhstan in 2011 were China (18.5%), Italy 
(17.1%), Russia (8.5%), Netherlands (7.5%), and France (6.2%). The most important 
partners exporting to Kazakhstan: Russia (42.8%), China (13.2%), Germany (5.5%), 
Ukraine (4.6%), the USA (4.5%). In the context of the customs union Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, is a visible transfer of Kazakh import to the 
Member States of the Customs Union, and replace it imports from the rest of their 
countries. 
 
 
 
                                                             
178 In 2011 the Ernst & Young Company conducted research within which it became clear that more than a half of foreign 
investors (53%) estimate Kazakhstani legislation as insufficiently stable. And working in the country, and potential investors then 
emphasized need of transparent and stable standard and legal base, and also more careful assessment of consequences at adoption 
of new laws. It is interesting to note that in similar poll for 2012 about 50% of respondents also counted level of transparency and 
predictability of the standard and legal environment insufficient. http://forbes.kz/process/expertise/izderjki_kadrovyih_pasyansov 
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TABLE 2.4: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR 
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €           
61.170  
 €           
43.385  
 €           
31.860  
 €           
32.998  
 €           
53.123  
 €           
61.686  
 €           
80.310  
Import  
 €           
27.920  
 €           
20.980  
 €              
6.252  
 €           
19.416  
 €           
21.830  
 €           
14.783  
 €              
8.058  
Trade 
Balance  
 €           
33.250  
 €           
22.405  
 €           
25.608  
 €           
13.660  
 €           
31.293  
 €           
46.903  
 €           
72.252  
Turnover 
 €           
89.090  
 €           
64.364  
 €           
38.113  
 €           
52.492  
 €           
74.953  
 €           
76.469  
 €           
88.368  
 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.5: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic 
of Kazakhstan 
1. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic 
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 
signed on January 22, 1997 
 € -    
 € 50.000  
 € 100.000  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan in 
thousands EUR  
Export Import  Trade Balance  Turnover 
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military and military-technical cooperation 
2. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
signed on March 18, 1998 
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mutual visa-free 
traveling holders of diplomatic and service passports 
signed on March 18, 1998 
4. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital 
signed on March 21, 2007 
5. Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation between the 
Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Culture 
and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
signed on November 21, 2007 
 
6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in 
combating organized crime, terrorism, illicit trafficking in narcotic 
drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors and other types of crime 
signed on November 21, 2007 
 
7. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic 
and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
cooperation in the military field 
signed on  April 17, 2008 
 
8. Memorandum between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak 
Republic and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on cooperation in the field of education 
signed on November 3, 2009 
9. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on war graves 
signed on March 30, 2010 
 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
Today Kazakhstan export volume ranks 40th among world exporters. Export 
destinations - 120 countries, including the finished products are delivered to 111 
countries. 
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1.3. Cultural cooperation 
Kazakhstani community is multinational there are 140 nationalities and 17 religious 
groups, therefore the experience sharing on ethnic issues on the territories of Czech 
Republic and Slovak Republic may be interesting taking into account the role of 
mediating and managing interethnic issues arising in whole region. Recent ethnic 
conflict in the region is alarming.  
In January 2011 on the General Consulate of the Republic Hungary in Almaty was 
inaugurated the visa center of 5 countries: Austria, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. This event is remarkable and will stimulate the development of cooperation 
between countries.  
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2.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Uzbekistan 
In 2012 export from the Czech Republic to Uzbekistan exceeded the amount of 58 
million euro, and was a record. Exports from Uzbekistan to the Czech Republic in 2012 
exceeded 6 million euro. 
TABLE 3.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN  
 
Turnover between Czech Republic and Uzbekistan in thousands EUR    
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €           
26.665  
 €           
24.789  
 €           
37.747  
 €           
32.545  
 €           
41.300  
 €           
61.494  
 €           
63.629  
Import  
 €              
6.986  
 €           
14.331  
 €              
6.955  
 €              
8.329  
 €        
7.355,00  
 €              
6.241  
 €              
4.450  
Trade 
Balance  
 €           
19.679  
 €           
10.459  
 €           
30.793  
 €           
24.215  
 €     
33.946,00  
 €           
55.253  
 €           
59.180  
Turnover 
 €           
33.652  
 €           
39.120  
 €           
44.702  
 €           
40.874  
 €     
48.655,00  
 €           
67.735  
 €           
68.079  
Source: According to: MZV ČR 
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Czech investors have interest in projects of chemical industry, in pharmaceuticals, also 
in food industry, already Czech producers supply to Uzbekistan, including small and 
private enterprises, equipment for bakery, processing of agricultural products.  
 
 
TABLE 3.2.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan  
 
1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of 
the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan  
signed in Tashkent, 
September 10, 1993 
2. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation in the fight 
against crime  
signed in Tashkent, June 17, 
1998 
3. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the international carriage 
of passengers and freight road transport 
signed in Tashkent, April 20, 
1999 
4. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes and on income. 
signed on March 2, 2000 
5. Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic 
on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal cases  
signed in Tashkent, January 
18, 2002 
6. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation and mutual 
assistance in customs matters 
signed in Prague, April 15, 
2003 
7. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on economic, industrial and 
scientific cooperation 
signed in Tashkent, June 28, 
2004 
8. Protocol between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
amending the Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic 
signed in Tashkent, August 
24, 2009 
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of Uzbekistan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed on 15 January 1997 in Prague 
9. Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic 
on aviation services 
signed in Tashkent, 
November 8, 2011 
10. Protocol between the Government of the Czech Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which amends the Treaty 
between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan for the avoidance of double taxation and 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on 
capital 
signed in Prague, December 
12, 2011 
Source: MZV.ČR 
SlovakAid operates in Uzbekistan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has 
implemented ODA
179
 in Uzbekistan through a UNDP Trust Fund during this period 
were carried out 3 projects / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western 
Balkans and Asia /.In Uzbekistan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, 
rule of law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and 
infrastructure development. In 2007 and 2009 SAMRS has been contracted any project 
for Uzbekistan. In 2008, a total of 2 projects total 333 443.83 €. 
TABLE 3.3.:  
List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments 
signed in Tashkent, May 16, 
1995  
2. Treaty on the basis of the relationship and cooperation between the 
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
signed in Bratislava, January 
16, 1997 
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and signed in Bratislava, January 
                                                             
179
 SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development 
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Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the abolition of visa 
requirements for holders of diplomatic and service passports 
17, 1997 
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan for the avoidance of double 
taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital 
signed in Tashkent, March 6, 
2003 
5. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic and the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan 
signed in Bratislava, January 
17, 1997 
6. Trade relations with Uzbekistan Slovak Republic after accession to the 
EU has does not regulate the Agreement between the Government of the 
Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation signed on 
16.5.1995 in Tashkent. The validity of the Agreement, as well as 
Supplement No. 1 
signed in Bratislava, 
December 23, 1997 
7. In order to restore the contractual-legal base in the field of economic 
cooperation the initiative of the Ministry of Economy processed and 
approved the Memorandum on cooperation between the Ministry of 
Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of External Economic 
Relations Republic of Uzbekistan 
signed in Bratislava 
July 13, 2008 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
The government of Uzbekistan declares interest in foreign investment, but the real 
situation is not very favorable for foreign investors, because of the Uzbek SUM is not 
freely convertible currency
180
, companies have difficulties to finance deliveries of 
components (and not facilitate the purchase of foreign currency) also the free movement 
of capital in the country is not secure (complications of the export). In addition to these 
                                                             
180 Since February 1, 2013 by Uzbek Government to banks in Uzbekistan was forbade selling to the 
individuals living in the country, foreign currency in cash. Sale is allowed only in a non-cash form — on the 
cash card. The cash which is on the card, it will be possible to use for purchase of air tickets, transfer into 
foreign accounts for treatment and study payment and for other non-commercial purposes. In retail trade and 
a services sector of Uzbekistan calculations in foreign currency are forbidden. To draw out the money 
enlisted on the card it will be possible only with their converting in national currency (sum). 
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complications can assign supply problems of electricity, gas, water, as well as unclear 
legislation and complicated administration. Among foreign companies are successful 
mostly large multinationals; to which state proceed more or less correctly, or companies 
whose production is intended primarily for export. 
Investments to Slovakia from Uzbekistan cannot be expected, since Uzbekistan itself 
needs foreign investment and local industry for competitive production with demand on 
the world market, or available funds to implement investments. On June 2011 Slovak 
Ambassador to Uzbekistan J.Siváček handed over shipment of tangible humanitarian 
aid to First Deputy Minister of Health of Uzbekistan A.Alimova medication a total 
value of 26,300 Euros, including antibiotics. 
Slovak Republic with regard to the volume of bilateral trade is not among the priority 
partners of Uzbekistan. Slovak foreign trade with Uzbekistan in recent years shows a 
positive balance of trade, the decrease occurred only in 2008, when began to show the 
effects of the global crisis. In 2011 the overall balance achieved value of 9.95 million 
Euros.  
TABLE 3.4.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN 
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Turnover between Slovak Republic and Uzbekistan in mln.EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
9.003  
 €              
9.612  
 €              
4.543  
 €              
8.077  
 €           
10.180  
 €              
7.674  
 €           
11.879  
Import  
 €              
5.766  
 €              
6.642  
 €              
2.054  
 €                 
546  
 €           
230,00  
 €                 
129  
 €                 
233  
Trade 
Balance  
 €              
3.237  
 €              
7.251  
 €              
2.489  
 €              
7.531  
 €        
9.950,00  
 €              
7.545  
 €           
11.646  
Turnover 
 €           
14.769  
 €           
16.254  
 €              
6.597  
 €              
8.623  
 €     
10.140,00  
 €              
7.803  
 €           
12.112  
 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
 
There are some potential risks in Uzbek market. In the first place it should be noted lack 
of financial resources, both domestic shortages of currency as well as foreign currency. 
Further examples include difficult access to get loans; problems are with providing for 
banks guarantees for foreign loans. For Uzbek customer is therefore the ideal supplier 
who will deliver the goods on favorable terms, e.g. with delay the supply price. The risk 
of the domestic currency transfer to freely changeable conversion thus faced all 
suppliers, which may vary time to time, carries the risk of rate change, although in 
recent years the changes are not dramatic in any way. Another non-negligible risk of 
information from the Uzbek potential partners because all information is confidential. 
Information provided by the Uzbek partner, certainly not complete, therefore it is 
necessary to examine these and especially assemble information. There is can expect 
that someone at the very beginning of negotiations disclose everything. Therefore 
compilation of the contract is should be given due consideration. 
Also it should be noted that in Uzbekistan so called “clean” trade is not feasible, are 
always extremely important personal contacts. Also, it must be equipped with adequate 
language. 
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However, there is a strong consciousness of products from Czechoslovakia and they are 
seen as products of European quality. Products that are currently associated with 
Slovak, such as automobiles, are not in any way associated with it because of strong 
protectionist market, therefore practically absent. In connection with efforts of 
Uzbekistan to modernize its economy and build industrial base; there is room for Czech 
and Slovak companies operating in the supply of technology (water purifiers, health, 
irrigation, and food technology). Possibilities of application of Slovak producers are in 
the construction and reconstruction of thermal power plants (boilers supply) and 
generally in energy sector, where large investments are planned, such as the 
construction of new energy sources, as well as modernizing the electricity grid. For 
large investment projects are announced international tenders and, if funding is secured 
through loans from international financial organizations and supervised by them. In the 
context of General Motors factory existence there is a possibility of cooperation in the 
automotive industry. Since the government of Uzbekistan requires increasing 
localization of production, there is opportunity for Slovak companies acting as 
subcontractors for automakers in Slovakia. There are possibilities for the creation of 
joint ventures for the production of assembly parts for the local carmakers. Here, 
however, there are certain risks associated with investments in Uzbekistan, one of the 
major problems of exporters remain relatively high prices of Czech and Slovak goods 
compared with competitors’ weaknesses and opportunities in the export lending. Most 
significant investments in the country are on the basis of loans of foreign banks. The 
successful contractor on the local market includes Chinese companies to supply 
technological devices and offer favorable loans. 
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3.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan along with Tajikistan is the poorest country
181
 in the post-Soviet Central 
Asia with a dominant agricultural sector (cotton, wool, tobacco, meat). The main export 
items include gold, mercury, uranium, natural gas, electricity. Kyrgyzstan was the first 
CIS country became in 1998 a member of the WTO and is one of the economically 
most liberal countries in the region. Geographic closeness, poor infrastructure along 
with political instability hinders the economic development of the country and the 
inflow of foreign investment in other than the mining sector (Kumtor mine).
182
 
President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev has ensured that the EU will allocate 
13.5 million € to Kyrgyz economics. In Brussels during this official meeting Jose 
Manuel Barroso said: “It is important that the partners of Kyrgyzstan supported the 
strengthening of democracy”. Brussels has also promised to Bishkek 30 million € to 
ensure macroeconomic stability. Being heavily dependent on Russia, Kyrgyzstan is 
                                                             
181
The external debt of Kyrgyzstan in 2013 will reach $ 3.3 billion, said the Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan Olga Lavrova at a 
press conference in January 2013; “that is, the amount of external debt to GDP ratio will reach 45-46%, which is acceptable 
threshold, and does not go beyond what is permitted”. According to her, the domestic debt currently stands at $ 274 million soms. 
“It is our duty both external and internal debts do not grow highly , due to the fact that Turkish Government written off loans of $ 
50 million and the Russian Government in the amount of $ 189 million is also by Russia will be written off $ 300 million of debt,” 
- explained the minister. According to the press service of the Ministry of Finance in 2013 to service the public debt was provided 
15.4 billion soms. Source: KyrTAG http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1359109920  
182
The largest company in Kyrzystan is Kumtor Operating Company (operated by Canadian CAMECO Corporation since 1992). 
In 2012 payments within the Kyrgyz Republic (including taxes, refining charges, payments to local suppliers of goods and 
services, infrastructure payments, charities, etc.) exceeded $298 million. During the period between 1994 and 2012, Kumtor Gold 
Project’s payments within the Kyrgyz Republic have exceeded $2.15 billion. http://www.kumtor.kg 
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going to join the Customs Union, which could complicate its rapprochement with the 
European Union. 
In the first half of 2012 the overall decline in Kyrgyzstan exports by 18% was caused 
by reduction of gold mining in the Kumtor mine by 60%, resulting in a reduction in 
GDP in the first half of 2012 by 5.6%. Economic growth, excluding the Kumtor mine, 
however, was 3.9%. A small amount of rain causing insufficient production of 
electricity at Toktogul hydroelectric power station reflects the electricity export. The 
high level of foreign debt remains the main problem of Kyrgyz economy. According to 
IMF
183
 experts, the government of Kyrgyzstan in the period 2012-2013 provide for a 
number of measures to strengthen macroeconomic stability and improving the 
investment climate in the country. The planned measures are reforms in tax 
administration, increase transparency of public finances and strengthening social 
protection systems. The energy sector is very important for the development of the 
country's infrastructure. Conditions for enlargement inflow of investment by foreign 
investors (Kazakhstan, China, and Russian Federation) will bring possibility to export 
electricity to China, Pakistan, Afghanistan (completion of hydropower Kambar 1 and 
Kambar 2). But state is unable to fulfill the expensive energy construction projects.  
Kyrgyzstan is in third place after the Russian Federation and Tajikistan in terms of 
hydropower potential. Award-winning potential of mountainous rivers is equal to 142 
billion. KWh per year, of which today is used only 20%. In this sector there are ongoing 
negotiations with several investors from neighboring countries for the construction of 
hydropower plants on the middle and upper reaches of the Naryn River. On the rivers of 
Kyrgyzstan are several hydroelectric plants e.g. Toktogul (1200MW), Kurpsaj 
(800MW), Tashkumyr, UC-Kurgan. In 2012 an agreement was signed with Russian 
Federation to construct hydroelectric plant Kambar-Ata 1 (1200MW) and cascades of 
                                                             
183 IMF -  International Monetary Fund  
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hydropower plants on the Naryn River. Construction and operation of large hydropower 
plants is a source of tension with neighboring countries, especially with Uzbekistan, 
since their operation affects the water regime of rivers supplying the agriculture-
dependent Uzbekistan. 
The turnover of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is not very high. 
Most goods imported from the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in the Czech Republic: the tools, 
products, chemicals, clothing, rubber, food ingredients, tar, etc. Most goods imported 
from the Czech Republic to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan: glass, wood, weapons and 
ammunition, optical equipment, beverages, aluminum products, etc. In the summer of 
2012 in Kyrgyzstan was realized the Czech-Kyrgyz joint project on “Enhancing the 
research station Adygine”. The project was financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Czech Republic within the framework of development assistance. The project has 
improved the station equipment: the conditions for plant employees, as well as for 
scientific expeditions. It was part of the project for energy system station and 
supplemented monitoring program. The Government of the Czech Republic in the 
framework of the development of economic, social and cultural spheres of the Kyrgyz 
Republic provided 5 grants to receive the State scholarship of education in higher 
education in the Czech Republic for the 2014-2015 academic years.  
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TABLE 4.1.:  
 
List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan  
1.  Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Legal 
Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and 
Criminal 
signed in Moscow, August 12, 
1982, valid till 01.01.1993 
2.  Consular Convention between the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics 
signed in Moscow, April 27, 
1972, valid till 01.01.1993 
3.  Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic 
signed in Bishkek, March 7, 
1995 
4.  Agreement between the Government of the Czech 
Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 
on cooperation in the fight against organized crime, 
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances and precursors, terrorism and other types of 
crime 
signed in Bishkek, April 4, 1998 
5.  Agreement between the Government of the Czech 
Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 
for air services 
signed in Prague, April 29, 2004 
Source: MZV.ČR 
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TABLE 4.2.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN 
 
 
 
 
Turnover between Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
3.456  
 €              
3.385  
 €              
3.846  
 €              
3.306  
 €              
5.518  
 €              
6.714  
 €              
6.271  
Import  
 €              
1.394  
 €              
1.247  
 €                 
229  
 €              
1.405  
 €           
109,00  
 €                 
139  
 €                 
153  
Trade 
Balance  
 €              
2.062  
 €              
2.138  
 €              
3.617  
 €              
1.902  
 €        
5.409,00  
 €              
6.575  
 €              
6.118  
Turnover 
 €              
4.849  
 €              
4.633  
 €              
4.075  
 €              
4.711  
 €        
5.627,00  
 €              
6.853  
 €              
6.424  
 
Source: According to: Štatistický úrad ČR 
 
Slovak Aid operates in Kyrgyzstan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has 
implemented ODA in Kyrgyzstan by UNDP Trust Fund, and during this period, 13 
projects have been implemented / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western 
Balkans and Asia /.In Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, 
rule of law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and 
infrastructure development. In 2007 SAMRS contracted 1 project in the amount of 231 
596.40 €, in 2008, two projects total 219 390.89 €, in 2009 a total of 2 projects with a 
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total value of 211 404 EUR. Together from 2007 to 2009 SAMRS contracted projects 
for 662 391.29 €. 
 
TABLE 4.3.:  TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN  
 
 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
4.897  
 €              
1.998  
 €              
1.597  
 €              
1.720  
 €              
1.920  
 €              
1.669  
 €              
2.012  
Import  
 €                    
10  
 €                    
39  
 €                      
4  
€                      
9  
€                
4,00  
 €              
1.475  
 €                    
25  
Trade 
Balance  
 €              
4.887  
 €              
1.959  
 €              
1.593  
 €              
1.711  
 €        
1.916,00  
 €                 
194  
 €              
1.987  
Turnover 
 €              
4.907  
 €              
2.037  
 €              
1.601  
 €              
1.728  
 €        
1.924,00  
 €              
3.144  
 €              
2.037  
 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
 
TABLE 4.5.:  
List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan 
1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz 
Republic 
signed in April16,  1996 
2. Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and 
the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic on cooperation 
signed in December 12, 1996 
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3. Memorandum on cooperation and mutual understanding between the 
Slovak Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic 
signed in December 12, 2003 
4. Memorandum on cooperation in the economic field between the Ministry 
of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade of the Kyrgyz Republic 
signed in April 4, 2008 
5. Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
Government Slovak Republic on mutual abolition of visa requirements 
for holders of diplomatic passports 
signed in April 4, 2010 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
In Kyrgyzstan, lives a community of citizens of Slovak origin who are descendants of 
the team members of INTERHELPO (Slovak company based and operated in 
Kyrgyzstan in 30 years of the 20
th
 century) and have Slovak nationality either they or 
their parents. According to available data in the capital Bishkek lives only around 150 
expatriates. 
At the beginnings of 90s with gaining independence, the Kyrgyz Republic had large-
scale industry, good prospects in electric power industry; large reserves already 
explored deposits of rare earth elements, competitive education, science, and quality 
workforce. It remained only to establish the gold trade, sell and integrate energy chain. 
Regretfully, total systemic corruption, the lawless privatization, state policy without 
thinking roll back to feudal relations and under these circumstances Kyrgyzstan has lost 
chances to progress in the economy. The Kyrgyz Republic accession into the World 
Trade Organization in 1998 completely ruined remnants of the Kyrgyz industry, and 
has opened the way for a powerful flow of cheap Chinese goods. Today only markets 
collect and re-export of goods from China at $ 10 billion, and the entire GDP in 
Kyrgyzstan is $ 6 billion. 
November 24, 2013 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan hosted the international conference on 
“Intellectual initiative in the Process of Islamic Awakening in Central Asia”, to which 
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were invited religious and community leaders, scientists and experts from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
“Intellectual initiative” according to the organizers of the conference, was designed to 
create a platform for dialogue in Kyrgyzstan to Islamic scholars, experts and aimed at 
developing a joint ways to overcome the ideological, spiritual, social and political crisis 
of the Muslim communities in Central Asia, the preservation of peace and stability 
throughout the region, and to act as an intelligent response to the challenges of 
radicalization and the marginalization of the region. During the conference, participants 
discussed the role of religious leaders in achieving sustainable development, security 
and stability in Central Asia, the phenomenon of Islamic awakening in the context of 
related processes of the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as issues involving Islam 
to counter the ideology of terrorism and extremism in Central Asia. According to 
official data, in Kyrgyzstan, there are 91 institutions providing religious education, 
including 10 senior Islamic schools, 65 madrasas, 7 Christian higher educational 
institutions, 8 religious secondary schools, in total these organization are training 4630 
students.  
The security issues in Kyrgyzstan are related also to the Manas air base, as a crucial 
transit hub for US forces, the Kyrgyz Government were speculating the withdrawal of 
US presence in Manas airport since the election runs from 2009, the controversial issue 
became of the weak points of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev; and it continues to 
become an sensitive issue and bargain for contemporary government, due to its 
corruption and enrichment of local elites184.  
                                                             
184 In May, during his spontaneous trip to Turkey Kyrgyz President Atambayev was proposed to expand its own Turkish business. 
In particular, he was offered at a good price to buy a couple of hotels in Antalya, in exchange for the transfer of the project of 
reconstruction of Manas and its management Turkish companies. In Turkey, Atambayev also met with some businessmen from the 
CIS, which work closely with American and British companies and intelligence agencies (in particular, it was notorious Telman 
Ismailov and Ghafoor Rakhimov ), and the conversations were that Atambayev allowed to participate in a joint business with them 
if he fulfills the requirements of the United States , Britain and Turkey on Manas. It is planned that the joint Kyrgyz- Turkish 
venture - the airport "Manas" - will be established by the beginning of 2014 and handed over the entire management of the Turkish 
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According to the calculations of the World Food Program, 2.2 million people in 
Kyrgyzstan, of which 66% of the rural population live below the poverty line. In 
general, this is the “poverty” touched every third – in 2013 its level increased to 38% 
compared to 18% in 2012
185
. Slightly brightens this situation “money flow” from 
Kyrgyz migrant workers. In 2012 they moved to the Republic from Russia more than 1 
billion USD. 
Given the instability in Kyrgyzstan greater strength gaining supporters of radical 
Islamist parties, among which occupies a special place, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”. The study of 
the organization's activities in the Kyrgyz Republic shows that its main purpose is to 
penetrate into the structures of state power in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, about 3 
thousand mosques, the number of all public organizations religious orientation is about 
150. However, according to experts, “in recent years the rules of political games in 
Kyrgyzstan have changed and greater strength are gaining supporters of radical Islamist 
parties, which, possessing a serious ideological component”186. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
side. After all the necessary facilities, territory, services, etc. will be given a new commercial enterprise in the United States, or 
rather rent NATO. The agreement will be de jure not be the government of Kyrgyzstan, and the leadership of the new company. 
This complex will continue to perform all the basic transport functions, which are now performs TSC Manas, and part of the 
electronic- intelligence work. All U.S. military will officially be considered civilian employees; they will be replaced in part by the 
British and especially the Turkish experts. Even in recent months, Manas visited military experts from Qatar - from this country, 
along with some other closely related business for another Kyrgyz polition - Speaker Asylbek Jeenbekov. At meantime in the 
American base at that time actively under construction, contracts for construction of fixed deadlines in 2015-2020. In addition to 
the Manas system includes 26 radar stations scattered around the country (known as Sary -Tash in the Alai Valley, the area Kaji -
Say in the Issyk -Kul region, Tokomak). With the launch of its commissioning will be monitored airspace not only the 
neighborhood of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time there is building in Bishkek - officially - the new 
territory of the U.S. Embassy. This complex of buildings mainly located underground. Depth of construction - 28 meters from the 
territory of TSC There will be moved to a part of the electronic equipment of the CHP. About 200 U.S. troops from the CTP 
officially no longer the military and diplomatic status and were enrolled in the embassy staff. But the main center of the U.S. 
military presence and NATO moved to the south of Kyrgyzstan. The main points of interest of the U.S. and NATO are the Batken 
region. In Batken region are active Western non-governmental organizations, mainly British and American, about 50 organizations. 
Batken region can be completely cut off from Kyrgyzstan and will be fully under the control of the United States and NATO. 
185 http://www.wfp.org/countries/kyrgyzstan/overview 
186 “Stoletie” article in local Kyrgyz agency by I.Pankratentko.  
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4.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Tajikistan 
Tajikistan is the poorest countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s external debt as at 
December 2011 were to 2.955 billion. USD, which is 53.1% of the country's GDP. 
According to World Food Programme the 47.2% of population living on less than 1.3 
USD a day, majority of population are spending up to 80% of their income on food. 
Tajikistan is ranked the 125 out of the 187 states on the UNDP’s 2012 Human 
Development Index
187
. A positive trend registered in Tajikistan is to increase the rate of 
economic growth. The volume of GDP for the period of 2011 reached 30.0 billion 
Somoni (approx. 4.8 billion. EUR), compared with 2010, an increase of 7.4%. 
According to unofficial information, the total population migration to neighboring 
countries represents 2 million people (mainly they are looking for job in Russia and 
Kazakhstan). Number of economically active population in 2010 was 2.1 million 
people. According to ‘official’ statistics in the country only 114 thousand people was 
registered unemployed. Tajikistan is a priority country Slovak ODA since 2003, but the 
country has never implemented any project. In 2004, the UNDP Trust Fund has been 
contracted joint project of several countries of the Western Balkans and Asia, among 
them for Tajikistan.  
The Republic of Tajikistan is building its foreign economic relations, especially with 
neighboring countries, EU countries and US, as well as with international financial 
                                                             
187 http://www.wfp.org/countries/tajikistan/overview 
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organizations. In recent years, increasing the impact of the China in the country's 
economy, currently it is the largest creditor of Tajikistan. The EU development aid 
allocated for the development of Tajikistan for 2011-2013 financial aid of 62 million 
EUR. It also expressed its support for Tajikistan's accession to the WTO. Future 
cooperation with Czech Republic as well as Slovak Republic can focus on the 
development of small and medium enterprises, especially in the field of agriculture 
(agricultural equipment supplies, supplies technology for processing fruits and 
vegetables, packers, for cooperation at the enterprise and agro-food sector), in building 
thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants
188
, as well as the construction of roads. The 
advantages include high economic potential of hydropower, which provide 93.7% of 
the total energy needs of the country. Despite significant source of power energy, 
Tajikistan lack of it, especially in the winter months. On this basis based energy-
intensive aluminum production and wide electrochemical complexes. One of the main 
sectors of the fuel and energy complex is the coal industry. The relatively poor quality 
oil is mined in the north and the south, natural gas in Vah and Gissar valleys. From sites 
for natural gas pipeline was built till Dushanbe. To the north of the country, however, 
gas supplies from Uzbekistan (total length of pipelines 400 km), brown coal (1 billion 
tons) to launch the construction of thermal power plant. In Tajikistan the 30 sites 
lignite, of which 5 are functional. Brown coal is mined in open manner (which brings 
forth environmental problems). Total resources of hydrocarbon raw materials are 
estimated at 1,033.76 million tons, of which 113.1 million tons of oil, 863 billion m
3 
of 
gas and 36 million tons of gas condensate. There is benefit from mining location to the 
                                                             
188
 According absolute indicators of Tajikistan is on 8th place in the world in hydropower resources (300 billion. kW / 
year).  
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north of Tajikistan (Eastern Supetau, Rejgan, Kashkakum and Eastern Olimtoj). 
Tajikistan is heavily dependent on oil and gas supplies from Uzbekistan
189
.  
TABLE 5.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN  
 
 
Turnover between Czech Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
1.809  
 €              
1.819  
 €              
5.261  
 €              
5.993  
 €              
2.885  
 €              
3.988  
 €              
5.035  
Import  
 €           
56.209  
 €           
15.156  
 €              
1.632  
 €              
2.255  
 €        
3.291,00  
 €              
2.662  
 €              
1.623  
Trade 
Balance  
 €           
54.401  
 €           
13.337  
 €              
3.629  
 €              
3.738  
-€           
406,00  
 €              
1.326  
 €              
3.412  
Turnover 
 €           
58.018  
 €           
16.974  
 €              
6.893  
 €              
8.248  
 €        
6.176,00  
 €              
6.650  
 €              
6.658  
 
Source: According to: MZV ČR 
The difficult economic situation in Tajikistan has reduced the volume of trade with the 
Czech Republic for the first five months of 2012. Czech exports in comparison with the 
same period in 2011 declined by 14% and imports by 23%. The main problem of the 
further development of the Czech export is an unpaid debt of about USD 2 million for 
                                                             
189 From 24.2.2011, the Government abolished the daily limit on power consumption. In some regions, however, still 
remained overnight limit consumption over time from 22.00 am to 5.00 pm. 
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previously supplied equipment for the cement plant in Dushanbe. Due to that the 
insurance company EGAP
190
 is unable to insure new export credits, which naturally 
inhibits the negotiations on the supply of equipment of the Czech Republic for the 
construction investment and economic development in Tajikistan. Representation of 
Embassy in Tashkent through Embassy of Tajikistan in Uzbekistan by diplomatic note 
dated April 4, 2012 petitioned on the case of early debt repayment.  In 2013 the Czech 
government in the Tajik city of Vahdat put into operation plant for the production of 
bottled (in plastic bottles) of mineral water capacity of 2,000 sheets per hour. Water is 
produced under the brand name OFTOBAK. 
TABLE 5.2.:  
List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan  
1.  Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic and the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the 
Republic of Tajikistan 
signed in Prague, February 11, 
1994 
2.  Agreement between the Czech Republic and the 
Republic of Tajikistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, corrected notes dated 18.7. 
1994 17.2 1995 
signed in  Prague, February 11, 
1994 
3.  Convention between the Czech Republic and the 
Republic for the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to taxes on income and capital 
signed in Dushanbe, November 
7, 2006 
Source: MZV. ČR 
 
In mutual trade balance between Slovakia and Tajikistan: the most important import 
items are cotton, aluminum, agricultural products and electricity. The most important 
export items are petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and equipment, and textiles. 
                                                             
190 EGAP – Credit Insurance Corporation, founded in Czech Republic in 1992, Czech Republic has shareholder rights through 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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TABLE 5.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN  
 
 
 
 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
0,501  
 €              
0,411  
 €              
0,559  
 €              
1.068  
 €              
0,496  
 €         
524,000  
 €     
1.095,000  
Import  
 €              
6.911  
 €              
1.732  
 €              
0,012  
 €              
0,002  
 €              
0,002  
 €                    
11  
 €                      
7  
Trade 
Balance  
-€             
6.410  
-€             
1.321  
 €                      
0  
€              
1.066  
 €                
0,34  
 €                 
513  
 €              
1.088  
Turnover 
 €              
7.412  
 €              
2.143  
 €                      
0  
€              
1.007  
 €                
0,35  
 €                 
535  
 €              
1.102  
 
Source: According to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
TABLE 5.4.:  
List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan  
1. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan 
on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments 
signed in February 14, 1994 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
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5.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
Turkmenistan  
Turkmenistan is a neutral state, its foreign policy line implements the principles 
bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation, and however, does not reject or cooperation at 
the multilateral level. On the contrary, refuses to participate in military or military-
political blocs. Turkmenistan is a member of international organizations and agencies, 
such as the UN, OSCE
191
, IMF
192
, IBRD
193
, Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc. Turkmenistan is a recipient of 
development aid (mainly USA). In 2012 the officials of Turkmenistan reported that the 
18 foreign volunteers must leave the country. In recent years, Turkmenistan has reduced 
the number of volunteers from other countries that could receive. In 2013, had come 
only six people, while in 2003-2005, the volunteers were almost 10 times more
194
. 
Over the last decade been built in Turkmenistan dozens of industrial enterprises, most 
of which were built by foreign companies. Currently under construction are about 90 
industrial buildings. Of the total volume of industrial production is fuel-energy complex 
27.5%, chemicals 5.4%, 5.1% engineering, light industry 41% (is essentially a primary 
processing of cotton). The dominant is mining industry but still poorly developed. 
Natural resources are natural gas, oil, sulfur, iodine, ferrous metals, potassium and 
                                                             
191 OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
192
 IMF- International Monetary Fund 
193 IBRD – International Bank of Reconstruction and Development  
194
 By the end of 2012, the Peace Corps has completed its mission in Turkmenistan 
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mined salt. Fuel and energy sector is the most important part of economy; practically on 
this sector depends the entire economy of the country. In Turkmenistan operates 149 
mining places for gas and gas condensate reserves of 49707.8 billion m
3
 of gas. Daily 
production represents 220 million m
3
. By long-term plan in 2030 Turkmenistan will 
increase its production to 230 billion m
3
 of gas per year, of which 70% for export. 
Electro-Energy is among the leading industries in Turkmenistan. Options of energy 
potential not only settle for the country’s needs, but also allow supplying to neighboring 
countries. To generate electricity Turkmenistan uses inexpensive and environmentally 
clean fuel natural gas. 
Relations between the EU and Turkmenistan follows the document “The EU and 
Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”, which was adopted in June 2007. 
Considering to Czech and Turkmen mutual relations - Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Turkmenistan was signed in May 1998. “Interim 
Trade Agreement” was signed in November 1998. In May 2008, it was signed 
Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the energy sector. EU objectives in 
Central Asia, respectively Turkmenistan, are evident from the EC Regional Strategy for 
Central Asia 2007-2013 and Central Asia Indicative Program 2011 – 2013. 
A Czech export to Turkmenistan is developing positively, the annual index of the Czech 
export in 2013 reached 127.1%. The main commodities in commodity exports from 
Turkmenistan are natural gas, petroleum products, crude oil, electric energy, cotton 
yarn. The main commodities in commodity imports from Czech Republic represent 
technological equipment, transport equipment, electrical equipment, steel products and 
building materials. 
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TABLE 6.1. TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND TURKMENISTAN 
 
 
Turnover between Czech Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €              
5.889  
 €           
14.922  
 €              
9.344  
 €           
12.735  
 €           
12.169  
 €           
17.599  
 €           
17.897  
Import  
 €                 
340  
 €                 
780  
 €           
75,000  
 €         
324,000  
 €     
1.109,000  
 €                 
661  
 €              
1.494  
Trade 
Balance  
 €              
5.549  
 €           
14.142  
 €              
9.269  
 €           
12.411  
 €     
11.061,00  
 €           
16.937  
 €           
16.402  
Turnover 
 €              
6.230  
 €           
15.702  
 €              
9.419  
 €           
13.058  
 €     
13.278,00  
 €           
18.260  
 €           
19.391  
 
Source: According to: MZV ČR 
TABLE 6.2. 
List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Turkmenistan  
1.  Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic and the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance of Turkmenistan 
signed in Ashkhabad, September, 
9 1993 
2.  Convention between the Czech Republic and 
Turkmenistan for the avoidance of double taxation and 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income and property  
The Czech Government 
approved to sign April 7, 2003, 
however, has not yet been 
signed. 
Source: MZV.ČR 
In April 2010 in Ashgabat took place 1
st
 “Turkmen Gas Congress” together with senior 
officials of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan congress attended by 
 € -    
 € 10.000  
 € 20.000  
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Turnover between Czech Republic and Turkmenistan in 
thousands EUR    
Export Import  Trade Balance  Turnover 
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representatives of the world's leading energy companies and EU Energy Commissioner 
G. Oettinger. The Czech government delegation was represented by Ambassador at 
Large for Energy Security V. Bartuška, Ambassador R. Kopecky, who later on the 
handover of credentials in Ashgabat on 28 September 2010 held a meeting with senior 
representatives of the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry of Turkmenistan and agreed 
upon the possibility of adopting a mission of Czech companies in Ashgabat. In 2012 
took place the meeting with Turkmen officials and Czech party about the processing of 
authorization for over flight specials of Army of the Czech Republic through the 
Turkmenistan to Afghanistan. Have been also discussed current issues in the field of 
economic cooperation. Representatives of the Czech Embassy mentioned significant 
business case; supplier implemented the Czech Republic - equipment for drying natural 
gas deposits Dovletabad 3 state company “GK Turkmengaz”. A supplier contract worth 
nearly 140 million USD is the Brno Company DOMINANTA GROUP. 
 
 
5.1.1. Gas export routes from Turkmenistan 
1. Turkmenistan-Russia (CAC Central Asia-Center) - capacity 45 bln.m
3
/year, 
2 Turkmenistan-China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the length of the pipeline is 
1800 km, capacity 40 bln.m
3
/year; construction terminated at the end of year 2009 is in 
operation 
3. Caspian pipeline - signed an agreement on the implementation of the Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
4. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAPI) with links to India - operates a 
consortium working on the project. November 20, 2013 in Ashgabat was signed the 
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service agreement for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI). The basic 
document for the promotion of TAPI is signed in 2010 Ashgabat intergovernmental 
agreement of the States Parties to start practical implementation of this project. In May 
2012, the Turkmen government has signed an agreement for the sale of the Indian 
GAIL ltd and State Gas Systems of Pakistan. The corresponding agreement was signed 
with Afghanistan in July 2013.
195
 
5. In 2010, construction began the pipeline “East – West” with a length of 1000 km 
with links northwestern mining towns with Caspian pipeline (length 600 km), or with a 
link under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and connection to the planned pipeline bound 
for Europe 
TABLE 6.3.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND TURKMENISTAN 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
195 At this stage of a legal framework for addressing issues related to the formation of a consortium of TAPI, 
which will provide financing and construction of the power line. 
 
The design capacity of the TAPI is up to 33 billion m3 of gas per year. The length of the pipe may reach 
1,735 kilometers. Highway should reach out to the largest gas field in Turkmenistan “Galkinish” through the 
Afghan cities of Herat and Kandahar, and reach its final point - the Community Fazilka, on the border 
between India and Pakistan. 
-€ 50.000  
-€ 40.000  
-€ 30.000  
-€ 20.000  
-€ 10.000  
 € -    
 € 10.000  
 € 20.000  
 € 30.000  
 € 40.000  
 € 50.000  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Turkmenistan in 
thousands EUR    
Export Import  Trade Balance  Turnover 
279 
 
Turnover between Slovak Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR   
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export 
 €                 
866  
 €              
2.772  
 €              
4.015  
 €              
2.220  
 €              
2.583  
 €              
2.784  
 €              
3.642  
Import  
 €                 
671  
 €              
1.946  
 €              
4.000  
 €              
2.203  
 €              
2.571  
 €                 
826  
 €                 
151  
Trade 
Balance  
-€           
40.933  
 €              
1.120  
 €              
3.985  
 €              
2.186  
 €        
2.559,00  
 €              
1.958  
 €              
3.491  
Turnover 
 €           
41.604  
 €                 
826  
 €                    
15  
 €                    
17  
 €              
12,00  
 €              
3.610  
 €              
3.793  
 
Source: According to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
Priority basis for the development of foreign business is the supply of foreign 
investments especially in sectors of strategic importance, adapted to legal base, which is 
the customs duties and tax relieved imported goods, and deposit of a foreign entity for 
its own production and needs. 
TABLE 6.4. 
List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of 
Turkmenistan  
1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan 
signed in November 17, 1994 
2. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Turkmenistan on mutual abolition of visa requirements of 
holders of diplomatic and service passports 
signed in June 22, 1996 
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Turkmenistan for the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to income taxes and on capital 
signed in August 8, 1996 
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Turkmenistan on cooperation in the fight against 
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking and other organized crime 
signed in August 8, 1996 
5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Turkmenistan on air transportations  
signed in October 24, 1996 
Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 
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Conclusion 
In the first chapter were mentioned this model of thesis:  
FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to conclude these issues are presented following points:  
1. For institutional building up in region it is important to be able to adopt models 
of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, even though these countries still are 
undergoing of transitional economics stage 
2. The relevance of main actors in Central Asia shown in comparative analysis, by 
which we can conclude that not all actors have equal interests and that global 
governance will not proceed at the same speed to assist the tension, risk of 
conflicts in region  
3. Future importance of a strategic evolution of present and future of energy 
perspective is crucial for region due to their abundance of natural resources and 
lack effective and innovative technologies  
Central 
Asia  
Institutions  
Actors  
Transition 
Security issues  
Natural 
resources  
Geopolitical 
context 
Interests  
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4. The relevance of conceptuality in national politics’ changes necessary for 
development of region in order to adopt and adapt the transitional models of ex-
socialists countries as Czech Republic and Slovak Republic   
5. Transition period brings new challenges in national policies of these countries, 
for future cooperation links are important to have focus on institutional pillars, 
to strengthen the cooperation in security issues, and last but not least the 
innovations, new technologies for economic growth and fully involvement of 
local economies in global market and transforming their natural resources 
oriented sectors to highly productivity sectors of economy.   
Comparative table of principal characteristic of policies mentioned in the thesis 
regarding to Central Asia:  
TABLE 17: COMPARATIVE TABLE OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF POLICIES Source: Adopted from Losada, 2000 
 Policies in the past  Contemporary situation  
Criteria  Institutional order   Institutional changes  
Style  Predicted, planned development  Patterns of corruption, clientelism, 
clan-based norms, patrimonialism  
Strategy  One strategy for all socialist 
countries  
Each country has own strategies  
Regulation Systematic  Non systematic  
Planification Planned economy and policy  Adapting strategies and policies  
Policy 
contents  
Maintenance of status quo  
Central governance  
Integrated economy  
 
State building  
Market development  
Legislation building  
Industry building  
282 
 
 
During numerous intergovernmental commissions’ meetings the representatives of 
Central Asian countries were interested in this transformation process. Nevertheless, all 
these local governments should be aware of not only liberalization and stabilization are 
sufficient for successful transformation but most importantly adequate legislation and 
market institutions must be introduced in Central Asian region. 
The objectives of thesis were to focus and to analyze at institutional changes in Central 
Asian region, as we could see that this region is still under the process of institutional 
building up, the transformation of post-socialist countries is interesting and instructive, 
but also in their specific case institution and political leadership failed short facing the 
challenge of their programs. 
The analysis of development of relations between Central Asian states and Czech 
Republic along with Slovak Republic shows that these countries have not yet come 
close to their potential of cooperation. The dynamics of cooperation demonstrates the 
growth of trade numbers and collaboration links every year. 
As it seen in thesis the EU's foreign and security policy is present in region but more 
effective foreign policy is lead by Chinese government. Indicated data in thesis are 
showing the high numbers of trade between Central Asian countries and China, having 
in mind that EU is presented by many member countries, nevertheless China has a great 
potential in this region. The interests of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic 
are mainly in economic sphere in this thesis are presented information about actual 
projects of cooperation between countries as well as statistics of volume of trade.   
The analysis of relevance of actors in region shows the necessity of EU foreign policy 
new approach in region, which might have dimension not only about the situation in 
Afghanistan after 2014, .but also regarding the Russian policy after Crimea annexation.  
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Another aspect of successful transformation of economies is regional cooperation. The 
first agreements on regional cooperation between Central Asian countries have been 
achieved in 1993. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on measures to 
deepen economic integration, and in January 1994. However, “the process did not 
work” despite periodic statements on the need and the importance of regional 
integration, the countries of Central Asia have not been able to create an effective 
regional organization for several reasons, the key of which is at the political level is the 
unwillingness of the current generation of Central Asian elites to limit the sovereignty 
for the sake of strategic objectives. “Subjective factors”, in particular, the rivalry for 
regional leadership, personal relationships between presidents initially prevented 
recognizing an objective and logical socio-cultural integration. 
For efficient development of countries and value added regional cooperation is 
necessary to liberalize the political and economic levels of governance with greater 
transparency and accountability of the executive branch. Introduce the necessary 
elements of an effective control not only for the development of each country, but also 
as a means to support key aspects of cooperation. Reforms aimed at improving good 
governance should include the reform of public institutions and to address some issues 
related to corruption and governance that promote fruitful cooperation. It should be 
implemented the anti-corruption measures, these programs should be targeted to areas 
that deserve special attention in terms of victims of corruption, government financial 
agencies, including tax and customs agencies, the judiciary, police and border services. 
To participate in regional cooperation and regional organizations to strengthen reforms 
to generate economic and social benefits of integration, this in turn will provide the 
political impetus for further reforms domestically. International organizations should 
support national reforms and promote regional cooperation and integration through joint 
evaluating reforms in accordance with agreed standards and mechanisms for conflict 
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resolution. This support is provided by the European Union, in particular through the 
programs:  
BOMCA
196
, which helps to increase security in the Central Asian region, also assisting 
towards the contribution of legitimate trade and transit, and minimize any kind of the 
illicit trafficking;  
Program DIPECHO
197
 in the field of disaster preparedness covers all five Central Asian 
countries.  
CADAP
198
 helps on identifying actions to address particular problems associated with 
illicit drug issues.  Czech party takes part actively in CADAP is divided into four 
programs DAMOS
199
, MEDISSA
200
, TREAT
201
 and OCAN
202
, one component 
DAMOS run by Czech representatives. 
As well as maintain a network of public organizations, including regional chambers of 
commerce, non-governmental organizations dealing with key issues such as the 
environment, gender, human rights, and so on. For example Slovak chamber of 
commerce and Chamber of trade and commerce of Kazakhstan have cooperation ties; 
also the NGOs of countries are having results of collaboration.  
International community should support national reforms aimed at strengthening the 
accountability and transparency of governments in Central Asia, the eradication of 
                                                             
196 BOMCA – The Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA) is large EU-UNDP assistance program in Central 
Asia 
197
 DIPECHO – Disaster Preparedness ECHO dedicated preparedness, launched in 1996; ECHO has invested more than €255 mil. 
in disaster preparedness. 
198 CADAP – Central Asia Drug Action Program is EU funded program dedicated to assisting the further development of 
effective, comprehensive drug policies in Central Asia.  
199 DAMOS – implemented by ResAd, Czech Republic, to help the governments develop a better understanding of the drug 
trafficking, drug use, misuse and abuse, as well as their consequences in Central Asia. 
200 MEDISSA – implemented by the National Bureau for Drug Prevention (KBPN) Poland, to help the governments prevent 
potential new drug users and reduce the number of current drug addicts by better informing the public of drug usage risks.  
201 TREAT – implemented by Zentrum fur interdisziolinare Suchforschiung of Hamburg University (ZIS), Germany, to support 
the introduction of modern drug addiction treatment methods within the public health system and the prison system. 
202 OCAN – implemented by GIZ, Germany, to help to project management issues of all three specific components.  
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corruption by providing analytical, technical and financial assistance. Promote 
cooperation and support of regional institutions in developing programs at the national 
and local level, including targeted programs for conflict resolution, border management 
and the development of networks of organizations across the region. 
However, for the effective activity of the EU and the international community, 
including the immediate neighbors in the region, bilateral partners and donors, and 
multilateral organizations must not only have common goals, but also to work together. 
This is a challenging task in the context of geopolitical rivalry and differences in 
political systems and the views of the various partners in Central Asia. 
 
This dissertation as is trying to compose an apparently impossibly task: Great Central 
Asian region building up; EU most advanced laboratory of political, economic, 
institutional, social, environmental and cultural and human capital approach because it 
is very special condition of non statehood union, that means partnership between 
sovereign, independent, free countries;  in this large frame the case of Czech and Slovak 
Republics very well interpreter how to connect the past to the future with reverence to 
Central Asia, for countries which has been for a long part of past century into so called 
USSR bloc. 
It is now time in the contemporary history, in international relations theories, in 
transnational and regional cooperation experiences, on the way all over the world to 
make clear the starting point of this dissertation, only EU could become a credible? 
fusible, flexible example and modern for future regional aggregation not only in Europe 
and Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and Asia Pacific quagmire.  
In the last process of EU enlargement still undergoing with the last membership of 
Croatia and ongoing negations with Balkan countries, Central and Eastern Europe had 
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assume a great role and in bridging problems and incapability, cultural and ideological 
barriers historical reason of conflicts, ethnical and language tensions, as nobody could 
have imagine as singing the founding the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
Czech and Slovak republics in this sense are two small laboratories what we have said 
page after page in this dissertation. Climbing this rocky mounting of these challenging 
problems, the main support came to me, defending today this dissertation from the 
personal experience of almost ten years, living, working, studying in these countries. 
Statistically the number appears small. Trade, investment, bilateral agreement, 
European programs, even huge international development projects, could leave the 
great experience of Prague and Bratislava into the fog of the tables, numbers, 
percentage and comparative indexes. But a more careful weighted exam based on a 
wide reference text and reports utilized to this and allows us to conclude that a 
experiences of the last ten years had demonstrated how much in EU small partner had 
be extremely well performing in main policy of the Union.  
If the cornerstone of this dissertation aims and scope of the giving the perspective of the 
“Great Central Asian” regional building up, adopting of the EU non statehood to this 
very different part of Eurasia. The second pillar is related to  a strategic evolution of 
present and future of oil producing countries vis-á-vis alternative energy perspective 
and already experimented new technological alternative to energy production (we 
talking of solar, wind, water, biomass and other small but available sources, nowadays 
usable due to technology advanced).  Both are the follow up of the nuclear energy 
plants experiences and completely new innovation application of hydrogen turbine fuel 
cells, and fall out form these experimental prototypes to the industrial, civil and military 
use.  
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As could be easily imagined we are touching issues that in next 20-30 years will 
completely reshape not only the way of production the logistic of international trade, 
the flows of foreign direct investments but of our societies and the same human being 
role inside of new highly developed but not integrated world.  
Global governance will not proceed at the same speed and then we will assist the 
tension, risk of conflicts and citizens reaction in front of inequality and distribution of 
big change of third industrial revolution. All this said considering that Czech and 
Slovak Republics historically are playing the great mediation and integration role of 
differences not only in politics and economics as well as cultural, scientific, ideological 
and religious multiplicity, we focus the attention of this small scale laboratory to 
explain the EU enlargement as well as the experimental regional cooperation going on 
beyond the enlargement itself, this is the case of Central Asia.   
Of course this ambitious aims and scope of dissertation cannot answer to all the many 
contradictions and work in progress; still going on inside the same EU as the different 
speed institutional building up from one side and many initiatives and attempts to 
converge of these same regional approach conclusions even beyond the possible EU 
enlargement.  
I have collaborated my analysis with data, indexes, long and short term trends, weighted 
and international accepted criteria measurement social factors and outcomes, but I 
understand we need to go further as I have experienced a lacking of really sound, 
comparative, reliable data regarding Central Asian countries in front of the Eurostat 
very “to the point” database.  
I believe this could become my second step of research to which my intellectual efforts. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Position of Tajikistan  Position of Uzbekistan  
1. The transportation issues 
Blocking by Uzbekistan transit trains with 
Tajik cargoes through the ruined railroad 
bridge on the stretch ‘Galaba-Amuzang’ 
allegedly because of “terrorist act”. 
Forced shutdown for a short time on the 
transit of cargo on railway line ‘Galaba-
Amuzang’ was related with the tragic events 
(so called “terroristic act”) whichtook place 
in December 2011 
  
 
Uzbek authorities' refusal to assistance in the 
reconstruction of the Tajik side of the road 
section; reconstruction work in this sector 
has not begun.  
 
As a result of the full deterioration of the 
railway line, which was built more than 50 
years ago, and often repeated accidents do 
not allow to use its throughput capacity by 
more than 10 per cent and further to its the 
safe operation 
A railway line is of vital importance for the 
socio-economic support of Khatlon and 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of 
the Republic of Tajikistan, representing 
nearly three million people. Due to 
transportation blockade inhabitants of these 
areas were left without consumer goods, 
petroleum products, international 
humanitarian aid, including hospitals, 
schools and other social facilities. 
All goods with destination to the Khatlon 
area Tajik railway freely transmitted to other 
parts of the railroad of Tajikistan through 
interstate seam point Kudukli and delays in 
moving cars in this area are not take place. 
2. The gas conflict  
January 5, 2012 Tajikistan signed an 
agreement on a phased delivery of 200 
million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2012. 
In March, the Uzbek side stated that since 
April 1 2012 completely cuts off gas supplies 
to Tajikistan, citing the reason for the 
increase of their exports to Russia and China, 
thereby aggravating tensions supplying the 
population of Tajikistan and industrial 
objects with natural gas. 
“Uztransgaz” fully complied with its 
specified for the current year guaranteed 
contract deliveries of 45 million cubic meters 
natural gas to “Tajiktransgas” and the matter 
is the subject of the interaction of economic 
agents, as is customary in international 
practice. In connection with the operation of 
the Turkmen and Uzbek gas pipeline system 
separately from each other, the transit of 
Turkmen gas through Uzbekistan is not 
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possible. 
3. The transit of electricity 
The Uzbek side for several years already 
absolutely prohibited transit of Turkmen 
electricity across its territory to Tajikistan. 
As a consequence of the Tajik Government is 
forced to introduce strict limit energy 
consumption throughout the country.  
 
Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the "United 
Energy System of Central Asia" is related to 
several factors: 
1. ECO was established during the Soviet 
period as part of the Unified Energy System 
of the USSR and post-Soviet times has shown 
its incapacity. 
2. the lack of effective mechanisms for its 
normal operation, leading to the threat of 
industrial accidents, 
3. Regular unauthorized withdrawals of 
Tajikistan's electricity from neighboring 
countries. 
4. Uzbekistan made this decision following 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 
4. The Rogun HPP 
In recent years, the Uzbek side is trying to 
prevent the construction of the Rogun 
hydroelectric power station on the inland 
waters of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Thus, 
without any consultation with the 
neighboring countries of the Aral Sea, has 
built on its territory dozens of reservoirs, 
which allows it to concentrate large amounts 
of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, thereby 
aggravating the plight of the Aral Sea. Rogun 
HPP in Tajikistan is the construction of the 
century, the money for its construction was 
collected all over the world. Now there is a 
feasibility study for the construction of 
Rogun by the World Bank. 
 Uzbekistan declares "failure of the project" 
construction of the Rogun hydropower plant 
for several reasons: 
1. " Bad choice " area under construction , 
due to its location in the area Ilyaksko Vahsh 
- fault " is characterized by episodic 
catastrophic earthquake of magnitude 9 or 
more on the Richter scale ." In the event of an 
accident at the Rogun hydropower plant, 
according to the Uzbek experts not just say 
this with pages Governmental edition of 
Uzbekistan, the height of the waves rushed 
down with a speed of 130 meters per second, 
will be 100 meters. What would “destroy on 
all other plant and waterworks of Vakh, flood 
dozens of towns and villages in Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, triggering 
unprecedented in its scope and man-made 
environmental disaster in the region of 
Central Asia” 
2. Also, the consequences of operating power 
plant, large-scale drought, famine, and 
disease, displacement of millions of people 
living in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. 
3. The Uzbek side offers Tajikistan instead of 
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the Rogun HPP construction in the upper 
reaches of the Amu Darya complex of small 
hydro power plants, “which absolutely 
exclude all risks and would solve the problem 
of energy supply in Tajikistan efficiently and, 
importantly, much cheaper” 
5. De-mining of joint borders sectors  
On 54 joint border areas by the Uzbek side 
are established mines that threaten the life 
and health of the citizens of both countries. 
Minefields were laid in 1999 without 
notifying the Tajik side and incomplete 
accounting of joint delimitation - 
demarcation. Minefields are not immune and 
not labeled. During this period, these 
minefields. Tajik citizens were killed, among 
them more than 100 civilians, 93 people 
were seriously injured, more than half of 
them are children. These actions contradict 
the Uzbek side for centuries to shape the 
spirit of traditional friendship and good 
neighborly relations between the two nations, 
as well as the generally accepted norms of 
international humanitarian law and the 
majority of international acts. 
 
In the acute phase of the civil war in 
Tajikistan in 1992-1996. Uzbek law 
enforcement bodies have been forced to 
mining (besides the territory of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan) on some high-altitude areas of 
the state border height of at least 3.5 km, 
where there was risk of seepage gangs, as 
well as the uncontrolled flow of drug 
trafficking on the territory of Uzbekistan, as a 
normal communication through concerted 
border areas transition and it does not raise 
any problems on both sides. 
6. The growth of customs tariffs 
 
Uzbekistan unilaterally year significantly 
increases the rate of the fee for the transit 
passenger trains formed Tajik railway. In 
2012, the increase was 60%. It should be 
noted that this is the fourth increase in the 
coefficient of indexation by the Uzbek 
government, which already held a 32% 
increase in the cost of imported goods in 
Tajikistan and have a negative impact on the 
social situation in the country. 
An increase of tariffs is a forced and a 
reprisal for the railway administration in 
Uzbekistan, as the railway administration 
Tajikistan “Roh ohaniTochikiston” for a short 
time at times increased tariffs, namely in 
2011, 3 times, in 2012 - by 40 %. In this case, 
for the same period of the “Uzbekistan 
Railways”, respectively the increase was only 
30 % and 32 %. Tariff increase has been 
affected by the growth of multiple prices for 
rolling stock, spare parts, fuel and lubricants, 
as well as operating costs. 
7. The controversial section of the border - Farhad dam  
 Remain unresolved for many years and the  
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delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-
Uzbek border on its remaining disputed 
sections, in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Agreement between the Republic of 
Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
"State border." In this case, the Uzbek side 
requires the transfer of its property section of 
the border, Farhad dam to the territory. The 
Tajik side sees this as an attempt to annex the 
territory of a sovereign Tajikistan. 
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Field work  
In addition to the research in order to evaluate copperation between countires were 
prepared the quitionarre for few interviewers, among them: 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czech Republic to the Republic 
of Kazakhstan JUDr. Bedřich Kopecký. 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the 
Czech Republic Anarbek Karashev 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Republic 
of Kazakhstan Dušan Podhorsky 
Leading expert of the Agency of the Slovak Foreign Policy Ivo Samson 
 
Personal interview with Dušan Podhorsky. 26.04.2013 
His Excellency D. Podhorsky during the conversation in Bratislava commented the 
policies and cooperation issues. 
- K.Maksut: What are the priorities of Slovak Foreign policy in Central Asia? 
- D.Podhorsky: Slovak Foreign policy in region has same agenda as EU foreign 
policy, with particular interest in new market due to potential of import, because 
these countries produce only 5% of products and import 95 % of product from 
abroad. All these countries are resource oriented, for example Kyrgyzstan has 
only one factory.  Slovak business community has interest in joint companies, 
and technical assistance.  
- In 2013 is 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Slovakia and Kazakhstan, what are objectives of the strengthening cooperation? 
- First of all the area of nuclear physics, the certification assistance, educational 
programs, security training programs, medical training, medical tourism, science 
and technologies. In Slovakia and Czech Republic are excellent centers for 
cancer treatments, Kazakhstan is the second in the world according to its 
uranium resources, we can provide technologies and assistance to build up this 
industry. Cooperation of Czech and Kazakhs are improving in automobile 
industry due to Skoda factory.    
- In your opinion are there any major challenges for implementing the EU regional 
policy in Central Asia? 
- In my opinion the corruption, clan- based governance, government-business 
relations,  the influence of other actors as Turkey (having neo-Osmanic or Neo-
Ottoman ambitions in region, would like to bring together all Turkic speaking 
nations,), of course China, SCO and its military cooperation ties.  
- Are there any determination how the evaluation of cooperation is done and 
how the results are analyzed and applied? 
- The presence and successful work of joint companies, the effective work of 
intergovernmental organizations, the opening and functioning of all Vyšehrad 
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countries embassies in Kazakhstan, the increase of students’ mobility number. I 
would like to mention that if Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will continue in their 
nationalistic policies I think it won’t bring any improvement in political dialogue 
between Slovak Republic and Czech Republic; because we do not like 
nationalistic tendencies bring up in policy making.  
- Thank you very much for your interview Your Excellency  
 
   
Personal interview with Ivo Samson 13.12.2013 
 
I.Samson during the conversation in Bratislava regarding cooperation between countries 
commented following:  
 
- In my opinion for Slovak and Czech diplomats Kazakhstan is most perspective 
dialogue partner in Central Asia.  
- The Russian speaking generation of businessmen is able to do business in these 
countries.  
- For Central Asian countries could be interesting to study our experience of 
joining EU by implementing major institutional changes in country.  
- Slovak and Czech experts are ready to provide any assistance to their counter 
partners in Central Asia.  
 
 
Other three interviews did not reply to any questions and did not provide 
information.  
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TABLE 18:  
According to data of European Comission the statistics of trade between EU and CA: 
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This information provided by World Bank indicators. 
TABLE 19:  
1. Kazakhstan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net 
outflows (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
 
 
TABLE 20: 
2. Kyrgyz Republic - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net 
outflows (% of GDP) 
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TABLE 21: 
 
3. Tajikistan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, 
current US$) 
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TABLE 22: 
 
4. Turkmenistan - Foreign direct investment foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$) 
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TABLE 23: 
 
5. Uzbekistan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$) 
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TABLE 24: 
 
Slovak Republic - Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 
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TABLE 25: 
 
Czech Republic - Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 
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